

**SHEKU
BAYOH
INQUIRY**

The Sheku Bayoh Public Inquiry

Witness Statement

Craig Finnie

**Taken by [REDACTED] on 30th August 2023 at Bilston Glen, Area Control
Room.**

Witness details and employment history

1. My name is Craig Finnie. My date of birth is [REDACTED] 1971. My details are known to the Inquiry.
2. I am providing my answers in relation to the position of training as at 2015. Where I am able to comment on the position as at today's date, I have specifically stated this in my statement.
3. I am currently the Chief Inspector for Governance and Improvement within C3 Division. I have been in this current role for 13 months. Overall, I have 26 years police service.
4. I am asked to provide a summary of my history within Police Scotland. I joined the police in February 1997. I first served as a probationary Constable in

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uniformed response duties in Midlothian, working in Loanhead, Penicuik, and Dalkeith. I remained in the uniformed response role until June 2002. Between June 2002 and May 2005, I performed the role of Detective Constable (DC) in the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in E Division, which at that time covered Mid-Lothian, East Lothian, West Lothian and the Scottish Borders. From May 2005 until January 2010, I worked in [REDACTED] based at [REDACTED]. During this period, I was promoted to Sergeant on the 17th April 2006.

5. Following a substantive promotion to Inspector in January 2010, I started as a uniformed Inspector in response policing at Craigmillar police station. At the time, I covered the Craigmillar, St Leonard's, Portobello and Howdenhall areas of Edinburgh. In June 2011 I moved into St Leonard's headquarters and took up the role of intelligence manager for Edinburgh division. Following the formation of Police Scotland in 2013/2014, I transitioned from the divisional intelligence manager role across to the Area Control Room, at Bilston Glen, where during the summer of 2014 I attended the Initial Tactical Firearms Commander ('ITFC') course.
6. I attended the ITFC course from 21st to 25th of July 2014, in Kent, which was hosted by Kent Police Force. At the time, that was an external course because there was no availability within Police Scotland, which was not unusual at that time. This allowed me to attend an ITFC course as quickly as possible after commencing in C3 Division. I passed that course successfully. From the 29th September to 1st October 2014 I attended a training course on the System for Tasking Operational Resource Management (STORM) Command and Control System, which was held at Fettes Police Headquarters, Edinburgh. I successfully passed the course, which was a necessary component of my learning and development to become a Duty Officer or ITFC within C3 division. Once you have attended your initial ITFC training course you are 'occupationally' competent as an ITFC. To become operationally and occupationally competent as an ITFC you then have to complete at least two or three live incidents to achieve this status. The operational competence is

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completed once you have been shadowed by a more experienced ITFC who was already occupationally and operationally competent. Once I had demonstrated competence in the role, a memorandum was submitted to the Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) with responsibility for the armed policing portfolio. The ACC will personally endorse the memorandum, which is retained by armed policing policy and compliance unit. Once this process is complete, you are authorised to perform the role of ITFC without supervision. This was completed with regards to me during the latter part of 2014.

7. Moving into 2015, I was performing the role of Duty Officer/ITFC at Bilston Control Room.
8. I have not worked anywhere else in C3 Division as an ITFC other than the Area Control Room (ACR) located at Bilston Glen in Midlothian. Between 2015 and 2019 I performed various roles at Bilston Glen including the ITFC role and the deputy local area commander, which, as the name would suggest, is the deputy for the Chief Inspector. In December 2019 I was temporarily promoted to Chief Inspector within the ACR at Bilston. I held that position until January 2022, where I then reverted back to the rank of Inspector. In June 2022 I commenced an additional period as a temporary Chief Inspector before being substantively promoted to Chief Inspector in September 2022.
9. I remain in the rank of Chief Inspector at this time. From June 2022, I performed the role of temporary Chief Inspector in the Governance and Improvement department and remain there to date. I am Chief Inspector in Governance and Improvement for C3 Division, not just Bilston. The post is a national post and ensures that the governance and improvement of all the process and practice within C3 Division meets legislative requirement and Police Scotland's values and standards.

Role of ITFC

10. I have been asked to give a basic definition of what the role of an ITFC is. The role of the ITFC deals with the policing response to incidents that are declared

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as a firearms incident. It can be viewed, in isolation, as very narrow, very linear. You are responsible for commanding the response to declared firearms incidents, where the threshold for the deployment of firearms officers has been met. This responsibility rests with the ITFC. That can be very subjective, but if I decide that the threat presented by a spontaneous incident necessitates the deployment of firearms officers, then that is my decision and my decision alone. Nobody else can instruct me to do that. So, when on duty it can be a very lonely and demanding place. In the early stages of your ITFC career, you may have a more experienced colleague on duty at a similar time and have the opportunity to discuss the situation and take their advice and guidance. However, in my experience this situation was very rare, and you were required to make accurate decisions in a dynamic setting. The initial decisions taken are by me and are my responsibility alone.

11. You have support from a firearms tactical advisor and the Strategic Firearms Commander, who are always at the end of the phone should there be adequate time for meaningful discussion to take place. Given the dynamic and fast-moving pace of firearms incidents this is generally unachievable in the initial stages when dealing with the circumstances presented to you. Once you have formulated and implemented your initial response, you would look to update and take advice from the firearms tactical advisor and Strategic Firearms Commander at the earliest opportunity.

Training to become ITFC.

12. I am referred to a copy of my SCOPE training record (**PS18799**). I have been asked to identify the training modules that I had to complete in order to become an ACR Inspector/ITFC. In my opinion, one of the key fundamentals in preparation for the role of Duty Officer/ITFC is strong experience in general policing. A lot of the decisions you are asked to make are critical and occur during fast time, fast-moving incidents. There are courses which you must pass, for example the ITFC course but in terms of the overall development of an

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individual as a Duty Officer/ITFC, one of the key criteria in training, in my opinion, is a broad range of previous policing experience and knowledge.

13. I certainly found that the areas that I had worked in before coming to C3 Division, for example, in response Policing, [REDACTED], CID and the Divisional Intelligence office provided a very good foundation from many spheres of policing, which were put to good use in the role of Duty Officer/ITFC. The role of Duty Officer and ITFC are very distinct. You do not need to be an ITFC to deal with everything else that may occur whilst performing the role of Duty Officer, but you must be an ITFC to deal with firearms incidents.
14. I have been asked if I can indicate the specific training modules that I have completed during my career, which allowed me to become an ACR Inspector/ITFC as at the date 3 May 2015. The list of completed courses within my training record assist in achieving the broad range of operational policing experience I have commented on above. The mentoring module which I have recently completed in July 2023 is a positive module for the role of a Duty Officer/ITFC.
15. The only course that I had to complete in advance of assuming the post as ACR Inspector was the ITFC course. This is a must pass course to allow you to perform the role of ITFC. Once you are occupationally and operationally competent, you must attend a designated amount of training inputs each year to maintain this status.
16. In order to maintain your competence as an ITFC, you must command at least 2 live firearms incidents each year in addition to attending 12 hours training per annum. The 12 hours training consists of 6 hours nationally mandated refresher training from the College of Policing and 6 hours 'in force' for the Security, Threat and Risk Assessment (STRA) refresher training. The training is generally delivered at Jackton or the Police College at Tulliallan. Corruption Prevention training, which is detailed on my training record, ensures that I am aware of current process and policy in this area to meet the demands of the rank of Inspector as well as I can. This course is not specific to the role of ITFC. As the Duty Officer you have responsibility for a lot of people, and you need to

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make sure that you are in a position to deal with and address any corruption allegations should they arise. The operational safety training is maintained from an operational policing perspective because at times you may be required to work out with the C3 environment, for example in response policing/events management etc. and a requirement for this is to maintain your officer safety training. Bespoke arrangements for this were implemented during the COVID pandemic and not explained in any further detail here.

17. I am asked whether, as at the 3rd of May 2015, if all Inspectors in the Area Control Rooms of C3 Division had to be trained as an ITFC. Police Scotland operated the model whereby all Duty Officers would be an ITFC. This was the model in place when I commenced in 2014/2015 and remained so during my time as a Duty Officer/ITFC. If you did not pass the ITFC course to become occupationally competent, then your role of Duty Officer would have stopped at that point. It was very much the case that you had to successfully pass the ITFC course. You were required to be an occupationally and operationally competent ITFC to be a Duty Officer. In theory, you could have an Inspector as a Duty Officer who is not qualified to command firearms incidents, but may be a very, very experienced Inspector and police officer, and would be more than capable of dealing with every other type of incident that may happen on a daily basis, but they would then be restricted from doing that complete portfolio. You would need to have a hybrid model with more than one Inspector on duty. Given the dynamic nature of firearms incidents specifically, the Inspector responsible for managing that incident needs to attend to it without delay and progress an appropriate response.
18. I am asked whether there was a Duty Officer who may not be qualified as an ITFC that would be used for other duties, for example managing resources. When I started in 2014-2015, I held the substantive rank of Inspector, and you were working at that point in C3 Division. I was working full rotating shifts, and I was aligned to a similar shift pattern as Inspector Steven Stewart. So, I was in a position, before being qualified as an ITFC, to manage a policing response to all incidents other than firearms incidents that may have occurred during the

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shift. For example, [REDACTED], assaults, murders, operational policing matters. I was more than capable of leading on the response to such incidents. You would have a hybrid model where we would be on duty together and if a firearms job commenced, prior to me being operationally competent, I would observe Inspector Stewart command firearms incidents, so you were performing the Duty Officer role, but not having the ITFC responsibility. Once I had achieved operational competence as an ITFC, you no longer required duality of resource. You can just have one person doing everything.

19. I am asked if I am aware of the position now and if it is now mandatory that an Inspector within the ACR has to be ITFC qualified. Yes, that remains the case. You still want that model where the Duty Officer is the ITFC, and there have been occasions where if people have not passed the ITFC role, then they are repopulated elsewhere within policing, for example local policing divisions. I do not believe there is currently any Inspector in the area control rooms in C3 Division that is performing the role of Duty Officer and is not in the process of becoming a fully qualified ITFC. All the Duty Officers are currently or are in the process of becoming occupationally and operationally competent.
20. I am asked if they might start as a Duty Officer and then very quickly get sent to the ITFC training course. Yes. There are a finite amount of ITFC training courses annually. The preferred model is that newly appointed Inspectors into C3 Division attend their ITFC course as soon as possible. In 2015 there was greater flexibility in transferring officers between divisions, which in some cases allowed Inspectors to attend their ITFC course before commencing their new post in C3 Division. Given the demands on the training schedules, the time between arriving in C3 Division and attending the ITFC course can vary. Currently within Police Scotland, there are agreed transfer dates for people moving between divisions. These dates do not always correspond to the training dates for ITFC courses, which can provide varying times between individuals arriving in C3 Division and the availability to attend an ITFC course in Police Scotland. It is still the case that Inspectors arriving in C3 Division can attend courses hosted in other parts of the United Kingdom and this is always

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considered as an alternative where the lack of availability in Police Scotland courses exists. In 2023, there is less flexibility in allowing officers to attend training courses in advance of them commencing in C3 Division due to overall operational demand. It is generally the case in 2023 that the Inspector starts working in C3 Division and then attends their ITFC course as quickly thereafter as possible. Once they have attended and passed the ITFC course C3 continue to develop them as an individual to be competent in performing the role of Duty Officer/ITFC. As mentioned earlier, each individual will shadow a qualified ITFC before running live incidents whilst being mentored by the qualified ITFC to achieve 'sign off' as operationally competent. The duration of their mentorship and number of incidents completed before sign off will vary between individuals. In 2015 I observed 2 incidents run by a qualified ITFC and then commanded 2 incidents under their supervision before gaining operational competence. Given the serious nature of the role that you are performing, an individual will achieve operational sign off at the appropriate time. You do not rush an individual's development when considered against the threat and risk presented by the management of live firearms incidents. There is dialogue between the mentor, mentee, and the Chief Inspector on a continual basis to make sure that the individual is ready and comfortable to be operationally signed off and work alone.

21. I am asked if I am still involved in the practical operational side of the ACR. No, I am not. C3 as a division has evolved significantly since 2015. You have the service centres, the Area Control Rooms, and the Resolution Team together with additional departmental functions assisting in the management of the division. The Governance and Improvement department manages policy and process to ensure appropriate response to external scrutiny, for example HMICS reports to ensure divisional policy is in line with current legislation and Police Scotland priorities. C3 Division strive to deliver the highest possible standards to our partners, stakeholders, the public and communities we serve. Governance and Improvement department manage, amongst other tasks, notable incidents, and quality assurance work, which have evolved from

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previous recommendations made in the 2015 and 2018 HMICS reviews of the Division.

22. I am asked if it is necessary to have an awareness of the officers working in local policing divisions. Yes. The officer safety equipment provided to response and community officers are your handcuffs, your baton, and your CS (or PAVA) spray. Every officer attends an officer safety training course, which also provides every officer with emergency life support training. Every officer must pass this course to be operationally deployable. You are re-certified on an annual basis so that you are authorised by the Chief Constable in the use of your personal protective equipment during operational deployments. For example, the arrest of an individual where the requirement to use PAVA, handcuffs or your baton may have arisen.
23. Being officer safety trained is distinct from the role of an ITFC, but absolutely necessary for your role as a response police officer. Officers in C3 Division could be deployed at any time to go and work on a parade or on a demonstration etc. outside of C3 Division. You would be deployed as an operational officer and, for those Inspectors who are deployed, not as an ITFC.
24. Many of the other training courses I have attended, for example the stop-and-search module, are again relevant to the response policing function and not specifically relevant to the role of ITFC.
25. As an ITFC, all of your operational deployments and training records will be held on Chronicle. My qualification as an ITFC has expired and this will be recorded on Chronicle.
26. I am asked if the firearms command refresher training was on an annual basis. Yes. You had to attend mandatory training each year. To maintain the role of ITFC, you are required to attend 12 hours training per year, which consisted of 6 hours nationally mandated refresher training from the College of Policing, and 6 hours in force for the security threat and risk assessment, which was called STRA training. This refresher training is in addition to the completion of two live firearms authorisations annually as detailed above. This was required to

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maintain your ITFC qualification. So, the entries on here would align to six hours nationally for each particular area and are now registered on Chronicle.

27. The training and operational deployments for each ITFC in C3 division, to maintain your ITFC qualification is as detailed above. The training, as explained is broken down to 6 hours nationally mandated refresher training from the College of Policing and 6 hours in force for the security threat and risk assessment, which was called STRA training. Elements of the training are nationally mandated because the role of ITFC is a national qualification. The management of a firearms incident across the United Kingdom (UK) will follow the same process. If a requirement for Police Scotland officers to deploy elsewhere in the UK arose, the management of the incident would be similar to that of an ITFC running an incident in Scotland. It is a national qualification so that is why there is six hours of nationally mandated refresher training. This training will cover any changes to the national portfolio, which is relevant to every ITFC in the United Kingdom.
28. We also had the College of Policing and six hours in the STRA training, which was more locally based and covered local trends and dynamics. For example, in 2015, there was a lot of global unrest from terrorist activity. Training would focus on appropriate responses to any incidents which may be perpetrated by terrorist organisations.
29. All our training was very relevant to me whilst performing the ITFC role. As I moved to other areas of responsibility there was no requirement to maintain my ITFC qualification and attend the training courses. My training record becomes more generic and most of the entries are not specifically tailored to the role of ITFC but maintained by personal continual professional development. Much of this was completed on the 'Moodle' platform, which is an e-learning site on the Police Scotland Intranet. For example, the My Career e-learning is a Moodle platform course which you complete during your working day. It is incumbent on me as an individual to make time to complete all relevant learning courses so that my knowledge is current and relevant to policing demands. The CVF learning platform is relevant to my own and my colleagues' promotion

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aspirations and a thorough knowledge of this was required. Most recently, I have attended the Your Leadership Matters courses and were implemented by [REDACTED] when she commenced in Police Scotland.

30. I am asked if back on 3 May 2015 if there were any elements of my training that I felt as an ITFC were lacking. No, I do not believe this to be the case. I received adequate training and support at all times.
31. I am asked if the ITFC training course has been updated since 2015. Yes. The training curriculum has changed since I attended in 2015. During my training the wording used by Police Scotland when formulating and communicating your threat, risk, harm and working strategy differed from the rest of the United Kingdom. In general terms we would articulate the need to maximise the safety of members of the public and minimise the risk to attending police officers. Police Scotland memorandum PS 30/21 dated the 8th of April 2021 amended the working practice of Police Scotland's ITFCs to provide a consistent working policy across the United Kingdom. The revised wording when formulating a working strategy was implemented from the 1st of April 2021. Following this Police Scotland ITFCs revised their terminology and would maximise the safety of attending police officers and minimise the risk to members of the public. The rationale for this policy change is articulated in the Police Scotland memorandum PS 30/21. Additionally, the content of the course and assessments were extended to cover a response to a terrorist related incident. I know this particular incident was not declared as a firearms incident. Had the incident in 2015 been declared a firearms incident, the ITFC, Inspector Stewart, would have been responsible for creating the Threat and Risk assessment and working strategy and commanding the incident until all aspects of his working strategy had been met.
32. Additionally, the naming convention for deployed tactics for firearms officers were changed. When I was trained as an ITFC, I used specific terminology when deploying tactics for armed officers, which was consistent nationally. During 2020 revised terminology was adopted nationally when deploying armed officers. This was briefed to all firearms commanders in November 2020 and

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implemented effective from the 9th December 2020. The terminology for deployment remains the same to date. So, were it to be the case I was required to go back to performing the role of an ITFC or, indeed, tactical firearms commander, I would have to complete the full ITFC training course again. As I am no longer occupationally and operationally competent as an ITFC, I could not be contacted and instructed to perform the role of ITFC at short notice due to, for example, resourcing challenges or operational demand. I would require to re attend a training course and go through the process of being singed off as operationally competent as detailed above before re-deployment as an ITFC could take place.

- 33.** This is a strict Police Scotland policy. The training curriculum has changed to meet current process, policy, and procedure. The purpose of the course is to test you in a controlled environment. You are put under pressure and are tested in a scenario-based training environment. It is very challenging and is a very demanding course. In my opinion it is one of the hardest courses I have ever done.
- 34.** I am asked if we watch a qualified ITFC deal with a live firearms incident first before dealing with a live incident ourselves under supervision. This was the case when I started in 2014 and remains the same now. I shadowed two incidents that were managed by Inspector Stewart who was my colleague/mentor at the time and watched him command two firearms incidents, and then I would command two firearms incidents under his direction. Once I had completed 2 live incidents to a satisfactory standard, I submitted a memorandum to the ACC holding the firearms portfolio. My submission was considered by the ACC and signed personally by them confirming my appointment as an occupationally and operationally competent ITFC. I was then permitted to perform the role of ITFC on my own without supervision.
- 35.** I am asked how many years 'senior' Inspector Stewart was when I came into post at Bilston. I do not specifically know how many years he had been qualified as an ITFC but knew he was a qualified ITFC and was suitable for the role of training and mentoring me.

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- 36. Since moving away from my ACR Duty Officer/ITFC role in C3 Division, I have not maintained my qualification as a qualified ITFC due to performing different roles in the Division. The ITFC role demands regular deployment as an ITFC to maintain the required skillset. I've not been deployed as an ITFC since 2019 when I was temporarily promoted to Chief Inspector as my role became more managerial.
- 37. The current ITFC training course provided by Police Scotland is held at Jackton. The course is run by Armed Policing division and lasts for 8 days. As mentioned earlier in my statement, the course content continually evolves to meet operational demand and requirements. Students undergo assessments at the end of the course, which must be passed successfully to complete the course and achieve occupational competence and achieve operational competence as described earlier in my statement. An Inspector will not be deployed alone as an ITFC until this process has been completed, which is the same in 2023 as was the case in 2015.

Composition of Area Control Room

- 38. The area control room at Bilston and all other sites in C3 Division is split into 2 main component parts: the Overview and the Area Control Room. During my deployment as an ITFC, the Overview would be resourced with an Inspector known as the Duty Officer/ITFC, an experienced Sergeant, an intelligence officer, and a communications officer. The Sergeant would be an experienced officer who would assist me during the management of ongoing dynamic/serious incidents. The intelligence officer, also referred to as the Research and Intelligence Desk (RAID) officer would support ongoing incidents through interrogation of police systems and open source systems in support of any ongoing incident. The communications officer is a member of police staff with responsibility for communicating with internal and external partners and logging appropriate entries on STORM during the management of the incident. In my experience, the resource in East Overview at Bilston did not exceed 4

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people at any time for normal operational duties. Whilst other officers may have used ICT available in the office, they were seldom involved in the management of incidents with me. This resource model is scalable and could be increased to meet demands from high-risk incidents, for example the response to any terrorist related activity. The resource complement in the Area Control Room (ACR) would be managed separately from East Overview, where I would endeavour to maintain controller numbers between 25 to 30 where achievable. This was known as the OBL (Operating Base Level). The controllers were required to resource a dedicated number of radio channels in support of operational activity. Additionally, I would look to have 4 Sergeants/police staff supervisors in the ACR to supervise the controllers.

39. I am told that other witnesses to the Inquiry have said that the ideal number of people within the Overview at one time may be six but have also heard that sometimes due to resourcing that might be four. I am asked what the ideal number of staff I would like to work with is and indeed what the reality is. As discussed above, I have provided my understanding of the resourcing model for the Area Control Room and Overview, which is the same in 2023 as it was in 2015. In 2015 I never operated with six people in Overview, it was always an expectation to try and achieve four people in Overview.
40. I am asked whether the RAID officer would be within the Area Control Room (ACR) No. The RAID officer would be located in the Overview room in support of myself as detailed above.
41. The Overview and ACR resourcing picture would fluctuate based on availability of controllers, annual leave, and absence. I worked with the resource management unit (RMU) to review, and risk assess the deployment of controllers and Overview staff. There was always a very determined effort to adequately resource the Area Control Room to allow for the efficient management of ongoing incidents. Any reduction in controller numbers could have a detrimental impact on the efficient management of the incidents. Within the Overview I always strived to have the complement of four. So, that was

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myself, a Sergeant, intelligence officer and a communications officer, and that, for me, was really critical in the management of fast-moving dynamic incidents.

- 42.** I am asked to confirm whether those are the key individuals that you require within Overview for an incident to be managed effectively. I am further asked whether it could ever be less than this as at 2015. It would depend on many factors. For example, absence, annual leave, and availability, so were it to be the case where you had, maybe, a shortage of Sergeants in the area control room, I would make a decision as to the best deployment model for the Sergeants. This may dictate that I do not have a Sergeant in Overview, preferring to have a full complement of Sergeants in the ACR. I would always try to ensure the ACR had a sufficiency of Sergeants on duty at any one time. I would then choose to have an experienced Constable, if necessary, in the Overview, assisting me. Predominantly that role, whether it is a Sergeant or an experienced Constable, would be to phone back the individual to obtain further detailed information about the incident. An experienced officer, with good questioning skills can facilitate that for me. The Sergeant in Overview, was not generally required for any staff welfare. Their priorities were to support me in the management of fast-moving dynamic incidents.
- 43.** I am asked to clarify what I mean. When I was on shift, I would always try to ensure that Overview had four people in it as described above. The make-up of the four people would be slightly different depending on available resources. I would always strive have four people in Overview. There were occasions where that was not achieved due to absence, annual leave, and other resource commitments (event rooms etc.), but my preference was that I always had sufficient resource in Overview because we dealt with the most serious of incidents. When significant incidents happen, you have very little time to react, and I think it is really quite crucial to get that across. The speed at which these incidents move is furious, and it was very important that you have colleagues helping you out with that, feeding information into you, as well as working for you. Once you got to know your colleagues, they got to know how I would work. I got to know how they would work and when an incident started there was

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minimal requirement for me to provide verbal instruction because they knew their roles. You would see that the room goes very quiet, and they know what is expected of them by me, and they would be working to deliver what I needed to manage that incident.

- 44.** I am asked whether I am aware of the composition of Overview now. The model for the Overview room today mirrors the model in 2015. The overall complement of Inspectors in the East in 2015 was ten in total, and the complement now of Inspectors remains ten in total. You have your Chief Inspector and ten Inspectors. One of those Inspectors will hold the role of Deputy Local Area Commander. They deputise for the Chief Inspector in their absence and have a primary role of resource management and recruitment. This leaves nine Inspectors available, distributed between the five teams. C3 Division operate a 5-team model across the area control rooms nationally. Four of the teams will have two allocated Inspectors with one team having one allocated Inspector.
- 45.** It may be the case that the two Inspectors would be on duty at the same time but there was a lot of other responsibilities to perform. For example, events planning, operations planning, staffing matters, etc. Generally, you would not have two Inspectors available as ITFCs all the time because one of the Inspectors would be concentrating on other matters and not to ongoing incidents. The dynamic of the overall supervisory footprint back in 2015 for the ACR at Bilston was fundamentally different to now. At the weekends and out of office hours, the Duty Officer/ITFC was responsible for the management and welfare of the ACR as well as the service centre and would be expected to spend time, where appropriate, engaging with staff in each area. The resourcing model in 2015 was similar to current day but has seen a significant uplift in overall numbers.
- 46.** I am asked how many people I would generally be in charge of and how that would be made up in terms of different positions. Within Overview the model is the same. You have your Duty Officer. You have your Sergeant, your intelligence officer, and your communications officer. Some teams you will have your second Inspector who may or may not be doing additional duties that day.

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The Area Control room is resourced in a similar manner now when compared to 2015 as detailed earlier in my statement.

Purpose of the Overview Room

47. I am asked what the purpose of the Overview room was and why it was created as distinct from the main Area Control Room. Initially, in 2014/2015, you were all down on the same floor as the service centre and the ACR. It was a very noisy environment. You need calm, you need peace when dealing with critical incidents, so the decision was taken to repurpose the Overview to a stand-alone room on a different floor at Bilston. I cannot recall exactly when this happened. In 2015, at the time of this incident, Overview had been moved up the stairs to the stand-alone room. That was, I think, a positive move because you can, in essence, shut the door. Nobody gets in. You are free to manage the incidents as necessary away from distractions. The Service Centre and the Area Control Room is a noisy environment with background noise caused by people talking on the radios and telephones. To remove that distraction and have Overview sterile from that was a very positive move.
48. I am asked whether the purpose of the Overview Room has changed since 2015. The Overview function remains the same now as was the case in 2015.

Grading of calls

49. I am asked if, as at 2015, it would only be a certain grade of call that would be escalated up to Overview. Yes. In 2015 Police Scotland operated a default grading structure based on the type of incident created by the service advisor in the service centre. Incident types would be automatically graded as a Grade 1, 2, 3 and so on based on the incident type. For example, a firearms incident, abduction, suspicious incident, robbery, major incident would be automatically graded as a grade 1 call. This list is not exhaustive and other incident types would also be graded automatically as a grade 1 call. Such incidents would

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appear on my 'Overview filter' in STORM. When an incident was tagged for the attention of Overview, the STORM Command and Control system had the capability to automatically and manually apply an incident tag called 'Overview' which would appear on the main screen I would monitor in STORM. There are different filters you can view in STORM and I mainly concentrated on the Overview filter for the east. Each controller in the ACR would have their filter open for whether it was Edinburgh or the geographical area they were responsible for. Overview staff would monitor multiple filters including the Overview filters. The Overview filter would contain the more high-risk, high-profile incidents for my attention. Certainly, anything coming in that was a firearms incident would come straight onto the Overview filter, and it would be very visible to the Duty Officer sitting there.

- 50. I am asked if a firearms incident would automatically be graded as grade 1. Yes, it would.
- 51. I am asked what sort of incidents might be graded as a grade 1. I have provided detail of some grade 1 incidents above. As at 2015 some examples of grade 1 incidents were - firearms incident, abduction, suspicious incident, robbery, major incidents, or vehicle pursuits. This list is not exhaustive.
- 52. Incidents on the Overview filter and those graded 1 and 2 are the type of incidents I would monitor closely and would want to know about as quickly as possible as it may be necessary for me to be involved and exert a degree of command for the incident.
- 53. An example of some grade 2 incidents would be abandoned 999 calls, assault, aviation incident, child protection, concern for people, missing persons. Again this list is not exhaustive. Some grade 2 incidents may escalate into something that I need to know about but, the general consensus was, at that time, that was suitable for a controller down the stairs, whether that be a police officer or police staff member, and a Sergeant to manage without the intervention of Overview. However, the capacity to escalate an incident to Overview existed at any time. For example, you could have an assault which comes in as: "Someone has just been assaulted." You may then get further information that

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they have been assaulted with a large machete. This information may change the dynamic of the policing response and then come up to Overview because of that escalation in risk for assessment by me.

- 54.** I am asked whether that is then tagged as “potentially lethal weapon” or is it actually changed on the system from being a Grade 2 to a Grade 1. Controllers had autonomy to increase the grading of an incident to ensure an appropriate response in relation to the risk presented from the incident. So, you could upgrade an incident from a 2 to a 1, but controllers were not allowed to downgrade an incident from a 1 to a 2 unless you had a supervisor’s permission. The Sergeants I worked with in 2015 were very experienced Sergeants, as was the supervisor. They understood my expectations and from looking at an incident if the threshold for escalation to Overview had been met. As I mentioned earlier on, every officer has a baton, handcuffs and, as it was at the time, CS/PAVA, incapacitant spray. They would determine if the allocation of response officers was suitable to manage the threat and risk presented by the incident or if it required assessment by an ITFC to deploy a firearms resource.
- 55.** I was very lucky with the Sergeants I had on my particular team. They were very good at looking at incidents and deciding on an appropriate response to positively resolve the incident from a policing perspective and public safety aspect. They would, if necessary, upgrade the incident and bring it to my attention. They would phone up to Overview, which would be answered by Overview staff, who would alert me to the incident for review.
- 56.** I am asked if I can explain the ‘Overview tag’. My working knowledge in STORM was sufficient to perform the Duty Officer role, but I would accept that I do not have a good working knowledge of some of the more technical aspects of the STORM system. There are various tags that you could apply to incidents to assist in their management. Some incidents had tags applied automatically by the system, for example concern for people, missing persons, firearms incidents, abductions. Some would auto-tag to come into Overview because clearly the risk in a concern for, or a missing person enquiry may escalate

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quickly, and oversight from myself was necessary at times. Such incidents would appear on the Overview filter without having to be upgraded by a controller or a supervisor. They would apply the relevant tag to the incident if necessary. It then automatically appears on my screen, and I would be in a position to review the incident rather than having to tab through various other incident lists appropriate to geographical areas.

57. I am asked if a call could be upgraded from a Grade 2 to Grade 1 where information and or intelligence comes in that would allow it to be upgraded. Yes this could be done. I am asked why I might tag something with the Overview tag. I am not able to comment on the content of the training that was provided to controllers in 2015 as that was not part of my responsibility. Threat, risk, and vulnerability were significant factors in assessing every incident we commanded. The general process with looking at the risk assessment of an incident was “Can that be dealt with by response policing and, if not, why not?” If it was not suitable for response officers then as the Duty Officer, I would look at potentially making alternative arrangements for the deployment of specialist resources to the incident. For example, public order, firearms, roads policing etc. This assessment can be the result of a re-read of the incident if further information becomes available, or once officers arrive at scene, for example, the airwave transmissions from attending officers may provide a completely different perspective on that incident and it is necessary to alter our deployment plan at that point.
58. During the 2015 His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland (HMICS) Independent Assurance review of Police Scotland call handling report, recommendation 24 provided that:

“Police Scotland should adopt a more formalised risk and vulnerability assessment model for service advisors, reflecting this in both general and specialised awareness training”.

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In response to this recommendation the Contact Assessment Model (CAM) was implemented across Police Scotland between June 2019 and September 2020.

- 59.** It removed default system generated incident grading (as detailed above) as a deployment option, with all decisions on incident grading based on a Threat, Harm, Risk, Investigative opportunity, Vulnerability, and third-party Engagement (THRIVE) assessment. The Contact Assessment Model program was a key project within the Serving a Changing Scotland Strategy and a key component in delivering on Police Scotland's strategic objective to improve public contact, engagement, and service. As an organisation focused on addressing vulnerability, CAM has allowed Police Scotland to make a more enhanced assessment regarding the needs of the caller (public and partners) based on a THRIVE assessment to identify and direct the most appropriate and proportionate policing response at first point of contact. The C3 Division workforce has been empowered and enabled to deliver a service tailored to the needs of the individual caller, undertaking an enhanced assessment of the caller's needs and any associated risks to improve decision making regarding the dispatch of officers and permit a greater resolution of non-urgent matters at the first point of contact.
- 60.** The legacy incident call grading system detailed earlier in this statement was replaced by the incident grading of:
- 61.** Immediate attendance - Where circumstances dictate that there is a threat to life, property or an ongoing incident that requires a dynamic policing response. An ACR controller would be expected to allocate and deploy a divisional resource to the incident within 15 minutes.
- 62.** Prompt attendance - crime /incident where there is a degree of urgency required and a scheduled response is not appropriate based on the THRIVE assessment, dispatched as soon as possible. An ACR controller would be expected to allocate and deploy a divisional resource to the incident within 40 minutes.

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- 63. Standard resolution - crimes /incidents which will not be prejudiced by a scheduled response, with police attendance being at a mutually agreeable time. This includes incidents which may be of a criminal nature but deemed suitable for a local policing appointment or direct crime recording and where the THRIVE assessment indicates that the matter is of low risk and there are no obvious immediate lines of enquiry.

Tagging of calls

- 64. I am asked to provide an example of where a Grade 1 incident would go automatically to Overview. In 2015 and 2023, examples of incidents that would be automatically tagged for Overview are firearms incidents, abductions, and major incidents. This list is not exhaustive, and I do not know the exact list of all grade 1 incidents that would automatically tag for Overview in 2015 or currently in 2023. Both in 2015 and current day, if there was the additional tag of 'Overview' added to an incident, that indicates the requirement for the incident to be brought to the attention of the Duty Officer. Police Scotland manage approximately 5,000 STORM incidents per day. So, for efficient management of the incidents if you tag it for Overview, it sits on the Duty Officers 'Overview' filter allowing me to review them easily. It did not offer any indication that it had become necessarily more serious. It would be that the content of the incident itself would determine what an appropriate policing response to that might be.
- 65. I am asked if all Grade 1 calls come onto the Overview Screen automatically. I do not believe this is the case.
- 66. I am asked whether grade 2 calls needed to be tagged with the Overview Tag by a controller, supervisor, or Inspector in order for it to be viewed on the Overview Screen. Yes, this would be required. I believe some grade 1 incidents and certain grade 2 incidents would automatically tag with the 'Overview' Tag. From the list of grade 1 incidents I have provided earlier in this statement at paragraph 49, this allows for their efficient management, and I would expect to

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see them on the Overview filter. Some of the grade 2 incidents I have detailed above at paragraph 53 would automatically have an Overview tag applied. I do not have the technical knowledge to provide a definitive list. I cannot remember if all grade 1s would come into the Overview filter automatically. Looking at the list provided, I would expect to see all of them in the Overview filter. As at 2015 some examples of grade 1 incidents were - firearms incident, abduction, suspicious incident, robbery, major incidents, or vehicle pursuits. This list is not exhaustive. They become key to manage because of the risk involved. Vehicle pursuits are fast moving and dynamic incidents and appropriate risk management is important. A pursuit is managed by a supervisor/Sergeant in the control room, but I have overall responsibility to ensure any vehicle pursuit is proportionate and necessary.

- 67. A controller may phone up to Overview and advise me of the incident, a colleague in Overview may alert me to the incident or I may notice it on my Overview filter once the tag is added. I would review the incident and act accordingly. I am asked whether, due to the severity of Grade 1/Grade 2 calls, those would be the calls I was most likely to see as an Overview Inspector. Yes, that is generally the case.
- 68. I am asked when you might expect an Overview Tag to be applied. The incidents when they come in, you can immediately reference an incident and know that this is something really serious and is ongoing and we need to have a look at this now. There are other incidents where I would not expect to have to be told because the nature of the incident and associated threat and risk does not always require scrutiny from me. The controllers and the Sergeants who are vastly experienced manage the threat and risk from these incidents with local policing, where you have Constables, Sergeants and Inspectors who provide an appropriate policing response and command structure.
- 69. The Duty Officer held the rank of Inspector. You had additional training as an ITFC but you held the rank of Inspector. When you discussed incidents with a local policing Inspector you did not have a higher rank. You worked in collaboration with them as opposed to dictating what should happen. You were

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dictatorial at times during pursuits or firearms incidents etc. but managed that relationship with respect. As soon as I need to know about an ongoing incident, I would expect to have been told about it. The team I had were very good at keeping me informed.

- 70.** I am asked how long it would take for a Grade 1 incident to be tagged for Overview. It is not possible to be prescriptive with this. As mentioned above, with some incidents it is automatically done, other incidents it is entirely apparent at time of creation. Other incidents develop and require the Overview tag to be added based on updated information or intelligence. My colleagues understood I wanted to know as soon as possible. My dictat to my Sergeants and my controllers was I would rather know now and be aware of it straight away and make an appropriate decision. As opposed to a delay in advising me of the incident and then being on the back foot. Five minutes is a long time when dealing with a dynamic incident. I was always very much: "Let me know and I will read it. If I do not need to be involved, then fine." I would rather know.
- 71.** I am asked if that was common practice across the other Inspectors within ACR. I would not like to comment on their practice. I think that is a question for them. My own preference was to know sooner rather than later. That was the instruction I gave to the team.
- 72.** I am asked whether the way I operated was based on my training or if it was my personal preference. That was my personal preference because every second counts. The preference for me was to always be on the front foot. That wasn't always achievable because you could be looking at something and dealing with something else when another incident is coming in. But in that type of scenario, that's where your Sergeant became very worthwhile, as well as your Intelligence Officer and your Communications Officer. They naturally knew to get everything needed for that particular incident because once I had finished the incident I was dealing with, I would be assessing the new incident. This minimised any delay in the process. You had to put autonomy with the Sergeants and the controllers down the stairs as well. They were more than

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capable of dealing with the vast majority of incidents end to end and didn't need my involvement.

- 73.** I had a lot of confidence in my colleagues. It was well-placed confidence through working with them. The Sergeants and the controllers that were on duty at that time would tell me quickly if I needed to know. I was confident that they would let me know.
- 74.** I am asked to clarify whether Grade 2 or 3 incidents may or may not come to my attention for a matter of minutes. Yes, that may be the case. If it was necessary I would review the incident, but it may not be immediately apparent from the initial information. My confidence in colleagues was well-placed. The Sergeants were more than capable of making good operational decisions in support of the officers and the risk that was involved in any particular incident.
- 75.** I have been asked with Grade 1 calls whether there would ever be a situation which I have come across where it was not flagged for my attention and, would that be something that as an Inspector I would have to look into and say: "Why has this not been flagged for Overview". Yes, that could happen. The process relied on human endeavour. Because of this, errors could occur. It may be that something was ongoing, and it was being dealt with and then I would happen across it or review it. For example, a short pursuit where the vehicle had crashed and had started and finished very quickly. There is organisational risk/reputation involved in that, so operationally I do not necessarily need to know but from an organisational risk perspective, I would like to know about that. We learned as individuals and as a team and were very effective in the management of incidents.
- 76.** As I mentioned before about mentoring colleagues, how you engage with them is important, so they understood my expectations. That was key. They would deal with incidents generally very well and they did not need feel the need to tell me. I may review it from a different perspective, for example, organisational risk. I would explain why I would expect to have been made aware and that learning was continual. So, yes, that could happen.

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- 77.** I am asked as an Inspector in Overview, would I become aware of an incident tagged for Overview. Yes, I would.
- 78.** I am asked whether I would toggle between two screens. Yes, you can do that, because what I would have is a list of my incidents on the Overview screen and I could also look at all incidents ongoing in the east of the country and nationally.
- 79.** I am asked if that is one screen within the Overview room. My Overview screen was a dedicated screen in the STORM system. I had the ability to toggle between different filters (or screens) in the STORM system to view incidents in dedicated geographical locations of the country. You would filter that to show Grade 1, 2s and 3s. Potentially one of the Grade 1s I would read in the master list I would take an interest in before it was on the Overview list. The list was in chronological order as when you were away doing a firearms incident you can lose two/three hours of your day and not be looking at other incidents. Again, you then have your Sergeants looking at incidents for you. They had capacity to allocate any other incidents to one of the other 2 Duty Officers/ITFCs that were on duty at the same time in the West and North of the country.
- 80.** I am asked who should be keeping an eye on the master list of incidents. As mentioned above this was a collective effort. I was just naturally curious and nosy, which are positive traits. It paid to be nosy, doing the role that I was doing. It was my responsibility, and we all took that very seriously.
- 81.** I am asked if that was a general practice across all Inspectors that they would generally sit in the Overview Room and toggle between those two filters. Yes, as I understand it, and certainly anyone that I was involved in mentoring or tutoring would apply this practice. The key message was: "Get on the front foot quickly. That is what I would say to them, and that is certainly the training that I got from Inspector Stewart. That was his mantra, the sooner you know about something and you're on it, the better it is.
- 82.** I am asked what the prefix AB stands for. Each incident in STORM has a code attached to it and some will start with AB. For example, a disturbance has the code AB-28. There are also prefix AA, AD, CR, PS, PW, and TR. Again, that's just a numerical value that's applied to a disturbance. So, if you look at STORM,

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every single incident will have a unique code. Some additional examples are: AA-94 is an audible alarm, AD-23 is assist member of the public, CR-63 is a robbery, PS-29 is a public demonstration, PW-25 is a missing person enquiry and TR-41 is a road traffic collision. AD19 is unique to a duplicate incident.

- 83. I am asked if there is any sort of relevance to the AB. I believe this is part of the STORM programming and do not have the technical knowledge to answer this further.
- 84. I am asked if that is something that is tagged by STORM. The current use of the STORM codes remains more common in the west of the country. Generally, the east and the north of the country would refer to them by name. For example, "That is a disturbance at 1, the High Street" whereas, in the west of the country it may be more common to hear "That is a code 28 at 1, the High Street." This does not impact on the management of the incident.

Grading of a knife incident

- 85. I am asked what grading I would give a knife incident with circumstances of 3rd May 2015. I was not on duty on the 3rd May 2015 and do not know what information was provided to controllers or the Duty Officer. In general, with knife related incidents, you needed to be aware of them to monitor the circumstances closely. If, for example, the knife was a pocket knife, then response officers would be sent: they are equipped with personal protective equipment – a baton, PAVA and handcuffs. My view is you have sufficient capacity to provide an appropriate response to that. There is public perception involved as well that if someone has a small knife, they are still capable of causing injury, but with your officer safety training, you are capable of dealing with this. One specific scenario of officer safety training is how to deal with someone that's presenting a knife at you. If that knife is then described as a large hunting knife or a machete, clearly that makes the scenario in my mind very different indeed with an alternative response potentially required.

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- 86.** Every situation is different, but you could deploy unarmed officers in response to ‘someone is in the street and they are brandishing a knife’ for which you may not have a better description of. The public rightly expect an effective policing response and that the police would go and deal with that. So, you would have your professional updates coming in from the officers on scene. Controllers would be asking pertinent questions, for example “Describe this knife to me.” If they respond, “It is a big samurai sword,” that changes the dynamic of that situation quickly. You would not instruct the officers to go and engage with that individual. They would be tasked with managing the scene to protect themselves, the public and the individual in possession of the weapon. A samurai sword has lethal capabilities and a firearms authorisation in that situation is likely. If they describe it as a small knife and the individual is not really presenting at officers, you are satisfied they have the officer safety equipment and the training to effectively manage that.
- 87.** I am given the scenario where you receive a call, and they say: “A knife” and you do not have any other descriptors other than that from a witness. I am asked whether the grading for this would be a grade 1 or grade 2 or other. Well, I think in 2015 this depends on the assessment by the service advisor and controller and what incident type the service advisor created. If the information is ‘A man in the street with a knife’ this could be created as a disturbance AB-28, which is a grade 2 default or assault CR-71, which is a default grade 2. Both of which could be upgraded to a grade 1 if deemed appropriate.
- 88.** I am asked where no other information from the witness other than: “They’re holding a knife” would that perhaps go in as a Grade 2. Yes, that may be appropriate but is subjective based on the circumstances.
- 89.** I am then asked whether as the risk to the public, the person or the officer changes it might then be upgraded to a Grade 1. Yes, and again, as I mentioned before, in my own operational experience I have attended calls where there was a report of a person in the street with a knife. Now, the only way you can sometimes identify exactly what the nature of that call is, is to attend. So, you do that, and then you give your professional update as to what is actually

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happening. The quality and content of the radio transmissions are important as that is all you have to work on. As a Duty Officer, unless the area is covered by CCTV, which is rare, you can't see visually anything, which can be a barrier sometimes. So, yes, officers would go along and provide a professional opinion on the circumstances being presented to them when they arrive at the incident, which I would expect them to update the ACR with. The ACR controller, the Sergeant, you would expect to be absolutely listening into that incident. Then if escalation is required based on their assessment, then that would come up to Overview for assessment and action.

- 90.** I am asked whether a knife incident could be confirmed before the officers had attended. You know witnesses may no longer be at the same location as the individual in possession of the knife and no longer able to give live updates on the situation. You may then be dealing with historical information. Witness accounts can be confused and provide inaccurate information. This is not intentional but can happen. They report what they think they have seen, which may turn out to be inaccurate.
- 91.** I am asked at what point is it confirmed as a knife incident. I am asked whether it is before or whether it is when the officers attend, and they see the knife. In my opinion, as a policing service, you will treat reporters as well intentioned and credible. So, if I have a member of the public phoning in to say: "I have seen someone in the street with a knife, with a gun." I would not simply turn around and say: "Well, I do not believe you." We make an assessment and appropriate response based on what is reported to us by members of the public.
- 92.** I am asked whether the call would be graded based on what the witnesses have said. Their account provides the initial information that we assess. It is then for the police to continue competent and thorough enquiries to ascertain the accuracy or otherwise of their account. People make genuine mistakes and it is only through investigation that you identify whether that's the case or not. But certainly, where reports are coming in stating there is somebody in the street with a weapon, my experience provides this may generate multiple calls from the public. In my opinion, it is quite unusual to only have one member of the

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public phoning in if there is something serious happening in a public space. More often than not you will get multiple calls coming in. The multiple calls provide a degree of corroboration of what is actually happening. Notwithstanding that, you can have a single reporter, which you are absolutely obligated to look into and make sure that the risk is managed accordingly.

- 93.** I am asked whether there are incidents which, for me as an Inspector, I would have to escalate above my rank to someone like a Chief Inspector. Yes, there is that obvious chain of command. The firearms command has a very distinct structure. Other operational incidents have a different command structure. So if we are talking about a non-firearms incident for example a murder, rape or an abduction, you would have avenues that you would naturally progress that through, whether that was through on-call senior officers, CID or other specialist resources – roads policing, public order, all of which are national resources available to you if that was deemed appropriate to manage that incident. In any kind of firearms incident, there is a defined command structure. The ITFC reports directly into the Strategic Firearms Commander (SFC) at Chief Superintendent rank who is always on duty or on call 24/7. Firearms incidents are always given oversight by a Strategic Firearms Commander.
- 94.** All other types of incidents are referred to an appropriate senior officer who understands the dynamics of that incident. They will establish an appropriate command structure and implement this if required. For example, a murder, you would contact the on-call Detective senior officer from the national on-call cadre. For matters of a serious nature, the decision to contact the on-call Assistant Chief Constable would be considered and completed where required. For example, organisational risk or reputation may evolve from a major incident, critical incident or a firearms incident with significant community impact and the on-call ACC would direct appropriate actions to manage this.
- 95.** I am asked how a knife incident would be graded as at 2023. Since the introduction of the Contact Assessment Model and THRIVE, any incident where a knife or other weapon is mentioned would be subject of a THRIVE assessment and an appropriate grading of Immediate or Prompt applied

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depending on the information provided. As was the case in 2015 incidents can be upgraded if appropriate. Autonomy now rests with the ACR controllers to down grade an incident without supervisor authority once a re-THRIVE has been completed, which takes into account current information. The grading of the incident in 2023 whether an immediate or prompt incident will be entirely dependent on the information available to the service advisor and or controller and their assessment of the threat risk and harm presented by the incident.

Comparison of incident logs (PS00231 and PS00232) in relation to grading of calls

- 96. I am shown two incident logs of calls that came in in relation to the incident on the 3rd May 2015. I can see from the documents that the first call came in at 0714 am and was graded as a Grade 2, listed as “male with a knife.” The second call then came in at 0715 am. I am asked why these two incidents, description, “male with a knife,” were graded differently within a minute of each other. The Grade 2 incident is now showing as a duplicate incident which is why it will be a grade 2 incident I believe. It may have started as a grade 1 and been changed. I cannot be certain of this as I was not on duty at the time.
- 97. I am asked if I can explain why an incident wouldn't be graded as a 1 if it is a duplicate incident. I cannot make an absolute determination on this matter without reading the narrative of the incident and understanding at what point it became a duplicate incident. In circumstances where multiple calls about the same event are received, it is best practice to run with one master STORM incident and link all other STORM incidents to the master incident. This ensures a single incident is updated with all relevant information. All other duplicate incidents will be known as linked incidents during the management of that event. The master incident may not always be the first STORM incident that is created for the event.
- 98. Reading an entry on one of the incidents - “Call type change from AB28 to AD19 and disposed.” This provides an audit trail that the incident was started as an AB-28 disturbance call and closed after being changed to an AD19 duplicate

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incident Grade 2. This would be in line with the management of several incidents created for the same event as detailed above.

- 99.** I am asked why the incident wouldn't be graded the same as a parent incident. The linked incident would not need the same grading as the main incident in use. This maintains clarity and ensures all appropriate updates are entered onto the correct master incident.
- 100.** I am asked whether all duplicate incidents get listed in a way that reflects that they've had multiple callers. The practice established to manage master and linked incidents is trained out to all controllers to ensure consistency of practice. They are referred to as parent and child incidents in the training. The main incident is the parent incident (call graded as 1), and the child incident would be the duplicate incident graded as 2.
- 101.** I am asked if the 0715 am call would be the parent incident. Yes. This incident was created after the other incident, but as explained above this is not always relevant. If, for example, someone had put more text on one than the other, you may choose to use the incident with the most comprehensive updates on it and shut down the others after considering the content of them.
- 102.** So, to clarify the purpose of downgrading an incident and having that as a linked incident to a master incident would have no detrimental impact on the management of the event itself. The focus remains on managing the main incident as well as possible. In my opinion I like one incident running so that, as a Duty Officer, you can see all of the updates in the one place.
- 103.** I am asked if there is anything within this log that tells you whether it initially came in as a Grade 1 and it has been downgraded. If so, I am asked to indicate where on the document this could be found. Looking at the incident it is marked as "duplicate" in the disposal code and asks the reader to 'see linked incidents' This incident tells you what has been said by the witness and recorded by Police Scotland. The last line stating, "Call type changed from AB28 to AD19 at disposal." Which is time stamped at 0724 am. So obviously the timing of that is post the other incident created. My assessment of this is a controller has closed this one down correctly, because you do not want more than one incident

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running. Albeit there is nothing in this incident to state that. I do not know the workings of STORM well enough to be able to comment further.

- 104.** I am asked if it would be the case that the child incident would be deleted. No, it wouldn't be deleted. It remains a permanent record on STORM.
- 105.** I am asked why the child incident does not adopt the same grading as the parent incident under the same grading if they are linked together. I am asked whether it is possible that the call came in as a Grade 2 and simply remained a Grade 2. Yes, I believe the incident may retain the original grading as of 2015 but cannot assert this with authority. The controller or the service advisor that has initially taken this call may have looked on it as appropriate to have it as a Grade 2. It may be the case that, had this incident progressed as the master incident, that that would be as a Grade 1.
- 106.** I am asked if the incident log tells you which controller managed the incidents. Yes, it does but here it is redacted on the copies shown to me. I would expect to see PS00231 not as a Grade 1 because we weren't using it and this one PS00232 as a Grade 1 because we were using it. Once established which incident is the master incident all updates entered are date and time stamped with a unique user's identity number for audit purposes. The updates to any incident would be date and time stamped as they were added by controllers during the life of the incident and not all completed at the creation of the incident. There is no right or wrong process when deciding on which incident to use as the master incident as long as it allows for the professional management of the event. This can come down to personal preference of a controller, supervisor, or Duty Officer. I would completely agree that the only incident that needs to remain at the higher grading is the master incident.
- 107.** I am asked what I would have done if it had been me grading this call. I am further asked whether the call could stay as a Grade 1 and be listed as a duplicate or would the reasoning for downgrading it to a Grade 2 to show that this call was a lower priority. There are two answers to that. Firstly, I do not know from a systems perspective if the process of changing it from an AB28 to a duplicate would auto-change the grade. It might, but I cannot be certain. From

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a Duty Officer/ ITFC perspective, I would not want PS00231 running as a Grade 1 because if you are looking at a screen, you will see a duplicate incident and see a Grade 1 here. PS00231 becomes less significant during the management of the incident because all of the updates are going onto this PS00232.

- 108.** I am asked how duplicate incidents are viewed and if I expect to view it on the screen as the parent incident and then duplicates being listed below. Yes. The Duty Officer needs an understanding of all relevant updates on all incidents because you would want to make sure that you were aware of as much information as possible. This is required to command the incident appropriately. The primary concern with the incident created at 0714 am is to make sure that any information on this incident is being assessed as part of the main incident. When incidents are linked correctly, information from any linked incident will appear automatically on the master incident, but I would always expect linked incidents to be checked during the life of an event for any relevant updates. That is a role for the Sergeant or the Intelligence Officer to ensure this is done. Any linked incident, as I have mentioned, does not need to sit as a Grade 1 incident when it becomes a child (or linked) incident because as long as everything in this is adequately referenced in the master incident, then I do not need to know about this incident. I just need to know about the content.
- 109.** I am asked how it would show on the system where you have the parent incident and the child incident, with the parent being a Grade 1. The system would show there were linked incidents, and then you could obviously tab in and see them together with the parent incident.
- 110.** I am asked if the tabs would show up under the Grade 1 call automatically or whether you would have to click on the Grade 1 call to expand it. Yes, you could open up the other linked incidents because once an incident is created on STORM, it cannot be deleted. Once an entry is put on an incident, it cannot be deleted. It is there permanently for future scrutiny, which is appropriate. It is common, when you have an incident happening in a busy public setting, you would absolutely expect multiple calls to come into the Police. So, if it became significant the guidance and process now is to put a pop-up message on

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television screens in the service centre advising call handlers of the situation. I do not know if this was available in 2015. So, if any calls come in about, for example, a significant road traffic collision on the M8 motorway, everyone would know the master incident number and add relevant details to that and know not to create a new incident. This would be so you get all the updates on the one incident. Once the main incident is up and running, you want all of the updates going onto that incident. Again, for me, this is a suitable role for your Intelligence Officer and or your Communications Officer to provide me with comfort that nothing is getting added to incidents I do not know about.

- 111.** I am asked if a folder system was in place when taking calls like this. Yes. STORM recorded the main incidents and the linked incidents, which could be viewed at any time. Closed incidents can also be looked at and interrogated. This is required where people need to know the content of STORM incidents that happened in the past. It is a similar design to folders and your subfolders in Microsoft word for example. You can create a main folder and have other documents in that folder which are relevant to the topic. So, for the Microsoft word analogy, the main folder is the main incident and the documents in the folder are your linked incidents.
- 112.** I am asked what best practice would be for previous incidents which have come in and had not yet been identified as part of the same incident. I am asked whether best practice would be to put new calls underneath the parent call or whether it would be to update the parent incident directly.
- 113.** I am asked if it would flash up as red. When an incident is transferred from the service centre to the area control room, it flashes in the transfer window until accepted and progressed by the ACR controller. Once the incident appears on the Overview filter it does not flash as it is already being dealt with. I cannot remember if it flashed up red. I had my screen set up, so that the chronology was showing the newest incidents at the top, so I would naturally be able to see when a new incident arrived.

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Feedback from officers

114. I am shown Michelle Hutchison’s statement (**SBPI-00202**) at paragraph 57 which says that she wouldn’t expect long for feedback from the time that officers arrive on scene. I am asked to reflect on my time as an Inspector in 2015 and to state how long I would expect to wait for updates coming in from attending officers. In 2015 and in 2023, in my opinion, once officers have been dispatched to the incident and arrive on scene, this can be updated by officers using their airwave terminal soft keys or verbally informing the control room of this. This is updated on the STORM incident, and I would see confirmation of that. I have been asked how long I would expect to wait for feedback on what officers at a locus could see. Again, both in 2015 and 2023, in my opinion, once officers arrive at a locus, they are generally in a position to tell you what’s happening. Within the Overview set up, when you know something is ongoing, you would have the channel on your headset, so you would be listening in live time to the radio transmissions. You could reasonably expect that if you have two officers arriving at a scene then the updates from those officers should be fairly instantaneous. Clearly, there are a lot of factors with that. If two officers arrive and are immediately entering into some kind of confrontation, they may not be in a position to fully explain what’s going on. But again, depending on the resource allocation that was put to any given incident at any given point, you would expect that one of the main priorities of officers arriving at a location would be to give you an update on what is happening.

115. I am referred to paragraph 62 of Michelle Hutchinson’s statement which states: “After initial feedback from arriving on the scene, you’d expect regular feedback from the attending officers as and when they can.” I am asked if that is my view that after that initial feedback you would be expecting updates. Yes, that is what I would expect. When you equate that to, for example, surveillance operations. Crucial to a surveillance operation is you have that narrative now. Everybody knows exactly what is going on at every given second, but with dynamic response incidents that is not always the case, and there may be factors

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preventing or reducing an officer's capacity to give you real-time regular updates, but you would certainly be looking for what I need to know and if I needed to go on the radio and exert authority to make sure I was being told what I wanted to know, then I had absolutely no problem doing that.

116. I am asked where there was an absence of regular feedback after that confirmation of arrival at the scene whether that would be triggering concern or raising issues in my mind. Yes that could be the case depending on circumstance. You want to make sure that you have a suitable response to deal with that incident. If you are not receiving any kind of communication, there are two examples I can give. In a dynamic operational situation where there is risk involved, for example if someone phones in saying a member of the public has a weapon, you would want to make sure that you have a sufficiency of resources going to that incident. That may be two, four, or six officers and you will then be in a position to ensure that you can get regular updates on that incident. Another example, two officers might be sent to someone who is on a bridge suggesting they are there to complete suicide. Officers may go quiet for good reason, because they do not want to be talking to the control room when they are trying to speak to the individual. Michelle mentioned the ambient listening in her statement. Where it is a calmer situation, ambient listening becomes a more positive tool because you can hear what the officers are saying. Ambient listening becomes reduced in terms of relevancy or indeed accuracy if officers are potentially attending a more volatile situation.

117. I am asked if there is any action that should be taken if there is not regular feedback after that confirmation of arrival. Yes. If you are not getting regular feedback your concern is naturally raised, I would suggest, and that would dictate for me: "I need more officers to go there to tell me what is happening", if the initial officer attending cannot give you updates for whatever reason. If their focus is on an individual it might be detrimental to their situation to keep radioing back and forward to the control room. I would look to have further officers attend. You certainly want that comfort and reassurance by deploying

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further officers to that locus to make sure that they could then provide you with a situational updates and support to colleagues.

- 118.** I am asked how long the period of radio silence would be before I think: “I need to deploy more officers so I can get feedback from the situation on the ground.” In my opinion this is pretty instantaneous. As detailed above, this can be dictated by the situation, but I liked to have good initial updates to determine an appropriate course of action. I would expect the initial updates to be received quickly so I can assess the situation and request further information if required. If the only way that I can fill in the gaps of what I do not know is by applying additional resource, then that is something I would be comfortable in doing and not delaying. You can see from the incident on STORM what resources were dispatched at any given time. Controllers can then have a look in the wider area and task specialist resources as well, for example Roads policing, who would be asked to make their way to that location, assist colleagues and provide updates.
- 119.** I am asked if I can quantify how long I might wait before thinking: “I’m going to dispatch additional resources.” I do not think that you can put a time on that. It would be dictated by circumstance and, certainly for myself, I would be incredibly uneasy if you have officers at a scene and you are not hearing from them. As mentioned above, I would take steps to immediately address this position. For example, allocate additional resources to the incident to provide an update on circumstances to me. You would also look for updates from other officers attending on their expected time of arrival at the scene. Whilst officers are travelling to the incident, you would continue to ask the officers on scene to update you. There is a balance to be struck of ensuring the safety and welfare of the officers and members of the public by asking for updates against the need to leave officers free to complete their duties. I would always strive to get an update as quickly as possible.
- 120.** I am asked whether Inspectors would ever directly communicate with witnesses who called in and whether you might ask them questions like: “What can you see?” I am given the example of where someone is watching from a window.

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Yes. This is absolutely the case and is generally tasked to the Sergeant in Overview to re-contact witnesses for more information, for example, "Tell me what you are seeing."

- 121.** I am asked if I would ever consider speaking to those callers and asking them what they can see where feedback was not being received from officers on the ground. Yes. As above, witnesses can provide crucial information to assist in the management of an incident and this would generally be tasked to the Sergeant in Overview with more serious, dynamic incidents. This is common practice.
- 122.** I am asked whether in my practice as an Inspector within the ACR you would endeavour to fill in any gaps in the feedback from officers at the scene. Yes, you want as accurate a picture as quickly as possible. Whatever relevant means you have for that, then I think it would be absolutely consistent with the risk management of that incident to apply that.
- 123.** I am asked where there is a potentially lethal weapon involved, whether there would be any reason why you would not take action. Any tactical reason why you would not take action that I can think of. No there is not. We need to manage every incident reported to the Police appropriately. I am naturally intrusive and curious. You sometimes have to allow officers at the scene of an incident to manage that. You have to put your confidence in them that they are managing it professionally. There is always going to be a delay in receiving information from them. You need to manage that delay, and you accept that there will be a delay because they cannot potentially talk and carry out actions simultaneously. Once you are comfortable the situation is being managed by an appropriate amount of officers, you let them do what they need to do and then get the updates from them. I think the key difference there is if I am not satisfied I know what is happening, then I want to know more as quickly as possible. But if you have a sufficiency of officers attending and they are doing what they need to do, then I do not need a constant updates because you put your trust and confidence in the officers attending a location to do what needs to be done.

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- 124.** I am asked whether where there is a lack of feedback the presence of more officers may change my decision-making in not taking action. I think you would generally be comfortable with limited updates into the ACR where I am satisfied there appears to be a sufficiency of officers at the scene. I would still be quite dictatorial in my opinion and would expect one of them to step back and say: "This is what's happening." If the original call came in as male with a knife, as an ITFC, a crucial part of any responsibility that I have is to question whether the appropriate response to that is a divisional local policing response, or do I need to allocate specialist resources? So, until I am satisfied in my own mind that I know the answers to those questions, then I would be visible on the radio to get the information that I need so that I can make appropriate decisions.
- 125.** I am asked whether I accept that the more officers attending and not giving feedback might indicate that there is a higher risk in that situation. No, I do not think that is accurate. I would be surprised if you have multiple officers attending a scene and no one is in a position to provide an update. I would be quite intrusive and dictatorial with officers on the scene: "I want one of you to update me now, what is going on?" It would be as blunt as that.
- 126.** I am asked what I mean by 'I personally'. I am asked whether the practice of demanding an update immediately is one of the tasks of ACR Inspectors. I would say this is a role for the Duty Officer/ITFC. I think the role of the ITFC in dynamic incidents is information based. We need to know what is happening. I would be surprised if there was not a desire amongst all Duty Officers/ITFCs to know what was going on.
- 127.** I am told that the Inquiry has heard from Inspector Stewart that he did not take further action when feedback was not received because he did not want to "Take over the airwaves." I am asked if I were in that position would not wanting to take over the airwaves form part of my decision making not to keep asking for feedback. Yes. You have to put your faith and confidence in the divisional officers that are attending. There are sides to that. Silence can provide, not reassurance, but if there is silence, you can at times take confidence from the

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fact they do not need anything because they are not asking for it. Officers are trained to ask for assistance if required.

- 128.** Then there is also the flip side of that conversation. If I am not hearing anything, then I do want to know sooner rather than later as to what the current situation is.

Use of the emergency button

- 129.** I am referred to paragraph 36 of Inspector Stewart's initial statement where he states:

"In fact, that was why I moved back into the control room business that was ongoing elsewhere across the east area, because local officers had attended and been able to deal with the situation and individual at the time. I was aware that there must have been some sort of issue during the arrest because the emergency button had been activated, but then the male in question must have been arrested was my assumption, so no need for any specialist resources to be deployed."

I am asked what I would be thinking where I am not receiving feedback, but an emergency button has been pressed. In 2015 I think there are so many variables in that one particular incident, and I am very conscious of the wording that has been used: "Failed to follow up." I wouldn't like to comment on what is a failure or what is not is. This relates to wording used by the interviewer during my interview.

- 130.** I am asked what does my training dictate that I should do in a situation where an emergency button has been pressed. I cannot comment on the training that was given to controllers in the use of the emergency button in 2015. The expectation of how controllers responded to an emergency activation in 2015 remains current in 2023. In 2023, all controllers receive specific training in the use of and management of the activation of the emergency button. This forms

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part of their end of training course assessment. During a dynamic incident, where officers are having to physically restrain an individual, the emergency button on the airwave terminal can be activated in error. The button sits on the top of an airwave device and accidental activation is known to happen. If someone deliberately presses an emergency button, then it means that they are in need of assistance. This would be progressed as a priority. I believe the improved training now delivered to all controllers before commencing in the ACR has provided greater consistency in the management of an emergency button activation in 2023.

- 131.** I am asked what kind of assistance that would be. The officer activating the emergency button is able to communicate their needs, but generally this will be activated for the attendance of other officers or other emergency services – Fire/Ambulance etc.
- 132.** I am asked if other officers could mean specialist resources. Potentially yes, but the pressing of an emergency button does not automatically dictate specialist officers. If one was to be in a position where you press your emergency button, it means that the level of policing response may not be adequate to deal with the situation. This would be communicated through the control room, and they receive a priority response from controllers.
- 133.** I am asked whether after an emergency button was pressed, during a grade 1 call that would come through to me as an Inspector. So, the controller would then address the activation of the emergency button and take appropriate action and whether that was the assistance of other officers or whatever would be dictated at the time. The second instance where an emergency button may be pressed is erroneously. If they are struggling with an individual, then it is not uncommon for the emergency button to be activated and not necessarily by choice. If they were surmising that an officer was struggling with an individual, it may be the case that until that struggle had been concluded there would not be much in the way of additional narrative coming from the officers at the scene.
- 134.** I am asked when an emergency button has been pressed would I, as the Inspector, be looking to try and get some feedback. I am asked whether I would

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attempt to communicate with those officers, stating: “The emergency button has been pressed, can you give me an update on what’s happening at the scene?”
Yes - my personal opinion is we require an appropriate update from the officer who activates the emergency button.

- 135.** I am asked whether I might go across the airwaves to them (the officers) and say: “Can you please give me an update?” I would expect that, absolutely, of the Controller and of the Sergeant, not just myself. If you have got something that is dynamic and ongoing, we want to know what the outcome of that is, because it may be you need to deal with more aspects of it or, indeed, if once the struggle – for want of a better word – had concluded, then I would want to know an update before I moved onto anything else.
- 136.** Two scenarios in which I am the Inspector are hypothesized to me: (1) It could be a deliberate push of the button; or (2) it could also be pushed during a struggle. I am asked whether, in both scenarios, I would want to get communication from them. Yes, and that would be around the welfare aspects of the member(s) of the public and the officer(s) and whatever else needs put in place. Again, it comes back to I am not there necessarily to do everything, but I am there to facilitate as much as possible. If you have the officers saying “We need this, and we need this.” then that would be something for the control room to organise. But yes - I would be looking for positive confirmation as to the outcome of any kind of given situation in that set of circumstances.
- 137.** I am asked if that training in relation to the use of the emergency button is consistent across the board or whether that is my own practice. In my mind, you want to know the updated position and the resolution. If it has come to my attention for any reason, I would personally want to know the resolution and what had happened, and then what necessarily needed to be done. You have the question of: “Does this require escalation to senior officers?” which would be myself as a point of contact to achieve that. There may be other actions I would need to perform on the back of that, but certainly for me it is something that I would seek personal confirmation of.

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138. I am asked if I am aware of whether the training stated that use of an emergency button would require an airwave transmission by ACR immediately thereafter. In 2015, controllers would manage an emergency activation in a similar manner to today and would involve communication with the officer via airwaves. As mentioned above, I believe the improved training delivered to controllers has improved the consistency of response to emergency activations. I cannot comment on the training syllabus in 2015. I do not have the training material to hand, but the controllers were well versed in the emergency button activation process, and certainly training now covers that comprehensively on the ACR training courses. As a natural consequence, if someone is in the situation of either involuntary activation of the emergency button or, intentional activation of the emergency button and I was listening out to that, I would want reassurance either from the officers at scene or from the controller/Sergeant down the stairs that there was a positive resolution. This is relevant to 2015 and remains current in 2023.

139. I am asked that even where it had not been escalated to me, as an Inspector, whether I expect to be made aware of the use of the emergency button. No, this may not be the case in all situations, but the mechanics of an emergency activation are visible to me at my desk. I might ask for clarity from the controller and say: "Has feedback been received? No, okay." You would be looking at the STORM job and you would expect an update to go on the STORM job. For example: Individual arrested. There are occasions where an emergency activation has been dealt with appropriately by controllers and there is no requirement for the Duty Officer to be made aware.

Ambient listening

140. I am referred to paragraph 58 of Michelle Hutcheson's statement (**SBPI-00202**) where she talks about how in a situation where you suspect that there's a struggle or a fight and you're not receiving feedback, or a situation where you're simply not receiving feedback, that there's an option to eavesdrop on the

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officer's radio. I am asked whether that is correct. Yes, the terminology of ambient listening or eavesdrop are the same and is simply different terminology used by different people. I think if you are applying hindsight to that kind of situation in 2015, then you could have considered eavesdropping but, as mentioned earlier on, the positives in that diminish if there is any kind of struggle because the quality and scope of the eavesdropping facility is limited.

It can also be determined by the location of the officer's radio or potentially their body armour. So, with hindsight being applied, yes, if you wanted to try and get some updates from the scene, you could have used that but, again, I think in that situation the preference would have been for me to be quite demanding on the radio to say "Somebody take a step back here and tell me what is happening."

- 141. I am asked whether or not it is a function that I would have utilised in the circumstance in May 2015. No, I think in my time as a Duty Officer I used it a couple of times. That was more for people who may have been looking to complete suicide where it was more appropriate, but for something like this incident in 2015 I would far prefer operational updates from the scene.
- 142. Ambient listening can still be used in 2023, but I am unable to comment on how frequently this is used by Duty Officers now.

Authority of ACR

- 143. I am asked in an incident like this whether, in a knife incident, whose responsibility is it to dictate commands. I am asked whether it is the officer on the ground or the Inspector within ACR to dictate what action should be taken. Relevant to 2015 and to 2023, it is a shared responsibility and can be answered in 2 parts. The Duty Officer/ITFC has an absolute responsibility to ensure an appropriate policing response, and the officers on scene have a responsibility to accurately relay the information around what they see and what is happening, and the amalgam of those responsibilities can then provide sufficient information to determine what that response should be. So, it is very much a

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coordinated approach. Ultimately, if I or anyone as a Duty Officer decides that “In my opinion, a course of action of X or Y needs to be taken,” then that decision sits with me. I would stress that as Duty Officer I can ensure appropriate resources attend an incident and provide a threat assessment and working strategy, which provides a framework to work within allowing certain tactics to be used. The decision to use any tactic then rests with the individual officer based on the threat and risk of the incident at that time. For example, the use of a baton, firearm etc.

- 144.** I am asked whether there are any circumstances where I might expect the officers on the ground to disregard the instructions of the ACR Inspector. As an example, Police officers are, on occasion, asked to attend persons near to a railway line who are believed to be in distress. You would never instruct someone to go onto a live railway line and try to recover the individual. You would ensure you had a sterile working area before any recovery was attempted. In that type of situation, an officer would rightly refuse to enter the line even if instructed to do so by a senior officer. Where a lawful instruction is given, I would expect this to be followed.
- 145.** I am asked who has command of an incident where there is a knife call. I am further asked about the different approaches that can be taken during the management of a knife call, or indeed any other type of incident. You acquire as much information as you possibly can, but at times you understand that you might have a partial picture which you need to make a decision on. With that in mind, there are two strands to this: there is the training as an ITFC, and there is your officer safety training. During your officer safety training you are taught to go along, to engage, to speak, communication being one of the critical elements of your officer safety training. You will always try for de-escalation rather than escalation of any kind of response, and I think that’s always a preferred route.
- 146.** I am asked if my first course of action, as an attending officer, would be to try and de-escalate the situation through good communication. I am asked - If the situation is quite tense, how do you de-escalate that rather than escalate that?

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Again, every officer within Police Scotland was given the same training at their OST, so that was a consistent approach, and if de-escalation is not achieving an appropriate resolution, then if escalation is required, the deployment of officer safety techniques and equipment is the decision of the individual. To escalate to the allocation of specialist firearms resources is a matter for the Duty Officer to decide to make sure there is a safe outcome for those concerned.

- 147.** I am asked what may stop the officers in a situation like 3rd May 2015 simply waiting by the van and observing an individual. I am asked whether the officers would make the call to engage the male or whether I would be telling them to stand and wait. I think at the point of the initial attendance by officers, the Duty Officer did not have command of the incident. It was managed by ACR controllers, Sergeants, and divisional officers. As a general observation, I would assume that attending officers would try to de-escalate any situation. If I try to assume the role of a divisional response Inspector, I would assess that as a possible course of action. However, I do not know the circumstances. I would not like to comment on the officer's actions at that time because I was not on duty, and I do not know exactly what took place.
- 148.** I am referred to paragraph 66 of Ms Hutchison's statement where she indicates that the ACR Inspector decides how the officers at the location should act during an incident with a potentially lethal weapon. I am asked to confirm where the responsibility to make decisions lay as at 3rd May 2015: with the ACR Inspector or the officers on the ground. I have provided comment to this earlier in my statement. Inspector Stewart will be able to provide threat assessments and working strategies with options and contingencies for the deployment of firearms officers, or instruction to response officers to attend an incident. A Duty Officer cannot compel a Constable to take a course of action, for example a baton strike or to discharge a firearm. Any decision to use officer safety equipment or specialist firearms equipment rests with the individual officer. Like I have said before, incident management is dynamic and fluid where communication is a key component. Individual officers are responsible for

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making decisions relative to their own course of conduct and rely on training and decision making for this. The Duty Officer will ensure that an appropriate level of resource attends to meet any working strategy to the best of everyone's abilities.

149. I am asked if that is still the case now that it is very much a combined effort. Yes, and I think the body worn video will augment that significantly. If Inspector Stewart had the capacity to view what officers at the incident are seeing, then that would assist potentially in any decision-making during that incident. We are still wholly reliant on being provided with verbal updates from the airwave radios.

Use of force

150. I am asked whether the grading of a call, specifically as a Grade 1, affects the use of force grading. No. I think the very general answer is no because the use of force is dictated by what the officers are encountered with on arrival at any given scene. This is relevant to both 2015 and 2023. For example, you might attend an 'assist a member of the public' incident. In that case, you would not reasonably expect that to be requiring the use of force. However, when you arrive the individual may be acting in an extremely aggressive manner or be in possession of a weapon and your response may well then be dictated by their actions and not the type of incident created. This is a general observation and not an opinion of the circumstances presented to the attending officers on 3rd May 2015

151. I am asked if this is a decision for the officers on the ground. Yes. As an ITFC, I authorise firearms officers with what they are allowed to do in terms of tactics, and then they are ultimately responsible for deciding what they do. For example, if a firearms officer deems it necessary to discharge their weapon that is not something I tell them to do. They are authorised to take a course of action and, if deemed appropriate by them on scene, then that is what they would do.

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A similar situation arises with any kind of use of force. It is determined by an individual officer's assessment of a situation, and they must then account for why they have taken that course of action.

STORM and CRM incident logs

152. I am asked about the difference between the CRM and the STORM incident log. CRM stands for Customer Relationship Management system, which is also known as ASPIRE. I believe the ASPIRE system was similar in 2015 to 2023 but do not have the technical knowledge to assert this. The journey of a call coming into Police Scotland transitions through the service centre to the ACR. Members of the public who contact the Police will be answered by a service advisor in the service centre. The first part of that process is for the service advisor to populate the system called ASPIRE. So, that would be with the caller's name, address, and information they were providing to the Police. So, the service advisor would briefly put a narrative in ASPIRE as to what exactly is ongoing. They would choose what type of incident it is. I have never used ASPIRE, so I am by no means familiar with the system, but my knowledge extends to the fact that ASPIRE is then directly linked into STORM. So, the service advisor transfers the ASPIRE record onto STORM, and then they will populate the fields in STORM before adding appropriate narrative into the STORM incident. The ASPIRE record is quite a small area for typing in some of the information, whereas on STORM you have a much wider field you can type in. STORM has undergone upgrades between 2015 and 2023, but I cannot comment with confidence on what the upgrades have been.

153. I am asked what the purpose of CRM is. It is a customer relationship management system. From this system, you would know if a caller has phoned us before. Elements of the system would pre-populate once appropriate checks and confirmation of details were completed. For example, if you had a mobile phone number, you might know that has been used by an individual who has contacted the Police previously. STORM is searchable as well in terms of

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similar information. The CRM (ASPIRE) is populated at the initial point of contact from the member of the public, and then the STORM incident log is used for the command and control of the incident from start to finish.

- 154.** I am asked how long I would ordinarily expect it to take for a call to be transferred from CRM to a STORM incident log. That process duration can vary significantly. During 2015 the service advisors were under instruction if you had something that was deemed to be serious and dynamic, then transfer it onto STORM as soon as possible and get it into the relevant area of the ACR so they can commence the management of the incident. This could happen even if the service advisor was still talking to the individual on the phone. So, you could have the situation where you have a live STORM job created and being managed by the ACR while the service advisor is still on the phone to the individual and is updating the STORM job. In the more serious of incidents, you would ask that the service centre transfer the call up to Overview, where the Sergeant will continue dialogue with the witness and reduce the time delay of updates reaching the Duty Officer. There are no performance statistics dictating how long it should take to transfer a call from the ASPIRE system onto STORM. It is very much dictated by circumstance.
- 155.** I am asked if the STORM incident log is created by the controller. Initially, it is created by the service advisor in the service centre in the normal flow of an incident. Clearly, if you have an officer who is out on patrol and radios into the area control room, then the controllers have the capacity to create a STORM incident, but the normal route of a STORM incident being created is through the service centre.
- 156.** I am asked how long after this point might it be before it is transferred to ACR. Again, this depends on the severity. The higher the severity or serious nature of the incident, the quicker you would expect that to be coming across. Sometimes the service advisors have been known to be on the phone for 45 minutes, 50 minutes to the individual. So, at a similar time the STORM incident is created and running, but they may hold the person on the phone for some time just to deal with that appropriately.

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- 157.** I am shown that the first call that is received by Bilston ACR from a Joyce Joyce at 0711 am. It is highlighted to me that it was not transferred through to Bilston ACR until 0716 am. I am asked if this is a reasonable amount of time for a transfer of a call all the way through to ACR. Yes. That would be not unusual.
- 158.** I am asked whether, had it been stated that he was in possession of a potentially illegal weapon, and that it was being graded as a Grade 1 call, it would still be a reasonable amount of time. Again, I do not feel confident to comment on that. I do not know the circumstances as to how the systems were performing on that day, the service advisor may be speaking to a colleague and taking advice in terms of the content of that call and, indeed, what would be the best avenue to deal with that. So it would be, I think, wrong of me to say generically whether five minutes is a very long time or five minutes is an acceptable time.
- 159.** I am asked to clarify whether 5 minutes would be an unreasonable amount of time. No, I think the five minutes would need to be broken down to say: "Here are the component aspects of that five minutes" to make a really informed decision about that.
- 160.** I am asked if I am aware of any changes to the CRM and STORM log system which might mean it has been improved since 2015. There has been an ongoing program of enhancements to the STORM system since 2015. I do not know to what extent from a technical specification perspective but background performance of STORM is a continual evolution and has improved. ASPIRE, to the best of my knowledge, is a very similar system now to what it was then.

Mapping of calls

- 161.** I am referred paragraph 13 of PC Masterton's statement where it states:

"In terms of how the information is presented, if I recall correctly, we could look at it in different ways. We could see all officers that are on duty; we can see what vehicles they are allocated to; we can see what jobs they're allocated to.

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Technically, you should be able to look on a map and see where they are, but my whole time there, I do not think I ever used it. I do not know anyone that ever found that a reliable system. There was technically a way that you could look at-- like, effectively, like, a Google map and you should technically be able to tell where resources were, but it was not accurate, and it was not reliable, and we never ever used it."

Referring to this excerpt of PC Masterton's statement, I am asked what my experience of mapping of officer locations was at 3rd May 2015. Yes, I think I would concur with PC Masterton. The mapping system was available, but updates to the system could be slow. It was something that was there, but not always accurate in real time. It was common practice to check with individuals via radio: "What's your current location?" as opposed to anything else. The mapping system would show the location of an incident accurately when an exact location was entered onto the system.

162. I am asked whether it was my normal practice to check in with officers via radio, given that mapping of their location was unreliable. Yes: "What's your current location?" I think that was a well-documented issue with the way the radios affiliated to a mast. It would skew because Fife or Edinburgh would maybe try to affiliate to a different mast, given the national airwave network. So, you would get some rogue locations, but if you were in an urban area with good mast coverage, then the locations of the vehicles were quite accurate.

163. I am asked whether, as at 2015, it was common practice for Inspectors within the ACR to check in via radio transmissions because they knew that mapping of resources was not accurate. Yes, in 2015 I would. I cannot speak for my colleagues. The mapping system can be used as a reference guide. It is not something I personally looked to use as a definitive location of resources. I would seek verbal confirmation from the assets that were tasked to go to something and then find out where they were to obtain accurate travelling times.

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- 164.** I am asked whether there was a time lag on the map. Yes. There have been enhancements made to it, but what you had to have was a good signal from the vehicle - the airwaves, and/or the officer's airwave terminal. You had to be able to be quite visible to the masts to get a good location. The frequency of the updates, if the vehicle was moving, for example, or an officer was moving, it wasn't like a continual tracking process like we have now in terms of your use of your iPhones etc. there was a lag built into that. So, if somebody was moving at reasonable speed, then there was that natural delay which could cause an inaccurate location.
- 165.** I am asked if I am aware whether the mapping of calls function is fit for purpose now. Yes. There are enhancements that have been made to it. I am not aware of the exact technicalities around that, but my understanding is it has significantly improved now compared to 2015.

Location of Duty Officer within ACR and Overview as at 2015

- 166.** I am told that the Inquiry has heard evidence from Inspector Stewart that on the day, and at the time when the first call came in, that he was not in the Overview room. I am asked whether this was normal practice for Inspectors not to be in the Overview room at times. Yes. When we spoke earlier on, the Supervisory responsibility in 2015 was significantly different to what we have now. In 2015 The Duty Officer's role at the weekend covered the Area Control Rooms and the Service Centre. So, it was not uncommon for the Duty Officer to be in the Area Control Room or the Service Centre environment doing welfare checks to ensure both areas had everything they needed resourcing wise, etc. From Monday to Friday there was more of a supervisory footprint in the Service Centre. So, the Duty Officer was less involved in this during the week, but, certainly at the weekend, it was expected of the Duty Officers to make sure that everybody had what they needed and to make sure that they linked in with people.

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- 167.** I am asked if this was just a resourcing issue over the weekend. Yes. I think at that time it was the resource model. C3 Division have obviously enhanced that significantly in the Service Centre between then (2015) and now. Present day you have Team Leaders and Operations Managers on in the Service Centre pretty much 24/7. At 2015, that was not the case, so any kind of welfare considerations within the Service Centre at the weekends were predominantly dealt with by the ACR Sergeants or, indeed, the ACR Inspector. So, yes, that would take you out of Overview. You were not in your chair all the time.
- 168.** I am asked how much of that shift would be spent downstairs in the ACR and whether it would be a large proportion of the shift. That would be entirely dependent on the day. You could have personnel issues that you were dealing with which would take you away for considerable periods of time. Notwithstanding that, you would never leave the building. You would always be within the confines of the building and available to be recalled upstairs if necessary but it would depend on what you were dealing with at that time.
- 169.** I am asked if it is part of the job expectation that an Overview Inspector should not leave the building on shift. Absolutely you would never leave the building whilst performing the role of ITFC.
- 170.** I am asked how the Inspectors communicate with those up in Overview if they are away from their post. Back in 2015, you were always highly visible, whether it was the Service Centre or the Area Control Room. If you went away for a refreshment break the practice now is that you will always carry a radio with you if you leave Overview, and you can be contacted on that. During 2015, I would not always have a radio with me, but would always ensure my colleagues knew where I was. While you were in the ACR and service centre you were aware of what was going on and you could be told of what was going on in person and then make your way back up to Overview. I do not recall it being policy at that time to carry a radio, but you were always visible. The size of the building was such that you were really never out of someone's view.
- 171.** I am asked how you could be communicated with if you do not have your radio on you. For me personally, I do not think it ever really happened. I was quite

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fortunate that way, but if you were down in the Service Centre and a call comes in about a pursuit or an abduction etc. then at that point you had a good working relationship with the personnel within the service centre, and they would just shout to you: "That's a pursuit, that's a," whatever". I would return to Overview. Similarly, if you were in the ACR talking to your colleagues, you would just be told about the incident and return to Overview to review it.

- 172.** It is highlighted to me that it is not a given that someone would alert you to the fact that a call has come in for my attention. No. I think you were easily visible, and I think that is one of the real crucial aspects. It is not such a large area that they would not know you were there. There was a good camaraderie and rapport at that point because it was a busy place, and it was entirely obvious to both the Service Centre and/or the ACR as to where you were when you were down on the floor. So, there was no dubiety there whatsoever.
- 173.** I am asked whether it was common practice to alert the Inspector within the Service Centre and the ACR that a Grade 1 call has come in. I am further asked if that would be the case where a Grade 2 call which potentially needed to be escalated. Yes, and certainly for me, personally, I had that luxury with the team that I had in 2015. In 2015, they had no reservations at all about telling me what was happening. They would tell me about the incident and I would return to Overview and review it.
- 174.** I am asked if I was aware if Service Centre/ACR staff had that relationship with other Inspectors within Bilston ACR. Yes, from my experience, there was a similar set up. Everybody would always make it known where they were, where they were going. You would never just get up and leave your seat and leave it to guesswork. So, that was always a consistent model in my opinion.
- 175.** I am asked if there was an unduly long or an average amount of time that you might be away from your post. No. There were no specifics. I think the vast majority of Duty Officers would eat and drink at their desk. You were never further away than down the stairs in the ACR or down the stairs in the Service Centre or through the kitchen area. Somebody always knew where to get you.

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- 176.** I am asked whether, on an average day where there are no incidents coming to your attention which require you to be downstairs, would five to ten minutes be an unreasonable amount of time to be away from your post in the Overview Room. No. That is not an unreasonable length of time. At the weekends, specifically, you were responsible for everybody in the building. You had that duty of care to everybody in the building and we all took that very seriously. So, it could absolutely be the case that you would be away from your desk dealing with personnel matters, but your location would always be known. That is where the cohesive nature of the team in Overview, ACR and service centre took effect because you would be very dictatorial in Overview that we have a minimum of, say, three in there all the time. You would never expect your Sergeant, Inspector and the Intelligence Officer to be away and leave one person in Overview alone. If I was away doing something, the expectation for me, other than comfort breaks, would be that the core in Overview remained to cover off anything. That was a similar model down in the Area Control Rooms. If one Sergeant was away from the desk for any given reason, then you'd be very expectant of the other Sergeants to be at their desk and cover the responsibilities for that absence.
- 177.** I am asked if five to ten minutes would be longer than necessary to do that if there was nothing else going on. No, I do not think that is longer than necessary. If there is nothing apparently ongoing to you at the time, and there was an absolute expectation that we would meet the welfare needs of everybody in the building at the time. There was no time limit because you had the reassurance that you would be made aware if anything was ongoing. You would regularly engage with the ACR and ask how things were going, how the filters were looking, how the divisional resources were looking and so on. It was as much managing just that continual demand as it was managing the demand of more serious incidents.
- 178.** I am asked whether an incident could, in theory, be managed using a hand-held airwave. I would never do that. You would always return to Overview and use the systems at your disposal.

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- 179.** I am asked whether all elements of an incident could be managed remotely away from Overview, even though my personal practice would not be to do this. The theory exists that it is achievable. For example, if you had a systems failure of the ICCS - the Integrated Command and Communication System, which you have on your desk and allows you to communicate on the airwave channels and on the phone you could command an incident on a hand held airwave device. It would be incredibly difficult, but it is in theory achievable. It is not best practice. This remains the case today.
- 180.** I am asked if remote management of an incident has changed since 2015. No, it has not changed and is explained above.

Composition of the ACR and Overview as at 2015

- 181.** I am asked to talk about the layout of the building. In 2015, as is the case now in 2023, Overview was a separate room, and when you are in the Overview Room, you cannot see the ACR or the Service Centre. So, when you are out the Overview Room, you are away from the view of your colleagues in Overview. When you are in the Service Centre and ACR, then you are obvious to colleagues. At that time in 2015, there was not any blind spots where you could be speaking to someone and not be seen. I would tell colleagues where I was going, for example, to see the Sergeants in the ACR or colleagues in the service centre. Everybody knew where you were at any given time. If the Sergeants down the stairs were going away for a comfort break or making lunch, dinner, cups of tea, etc., they would declare that to their other Sergeants so that everybody knew where everybody was.
- 182.** The composition of the ACR and Overview is covered earlier in my statement.
- 183.** I am asked if the Service Centre is where the CRM would operate. Yes, it is. They would take that in at the first point of contact as detailed above.
- 184.** I am asked if there are still no windows out of it. There are windows, but you cannot see the ACR from Overview. The ACR area was meant to be fireproof

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in the event of any damage to the building. There is a key entry into the ACR and the Service Centre.

Allocation of resources

- 185.** I am asked about allocation of resources and if a controller has authority to send more than one response resource to a call. I am given the example of a dog handler. Yes, they had that authority in 2015. The only resources they were not able to allocate without my permission would be the firearms officers.
- 186.** I am asked whether, where a Sergeant on the ground requests further resources, this should be honoured, or whether the decision would be balanced between the ACR Inspector and the Sergeant on the ground. Yes, very much. The command and control of an incident is a collaborative approach. The controllers are there to facilitate what local policing require. Once you have the arrival of local policing assets, then primacy of control or command of that incident generally sits with local policing. The controller is then there to support local policing officers on the ground and facilitate their requests. This remains the case now. In 2023 the allocation of resources is still the responsibility of the controllers or the Duty Officer where required.

Handling of a knife incident

- 187.** I am asked who had command over knife incidents. I am further asked whether it is local officers or is it the Duty Officer. The command of any incident is fluid, because if you look at the lifetime of an incident, that will start with the Service Centre. So, the initial command of that incident sits with the Service Advisor because they are determining what information they are taking, what incident they are creating and where they are transferring that to. Once that has been completed, the STORM incident goes across to the Area Control Room. So, you would have a controller and, if necessary, a Sergeant who would own that initially in the ACR and determine what is needed to manage the incident. At

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that point they are in command of the incident. They would be responsible for deploying appropriate resources. Once resources arrive at that scene, you could quantify that they then have command of the incident because they are there dealing with it, and if they have capacity to deal with it in its completeness at that time, they own it for the duration of that. Your local policing supervisory model has command of that incident with the Area Control Room, as I say, being more facilitators to support them.

- 188.** If that incident progresses to the point where conventional local policing assets are not suitable for that response, then the command would transfer to the Duty Officer, ITFC, if indeed there was specialist assets needed to attend. If it is then declared a firearms incident, for the time that it is a firearms incident, the ITFC is in absolute command. The local policing Inspector on the ground is then tasked by the ITFC. So, they would then be directed by myself as the ITFC as to what they were doing. Once the firearms element of the incident has been concluded, you could then see that command of the incident being transferred back to the local policing Inspector or, indeed, Sergeant depending on who was all there. So, the command structure is fluid.
- 189.** I am asked if it is right that an incident should be listed as a knife incident even when those officers arrive, and no knife can be seen. Yes. The incident will remain the same until you confirm the information you have been provided with. Officers will attend having been appropriately briefed by a controller and confirm that they have the individual under control and have not recovered any weapon. They may, for example, have another item, which has been perceived by a witness as being a knife/weapon. I would expect that once you have confirmed all relevant information, you would amend the STORM incident to accurately reflect the circumstance for statistical purposes.
- 190.** I am asked whether the incident type and grading would be changed where the presence of a knife is confirmed. Yes, and again, that would probably be an automatic default with the incident type for the grading.
- 191.** I am asked whether the incident type would only be changed from a knife incident where officers have apprehended the individual and have confirmed

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the presence of a knife or lack thereof. Yes, you want the closure codes to be accurate on STORM. I'm trying to think back in terms of the statistical returns, you would want the incident to remain accurate throughout its duration. There were certain incidents that you would not want changed because you would not want to dilute the significance of them. So, again, it probably comes down to circumstance as much as anything else in terms of how that may or may not be changed during the lifetime of a STORM incident.

- 192.** I am asked whether an incident would remain as a knife incident where it is confirmed there is no knife on the person, but it is unconfirmed whether the knife is in the vicinity. You would expect attending officers to make all reasonable enquiries to confirm or negate the presence of a weapon in the possession of, or proximity to the individual if that is the information that has been reported to Police. It is possible for an individual to dispose of a weapon before Police arrive and an appropriate search could be carried out in such circumstance. You would not want to allow the opportunity for an individual to retrieve a discarded weapon and go on to harm someone after they have been dealt with by Police. Again, it goes back to the trust and confidence of the attending officers to deliver a proportionate policing response.
- 193.** I am told that in Inspector Stewart's statement that a knife incident may not automatically become a firearms response incident where AFOs were deployed, however that this changes when there is a risk to the public. I am asked if it is correct that back in 2015 that Scotland was not in line with England in terms of this. Any response to reports of an individual in possession of a knife would be assessed and resourced as detailed previously in my statement. When formulating a threat assessment and working strategy the wording used by Police Scotland in 2015 differed from England and Wales and I have articulated this at paragraph 31. That did not dilute what you were trying to achieve in deploying appropriate officers deemed necessary at that time. I do not believe there was a difference in responding to knife calls between Police Scotland to the rest of the UK, albeit there was a difference in the wording of the working strategy in 2015.

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194. I am referred to the paragraph 10.2 of the Armed Policing Operational Response SOP (**PS10985**) on the area of responsibility of the ACR Duty Officer where it states:

“Deployment of armed firearms officers should only be authorised in the following circumstances: where the officer authorising the deployment has reason to suppose that officers may have to protect themselves or others from a person who [firearm obviously isn’t applicable but] is in possession or has immediate access to other potentially lethal weapon.”

I am asked if this was the guidance that was in place as at 2015 and whether this is the guidance that would inform my decision making. Yes, it is. The full wording of the SOP is as follows –

The deployment of AFOs would only be authorised where the Authorising Officer has **reason to suppose** that officers may have to protect themselves or others from a person who:

1. Is in possession of a firearm/or potentially lethal weapon;
2. Has immediate access to a firearm/or potentially lethal weapon;
3. Is otherwise so dangerous the deployment of AFOs is appropriate;
4. As an occupational contingency in a specific operation based on the threat assessment;
5. For the humane destruction of animals which are dangerous or suffering unnecessarily.

195. I am asked if I would act using that SOP and would it inform your decision-making on whether to class an incident as requiring a firearms response. Yes, that was one component part as detailed above. We would all have sheets made up to assist and complete during the command of a firearms incident. Inspector Stewart was no different. So, individuals work in different ways but, the structure of what you had to cover, which was given to you as part of your ITFC course, was similar across all ITFCs. You had to be able to relay that

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directly to the Strategic Firearms Commander on conclusion of an incident if you had, indeed, deployed firearms assets. In the early assessment of the information, you would need to satisfy yourself that the authority to deploy firearms officers had been met and be able to justify your decision-making rationale. You have to be specific to say: "I have reason to suppose that the authorisation of firearms officers is appropriate because," and "here is my rationale for that." You were certainly taken to task by the Strategic Firearms Commanders to explain exactly your rationale as to why you have done, or not done something and what your decision making was.

196. I am referred back to the paragraph 10.2 of the above noted SOP where it states:

"There is a reason to suppose the officers may have to protect themselves or others from a person who is in possession of, or has immediate access to, a firearm or other potentially lethal weapon."

I am asked what guidance the Inspector on the day should have been operating from. There is a distinction between firearms incidents and knife incidents. The knives could fall under the otherwise so dangerous/other potentially lethal weapon in some cases but not all the time. Where reports come in that someone is in possession of a firearm, then a firearms response is likely. But there are many different variables with someone that is in possession of a weapon, not just a knife. It is far more subjective and open to interpretation and, as I said earlier on, the decisions to be made are the responsibility of the ITFC unequivocally at that point. They make the decisions with the best of their honestly held beliefs at that time.

197. I am asked which decision-making criteria I would use. There are several component parts and I do not know what has been submitted in evidence from Inspector Stewart's threat assessment or working strategy on the day. So, you will be asking yourself "Has the criteria for the deployment of armed officers been met?" which would be one of the four circumstances above. The next

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stages are to then justify your decision-making rationale. You then complete your threat assessment and your working strategy, so all of those parts work as a collective. For example, if you have an instance where someone has a chainsaw in public and is actively trying to injure people, the risk to the immediate public is high and the risk to officers is high. Are officers with their conventional OST capable of dealing with that? No. So that assessment as a firearms authorisation is appropriate. If you have someone in possession of a baseball bat, who is in the public domain but, is not threatening, then is the risk to the public high? No. Is the risk to officers high? No, it is low. I would not send firearms officers to that. That is where the dynamic risk assessments from the Duty Officers become key and the logging of those decisions becomes crucial for any incident review. There is no manual to say you ‘This is what you should do.’ It is very much open to your interpretation of circumstances at the time, and then your ultimate justification to say why you took a course of action at that particular time. This practice in 2015 is the same as today.

Deployment of specialist resources

198. In relation to 2015, I am asked whether confirmation of the knife by the officers at the scene have to be given in order for AFOs to be dispatched. I am further asked whether it would be sufficient for a witness to state that they have sighted a knife, or are suspicious that there is a knife, for AFOs to be deployed. Both in 2015 and current day, 2023, as mentioned earlier in my statement, the assessment of an ongoing incident is the collection of as much information as possible, making decisions and implementing an appropriate policing response. This will take into account the behaviour of the individual, what behaviour are they exhibiting? You could have the situation where someone may be in possession of a knife which is concealed in their clothing or somebody is actively running around trying to injure people with a knife. Both individuals are in possession of a knife, but the manner in which they are behaving is very different, which may alter your response. Again, it is down to the individual

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circumstances and information that you have at the time and no single factor can be taken in isolation.

- 199.** I am asked whether, as part of my decision-making process as the Duty Officer on that day, I would be attempting to communicate with officers on the ground to confirm the presence of a knife. Yes, I would. Possibly not in person but I would want to know if a knife was visible to attending officers and get a description of it.
- 200.** I am asked if I would be looking for answers to that question in order to decide whether to deploy AFOs. Yes, that complements your decision. You then become very demanding "Tell me what I need to know now." This allows an appropriate assessment and becomes a key attribute of what you need to be doing.
- 201.** The position on the day is put to me that AFOs were basically prompted that there was an ongoing situation in Kirkcaldy and, they were asked to go on to Kirkcaldy 1, and they were basically told to prep themselves, but they were not deployed. I am asked whether this is standard practice or where you might simply dispatch AFOs to the scene regardless. Again, you could look at that from two different views. I think it is good practice to tell the ARVs as early as possible that an incident is ongoing and the ITFC is assessing this and trying to get more details. They would be asked to monitor the relevant channel and await further instruction. They are then aware of the radio transmissions, rather than have to have the transmissions relayed from the Duty Officer. In some circumstances, if you are not entirely clear about what is happening, you will ask them to attend a rendezvous point in anticipation that they may be required to be deployed. That is entirely down to the thinking of the ITFC at the time as to what course of action he or she may choose to take.
- 202.** A hypothetical situation is put to me where you are not receiving feedback and an emergency button has been pressed. I am asked whether I would choose simply to send them out. No, you would never just send them, and I have covered these points earlier in my statement. Without being there on the day, my working hypotheses is you want everybody to be on the front foot as early

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as possible. For example, travel time comes into this as well. I do not know where the nearest firearms officers were. So, if they have to travel some distance to the location, it would be prudent to get them to start making their way to the general area of the incident and hold at a designated rendezvous point. This allows efficient deployment if required.

203. I am asked if it is a standard response to send officers to a rendezvous point close to the scene. Yes, it is called tactically relocating firearms officers. The policy at the time, if the Duty Officer takes the decision to tactically relocate the firearms sets, then there was a strong inference that you are anticipating you will need to deploy them. So, during the initial stage of that incident, I would take command of it. I believe this changed in recent years and even if a Duty Officer has tactically relocated firearms officers, the PIO can deal with the initial stages of the incident. Geography plays a part and if you are in any doubt, you would instruct the firearms officers to make their way to a certain location without delay. Generally, you want to cut down travel time and if they are not required then you have not lost anything.

204. I am asked whether deployment of AFOs to a rendezvous point close to the incident is good practice. Yes, and if they are five minutes away, it makes common sense that that is better than being 35 minutes away. You want to minimise officers having to drive with blue lights on at high speed because you are protecting the interests of the officers and the wider public. So if you are tactically relocated, known as TR'd they would drive at speeds appropriate to the grading of the incident and their driver authorisations. My overarching principle is to move them early and make sure they are as near to the location as possible.

205. I am asked whether there would there be any circumstances where, due to geographical location, I might give the command to: "Sit and wait and do not go to the rendezvous point. Just be aware, log into the channel." Yes, I mean, again, it is so subjective in terms of your assessment of the information, which is happening real time. You may instruct them to monitor a particular airwave channel whilst the incident is developing. That gives them the knowledge of the

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incident whilst you assess it. When you brief them, they would already have an awareness of what they were going to be briefed about.

- 206.** I am asked whether I recall what the criteria for deployment of ARVs and AFOs was as at 3rd May 2015. The terminology can sometimes be confused. Your AFO is an Authorised Firearms Officer. An ARV is an Armed Response Vehicle. 'Foxtrot Mike' is the prefix of all armed response vehicle call signs. Any time the ITFC is deploying firearms officers, you must fully brief them as to why they are being authorised. They would have the right to question my rationale and therefore I had to be thorough in my briefing and tactics that I authorised. In my time as an ITFC I did not experience any conflict of this nature. When you are sending officers armed with firearms to an incident that is the highest level of escalation, so you need to be very clear in your own mind why you are deploying them. It needs to be based on good evidence or information as to why you are making that decision.
- 207.** I am asked if AFOs are always deployed with ARVs. Yes, you will have one or two officers in each vehicle. They would always be in a vehicle and mobile because it would be inappropriate for them not to be deployed in vehicles. They may be on foot patrol in the general confines of an area, for example the Scottish Parliament, but also have immediate access to a vehicle if required. Firearms officers have a different patrol matrix to general policing duties, so they would always be kept free. If they stopped a vehicle, for example, a drink driver which they would do from time to time, you would pass that as quickly as you possibly could onto local policing or roads policing, so that they were then free to perform specific roles around firearms deployments if necessary.
- 208.** I am asked to refer to the incident on 3rd May 2015 where ARVs were told to stand down. I am asked what sort of indicators I would be looking for in a developing situation to tell me: "I now need to make the call to tell the AFOs to stand down and whether I would be looking for feedback. As I mentioned earlier, where you are satisfied that the level of risk is being dealt with by the response officers, and you are satisfied that you do not need to add that additional tier of specialist resource, then you would be happy to stand them

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down. Without overly complicating things, we do send AFOs to some medical situations as they have a higher degree of medical training, given the roles that they do.

- 209.** I am asked if AFOs always come with ARVs. Yes, that is correct. As mentioned earlier in my statement, AFO is an Authorised Firearms officer – a person. An ARV is an Armed Response Vehicle which is resourced with Authorised Firearms Officers. Once I am satisfied that divisional officers are dealing competently with the incident and I do not need to deploy AFOs you would stand them down and ask they return to their normal patrol duties.” It is a simple instruction and, then if anything was to change to that, you would give them direct tasking.
- 210.** I am asked whether you would leave ARVs/AFOs at the rendezvous point until the conclusion of the incident. Yes. For me personally, you want to be satisfied the incident has been successfully concluded before you move anyone away. If indeed you have put them there in the first place.
- 211.** I am asked if there are specific rendezvous points or whether the rendezvous (RV) points are places of my choosing near the scene. Yes, the RV point is our choosing. You would make them sensible, good arterial routes in, ease of access and away from the public glare because, then and more so now, social media is so prevalent that people want to put that on social media as quickly as possible. So, you try to be very sensible as to where you deploy them to in terms of a rendezvous point.
- 212.** I am asked whether you can still deploy AFOs in a situation where it is not declared as a firearms incident. Very rarely. In 2015 there was significant scrutiny on tasking armed officers to unarmed incidents around public perception of deploying firearms officers to non-firearms incidents. So, it was certainly not commonplace, and you would hold in reserve the firearms officers for the more serious incidents. If you were engaged in potentially looking for a missing person – or vehicle stops - then that may be appropriate because they were a suitable resource to assist in some types of incidents. You wanted to keep them active and involved as much as you could for their own welfare and

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productivity. Any deployment to a non-firearms incident would have to be authorised by the Duty Officer on shift. This particular incident was never declared as a firearms incident. It was always a conventional policing response.

- 213.** I am asked if the deployment of ARVs were considered and are ARVs not deployed with AFOs. The ARV is the term for armed response vehicles. Firearms officers patrol in ARVs all the time for operational reasons. The Duty Officer would have to give specific direction if a firearms officer was used for a non-firearms related incident, i.e. helping to search for a missing person or the potential of forced entry to a premises if they were seeking to confirm or negate that somebody was in the house.
- 214.** I am asked whether or not it was the case that the instruction of armed vehicles to prepare themselves would necessarily mean that firearms officers would be coming with them. Yes, the firearms officers are in the armed response vehicles. Moving them to an area would be tactically locating them. That is just making sure they were in the vicinity of an incident. Authorising them to deploy as firearms officers allows them to put on their helmets and all their apparatus and then take all the guns and equipment out of the vehicle.
- 215.** What I would always want to try and avoid is a situation where a firearms officer attended an incident and had to 'self-authorise.' You always wanted a very structured and very controlled attendance. They knew when they were attending something having been authorised as a firearms officer. They would have access to all their equipment that you had authorised them to carry. They had their side arms with them and their larger machine guns. I have never been firearms trained as a firearms officer, but their larger guns were in a safe in the vehicle. They were only allowed to take them out of the safe once they had been authorised to deploy as a firearms officer. There may be other incidents where they would be asked to deploy in support of an unarmed enquiry. I would have to authorise that. You would risk assess the incident and authorise attendance. Your permission would then be logged on the STORM with supporting rationale. That was heavily scrutinised by armed policing the next working day.

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- 216.** I am asked if it is correct that a controller could make a decision as to whether to deploy a dog unit. Yes, absolutely.
- 217.** I am asked whether dog units would be deployed once it hits a certain grading or whether that is left up to the discretion of the controller or indeed the Inspector. Very much the discretion of the controller and the Sergeant. I think the dog units are a fantastic resource. We mentioned earlier on the desire to de-escalate as quickly as possible. In a lot of occasions, when you look at busy public streets on a busy Saturday night, sometimes the presence of a dog is just sufficient to completely de-escalate matters. So that is a natural route for the controllers. If you have reports of someone with a knife or a weapon then, absolutely, they should be considering at all times the allocation of a dog unit.
- 218.** I am asked at what point a dog unit would be deployed to an incident. I am further asked whether it be at the point that the call is received or after the officers arrive at the scene. This is an assessment made by the controller or supervisor. You put your trust in them to say: "What is it we have and what do we need?" Again, if there is a sufficiency or an availability of a dog unit, then it is uppermost in most controllers' mind that if a weapon is mentioned, then they will task a dog unit to the call. The dog handlers are acutely tuned into this and they are actively seeking to attend those types of things, with due regard for whatever else is going on at the time. So, yes, we see that as a natural progression.
- 219.** I am asked whether, like ARVs/AFOs, I would send the dog unit to a rendezvous point. If someone was in possession of a weapon and the controller had identified that, you would send them straight to the incident. Yes, again, the deployment of a dog unit to an incident, if the dog handler chooses to get his dog out the vehicle and deploy the dog that is their decision to make. The controllers do not send any units and dictate what they have to do. It is a decision-making process for the individual.
- 220.** I am asked for clarification, specifically where a dog unit was some 20 minutes away from the location, whether that would impact my decision. No, I think again you would, realistically, like to start moving them immediately. Again, it

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goes back to what I said that I would rather be on the front foot than wait. Early deployment is preferable.

- 221.** Some incidents are protracted, others are over very quickly, and you do not know that at the start. You would not assume the incident may be resolved quickly and chose not to do X, Y or Z. The nature of dynamic policing is such that we have to deal with the 'what if' and respond to that accordingly.
- 222.** I am asked whether the fact of an arrest would negate the need for deployment of specialist resources, especially when an emergency button had been pressed. In a hypothetical situation if you have someone under arrest, by the nature of that statement, they are under control. If the individual concerned is under the control of police, then the threat, in whatever way, that they were presenting has been negated to the wider public and officers. So, if that was a case that you had someone restrained, for example in handcuffs and, under the control of police officers, there would be no requirement for any other officers to attend that scene to deal with the arrest phase. As mentioned earlier, AFOs can be deployed in a medical capacity if relevant and dog handlers can be used to search for discarded items if required.
- 223.** I am asked how I would respond in the situation where an arrest has been made, but an emergency button has previously been pushed. I am asked whether I would ask the officers: "Oh, but you pressed the emergency button." You would be doing the welfare checks post incident absolutely. Confirmation that everything was under control, if appropriate would be sought. The officer activating the emergency button would be contacted to ensure there was no longer the requirement of further assistance. Nothing here would necessarily require the attendance of further officers. For example, if the welfare concern was someone has been injured, then an ambulance would be contacted. Or *in extremis*, the firearms officers have been used to provide emergency first aid to colleagues until the arrival of an ambulance. But certainly, if the subject is under the control of the police and you have an update from the scene confirming no more help is required or further help is required, you would act accordingly.

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- 224.** The only change to that would be if, for example, somebody had been seen with a gun, and they had thrown the gun away and it is lying in the middle of the road and the individual was there, they were under control of officers. In that case, you would send the firearms officers in that situation to make the weapon safe because you would not allocate that responsibility to local officers.
- 225.** I am asked if it is right to assume that everything is ok simply because an arrest had taken place. I think the emergency button is can be misinterpreted. You would want confirmation that the matter was under the control of officers and clarification if anything else was required. Because as I say, the ACR can become the conduit to achieving what local policing needs, so you would attend to additional requests for example contacting a senior officer/CID personnel. So, there may be actions for the ACR to complete on the back of that but, you would certainly want confirmation everything was in order. I have no doubt and I do not want to read too much into Inspector Stewart's statement, but I know, having worked with him, he was a very professional individual. I've absolutely no doubt that he would not be satisfied until, he knew that incident had been resolved completely.

Specially Trained Officers ('STOs')

- 226.** I am referred to a slide 6 of a PowerPoint (**PS18570**) entitled 'Specially Trained Officer Input – ACR Supervisor' which states that:

"STOs should be considered for all incidents where Tasers could assist with incident management."

And further where it states that STOs:

"... can be deployed to routine incidents, violent confrontations, threats of self-harm, domestics.... ongoing disturbance, weapons scene."

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I am asked if this is the training that I had at the time on deployment of STOs and I am referred to the 2015 date on the training document. I do not recall, in 2015, having the availability of STOs. So, you had the conventional policing response and you had firearms. My recollection is you did not have STOs, certainly in the East, available at that time. That was an evolution since 2015, where you now have the potential for a slightly enhanced tiered response of local policing, STOs, firearms officers. It was certainly something I never had to contend with, in my memory, whilst I was a Duty Officer.

227. I am asked if it might be that this training came out, but it was not necessarily used by people within that division at the time. Yes, you had your firearms officers which were equipped with Tasers and less lethal options, but I do not recall response officers having been issued with Tasers at that point.

228. I am asked if the decision-making of firearms officers to take a specific course of action, for example discharging a weapon, ultimately lies with them. Yes.

229. I am asked if I would consider deploying an STO to an ongoing disturbance with a weapon. Yes. If this was available to me as a tactical option in 2015, which I cannot recall if this was the case. This would be based on the circumstance and the information available to me. In 2023, you have officers equipped with Taser. You also have to have an awareness that Taser is not always a viable option. Certainly, more in wintertime, if people are wearing thick padded coats, Tasers are less effective. So, all of that needs to be taken into account. It does not diminish or reduce if an ITFC needs to look at something and accurately assess it, then regardless of whether Taser officers are available, there still sometimes needs to be that oversight from the ITFC.

Delivery of stay safe message

230. I am referred to evidence from PC Masterton which states that it was not the responsibility of the controller to deliver the stay safe message. However, Michelle Hutchison's evidence was that controllers had, at the time, been trained to deliver stay safe messages in firearms incidents or where there is a

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potentially lethal weapon. I am asked if I can clarify who has the first responsibility. My understanding of that was if you declare a firearms incident, the stay safe message becomes very relevant. It is designed for a declared firearms incident. If it is a response to an individual in possession of an edged weapon and not declared a firearms incident, then there are other acronyms. Both in 2015 and 2023 it is CUTT principles, which stands for Create distance, Use Cover (any large objects available), Transmit to ensure all people in the area (including the ACR) are aware the individual has an edged weapon and Tactical options.

231. So, the stay safe, in my mind, has the premise in a firearms incident because it tells you to take cover, to take specific actions. So in in May 2015, rightly, the controllers would not have a requirement to broadcast the stay safe message for this incident as it was not declared a firearms incident. In a declared firearms incident, you make sure the stay safe is read out. It is important they read it out to the officers that they acknowledge that they are aware of it. So, again, it comes back to trying to keep people as safe as you can. So, my interpretation of that is, absolutely, the controllers are more than capable of issuing the stay safe message and it is absolutely appropriate that they would read out the stay safe message for a firearms incident.

232. I am asked where the ultimate responsibility to check the delivery of the stay safe message lies. I am asked whether it lies, in the first instance with the controller, but a Sergeant or an Inspector or Duty Officer may double-check that a stay safe message has been delivered. If it has not, might they deliver the stay safe message. Yes. I mean, it was not uncommon for Michelle Hutchison as the communications officer in Overview to deliver the stay safe message during an ongoing firearms incident, and you would seek acknowledgement of that from the officers attending. Again, that was designed to keep them and members of the public as safe as we could.

233. I am asked if it is correct that there was a standard stay safe message. Yes, that is correct.

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- 234.** I am asked whether there were reminders of the stay safe message placed on desks as at 3rd May 2015. Yes.
- 235.** I am asked whether I would want confirmation of delivery of the stay safe message articulated on STORM. Yes.
- 236.** I am asked whether that would be read word for word. Yes, it was to be verbatim. It was designed never to be rushed and it was not one of these read it as quick as you can to get it done. It was there for a purpose and a reason. So, you wanted to – as best as you could – make sure that was a very deliberate delivery.
- 237.** I am asked can the stay safe message ever be changed in an incident where there is a potentially lethal weapon or whether it should it always be the same. If you have declared a firearms incident, the stay safe message is that consistent narrative.
- 238.** I am asked what sort of instructions I would be delivering following the delivery of a stay safe message. The role of the ITFC becomes very complex at that point, and then that is when you really rely on the assistance of your Sergeants within the ACR and Overview. You have the two parts to this where you have declared it as a firearms incident. Time does not stop for you, but you are compelled to give a thorough briefing to the firearms officers, so they know what they are authorised for and they know what their powers and processes are going to be. So, during the management of that, the stay safe message goes out to local policing so you want to be sure that the officers at the locus are fully aware of the expectations on them, which is for example do not approach, do not engage, and try and keep the public away, or whatever those instructions might be. So, your local policing Inspector - Police Incident Officer (PIO), becomes your on-the-ground manager of all such aspects of the incident and you have to put your trust in them to make sure that they are doing what they need to be doing.
- 239.** So, once you have briefed the firearms officers, then you can go back onto the local channel as well for any updates on what is happening. That is the busiest

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part during the initial stages of the firearms incident. That is a really crucial aspect of the ITFC's role.

- 240. I am asked after the stay safe message has been delivered, what sort of feedback I am expecting to receive. Yes. I'd be expecting an acknowledgement from anyone that is allocated to the particular incident.
- 241. I am asked what would happen if I did not receive an acknowledgement to the stay safe message. The response should be immediate and that would be overseen by the controllers or supervisors as I would be involved in briefing the firearms officers.
- 242. I am asked whether the delivery of the stay safe message would be tagged on the STORM incident log. Yes, it would. It was in place back in 2015 and it is in place now.

Use of aide-mémoire and the National Decision-making Model

- 243. I am told that Inspector Stewart mentioned that there are aide memoires for different scenarios that you might work from. I am asked if there are more detailed and specific versions and whether they are modelled around the NDM. No, both in 2015 and 2023, certainly my own personal working practice was the NDM. It is a national document, so that is set in stone, if you like. You would have your firearms assessment, the document that runs during any incident. You are issued with a general plan when you are on your ITFC course and once you come away from that, because people work in different ways, you just establish your own version. This was the case in 2015 and is the case now in 2023. Whatever you work from must include all the component parts of that document. So, it talks about: your powers and policy; your facts and assumptions; the threat and risk assessment; your working strategy; what tactics have you authorised, so on and so forth. That then becomes an auditable document which is submitted on the back of the firearms deployment.
- 244. Both in 2015 and remaining current to date, you also then complete on conclusion of the firearms incident, a command policy log, which is endorsed

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by the Strategic Firearms Commander, which is generally the Chief Superintendent and submitted to armed policing.

- 245.** I am asked whether the firearms document that I refer to could be what Inspector Stewart refers to as an aide-mémoire. I do not know what he would be referring to in terms of that. I would not choose to call it an aide-mémoire. You have aide-mémoires for, for example, a terrorist incident or a bomb threat etc. I created a Word document with all the stay safe messaging, CUTT principles and other relevant information so I could lift information from this document and apply it to the STORM incident quickly. Then the documentation that I worked from, I just found it flowed well when I was doing the briefings, and that then became the natural document for briefing the Strategic Firearms Commander when required.
- 246.** I am asked if we all had something that assisted us through the specific incident types and then you would amend them. Not so much the incident type because if you are deploying firearms, your rationale for why you are deploying specific resources, for example firearms resources, would be based on your assessment of the circumstances as I have detailed above.
- 247.** I am asked whether Grade 1 non-firearms incidents would have a specific document which as an aid memoire. If you had a terrorist attack in Edinburgh, I had a bespoke document for that because it was slightly different wording that you wanted to use, but thankfully that was never required as it never happened. If it is a non-firearms deployment you would spin the National Decision Model, you would document your assessment on the STORM job. I would not document that anywhere else.
- 248.** I am asked at what point in the NDM you would be identifying your resources. I think that is twofold for me. As we spoke about before, you would try to de-escalate the situation through communication. I do not know the training the officers that attended on that day had all had. You would try to assess what is the likely cause of an individual behaving in a certain way. The response in 2015 was a conventional response. The Scottish Ambulance Service generally seek confirmation that the individual is under control before deploying their

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resource. Understandably so, if there are reports of an individual being violent and/or in possession of a knife, Ambulance personnel want that sterile situation to work in once the individual is under control.

So, if you look at that from a firearms point of view, that forms part of your working strategy. Do you deem that this person may be suffering from any mental health condition or are they a vulnerable person? You would assess this as part of your working strategy. If you do believe that they are either suffering from a mental health condition or are otherwise a vulnerable person, you change the deployment matrix of the firearms officers, for example - remind them of their recourse to consider less lethal weapons and options, use effective cover /evacuation of the immediate area, be prepared to back off /give available space when considering containment. Use early negotiation.

Handling of a mental health incident from an ACR perspective as at 2015

249. I am asked when I am allocating resources whether I am assessing resources in proximity to an incident, or whether that comes once the incident has been identified as a mental health incident. I am asked to think from an ACR perspective. Yes, I think depending on what information you have been provided by the informing members of the public, for example “They appear to be under the influence of something. You will get quite regularly - “They appear to be under the influence of drink or drugs. They appear to be acting in an irrational way.” So, whilst that is not definitive, it is relevant information. Again, it goes back to you would then expect the officers attending to adapt their engagement style accordingly if achievable.

250. I am asked whether, from an ACR perspective, identifying a psychiatric ward formed part of my decision-making during an incident as at 2015. No, and I think that is an irrelevance at the initial stages of an incident. Even then we do not generally have any choice over where they are taken. Generally, individuals exhibiting unusual behaviour would be taken to Accident and Emergency pretty much 100 per cent of the time. You would take them to A&E and medical

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experts would triage them and decide on the best course of clinical treatment. In some cases, you might get mental health (MH) trained professionals advising they need to try and recall an individual back to a particular hospital, so you would know before attending where they were to be taken. But in a dynamic situation if you are transporting someone who may be exhibiting unusual behaviour, you would be going to Accident & Emergency.

Resolution of responsibility of ACR

- 251.** I am asked when responsibilities as a Duty Officer within ACR conclude. Both in 2015 and remaining current today, when all the elements of your working strategy have been satisfactorily completed then, as an ITFC, you would stand the firearms officers down, return them to normal status, and then you would generally hand responsibility of any divisional inquiries across to an Inspector. A quick for example with that, you might have someone in possession of a weapon, in possession of a gun who has been in a flat. Once they are under control, I want to know there is nobody injured in the flat. So, you would be extending your responsibilities for that incident until I was happy that the flat was safe and there was no one injured. Once that was all secured and confirmed you would be rescinding the firearms authorisation.” the individual would be handed over to local policing and then any subsequent investigation, whether it be response, CID, etc., would be the preserve of the PIO or the CID.
- 252.** It does not necessarily end when there has been an arrest. It can extend further past that, because your working strategy is the part where you want to maximise the safety of elements of society and minimise the risk in all that. So once all of your component parts of your working strategy have been completed then that would be conclude your command of the incident.
- 253.** I am referred to Inspector Stewart’s statement (SBPI-00084) at **paragraph 36**. It states:

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“I was aware there must have been some sort of issue during the arrest because the emergency button had been activated but, then the male in question must have been arrested was my assumption, so no need for any specialist resources to be deployed which we’ve dealt with or anything else from me at that time. So it was a case of moving on to the rest of my duties because there were other incidents.”

I am asked to refer to the situation described in Inspector Stewart’s statement. I am asked what I would do in that situation. Again, in the context of that and, I do not want to second guess Inspector Stewart’s language. But where you have a non-firearms incident, once the subject has been contained by the police, it is highly unusual that anything else would then transpire to need the involvement or engagement with the ITFC. So, the assertion for me at that point, Inspector Stewart was entirely satisfied that local policing had dealt with the incident to its conclusion and there was no requirement for him to get involved as an ITFC. Anything else that was required for the management of that incident would then be arranged through the Sergeant, the local policing Inspector, and the controllers down the stairs. As soon as you finish that, as he rightly says there, you are on to reviewing additional incidents to make sure that there is nothing else happening in the East that needs your attention.

Communication with other witnesses

254. I am asked whether I know or have spoken with any other witnesses in the case or discussed the case with them. I was a welfare officer for Inspector Steven Stewart. Whilst not discussing his direct evidence, that was my involvement with him. So, I was aware that he has been a witness in this, but I didn’t have the need to discuss his direct evidence, but I was there as welfare support for him in the lead-up to him presenting evidence.

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Involvement in the investigation since 3rd May 2015

255. I am asked whether I have been involved at all in the investigation since 3 May 2015. No, I have not.

Media

256. I am asked if I have been following the Inquiry so far via social media or the news. Yes, I have been following it. I have watched some of the witness evidence that was presented. I watched some of Inspector Stewart's evidence and that of other witnesses. Clearly, that was before I knew that I would potentially be involved. At the time, I assumed I would not be involved in the inquiry. I have watched the witness evidence from the public inquiry website and the YouTube channel. The public inquiry website provides copies of the evidence that has been provided by witnesses and yes, I have been watching some of it.

Declaration

257. I can confirm that this statement is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

Signature of Witness Date..... November 14, 2023 | 2:05 PM GMT