

Transcript of the Sheku Bayoh Inquiry

Thursday, 1 December 2022

(10.29 am)

LORD BRACADALE: Good morning. I'm sorry there has been on a delay this morning. There was a difficulty with the link to Opus 2, but that has now been resolved.

Before we continue with the evidence I wish to address the legal representatives. I have three matters to mention:

First, yesterday at the close of business Ms Mitchell drew my attention to an incident earlier in the afternoon in which in the course of evidence a legal representative appeared to use a mobile phone for a purpose clearly unrelated to the proceedings of the Inquiry. While that was a particularly egregious example, it was not the first occasion on which the sound of mobile phones has disturbed proceedings.

I have no difficulty with mobile phones being used silently to make communications on matters relating to the Inquiry, but inappropriate use within the hearing room is both distracting and disrespectful.

Second, I have received representations about legal representatives engaging in lengthy conversations during the evidence. This can be distracting to others in the hearing room and to those watching on YouTube. While I accept that occasionally it will be necessary for

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1 legal representatives to speak to each other during the
2 proceedings, I remind them that as well as using
3 mobile phones silently, as I have just suggested, there
4 is a facility on Opus 2 for having private
5 conversations.

6 Third, I have received representations to the effect
7 that certain legal representatives have, on occasion,
8 reacted to some of the evidence by adopting
9 inappropriate facial expressions. If that has been
10 happening it would, on any view, be very disrespectful
11 and wholly unacceptable.

12 May I remind legal representatives that these
13 proceedings are being broadcast and watched around the
14 world. It is therefore as surprising as it is
15 disappointing to have to address members of the Scottish
16 legal profession in these terms. I very much hope that
17 I will not have to do so again.

18 Thank you for your attention. Could I have the
19 witness in, please.

20 MS JOANNE CAFFREY (continued)

21 LORD BRACADALE: Good morning, Ms Caffrey. I'm sorry of you
22 have been kept waiting. We had some difficulty with the
23 link to the transcription service this morning.

24 A. That's okay, sir.

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1 LORD BRACADALE: Ms Grahame.

2 Questions from MS GRAHAME (continued)

3 MS GRAHAME: Thank you.

4 Ms Caffrey, good morning.

5 A. Good morning.

6 Q. Yesterday we were looking at the "Use of Force Standard

7 Operating Procedure" --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- as I asked you questions, and I wonder if we could

10 have that back on the screen, please. That's PS10933

11 and we were focusing on 4.6 and 4.7, "Profiled Offender

12 Behaviour" and a reasonable officer response. There we

13 are, 4.6, and we had begun to discuss a scenario where

14 officers use strong verbal commands, but the subject

15 does not comply --

16 A. Mm-hmm.

17 Q. -- and you had indicated, in relation to the scenario

18 I put, which was: the subject was already walking

19 towards the officers when they got out of a van, they

20 park in his path, he is not aiming at them as such, but

21 he continues walking, does not move and does not divert

22 away from them. So that was the scenario that we were

23 discussing at close yesterday.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. You identified that offender behaviour as level 2 --

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1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- if they failed to comply, which we can see on the
3 screen there at 4.6.3, "Level 2 - Verbal Resistance
4 and/or Gestures". And you said, as I understand it,
5 that a reasonable officer would be considering a level 2
6 response and we will see that at 4.7. So there's the
7 "Officers reasonable response" at 4.7 and level 2, if we
8 can just move down the screen, "Tactical communications"
9 and that would be within that -- the range of options
10 within the tactical communications level --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. -- and I think you agree that that -- where to pitch
13 that response by the officer would be a matter for their
14 discretion, tailored to the particular circumstances
15 they faced.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Thank you. Before we leave this scenario, may I return
18 to the question: if a reasonable officer is faced with
19 level 2 behaviour, would a reasonable officer consider
20 using a level 4 response, namely using their CS or PAVA
21 spray?

22 A. I don't believe so.

23 Q. Why do you say that?

24 A. Simply because looking at proportionality, if the
25 person's at level 2, they're not actually being a threat

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1 to the officer and the idea of level 4 is it's
2 a defensive tactic, so it's used in defence of the
3 officer, or defence of another person, or all other
4 options have been discounted because of the severity of
5 the incident.

6 Q. And just looking at level 4, just if we can move that on
7 to the screen for the moment, this is a defensive
8 tactic -- if we can move up slightly, thank you:

9 "These tactics are generally perceived to be
10 strikes, whether delivered by ... empty hand techniques
11 or baton strikes, but also include the more robust
12 defensive handcuffing techniques and the use of CS
13 Incapacitant Spray."

14 Again, in relation to a level 4 response, would it
15 be reasonable to assume that, again, there's a range of
16 options open to a reasonable officer in adopting a level
17 4 response?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And it describes the use of spray as "a more robust
20 defensive handcuffing technique", or the -- and the use
21 of spray.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Are they the more robust ranges of options within that
24 defensive tactic level?

25 A. They can be. It's the decision -- because you could say

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1 "Well, the open hand techniques could be more robust",
2 it would depend on force levels and some concepts by
3 using the CS, for example, can avoid the physical
4 impact, so depending on the circumstances, CS use could
5 prevent physical injuries, but CS brings about its own
6 potential injuries and risks as well.

7 Q. I will come on to that in a moment.

8 If a reasonable officer is endeavouring, or trying,
9 to adopt the minimum level of force in response to level
10 2 behaviour by the subject --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. -- what options would be open to that officer?

13 A. So, defensive tactics would be as simple as hands up
14 (indicating) and being prepared to push the person
15 backwards. It would also give the opportunity for
16 an officer to back off as well because that's within
17 an officer's response options as well: hands up ready to
18 protect, but also backing off at the same time, whilst
19 using verbal communication.

20 Leading up that, if it was to be an engagement and,
21 for example, the arrest process, then you would be
22 looking at getting -- taking a hold of the person and
23 moving into some kind of restraint technique, which
24 could either be hands alone, so for a physical
25 technique, or it might be that if that's too high a risk

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1 they decide then that they will use such as the CS or
2 the baton.

3 Q. What difference would it make to the options open to
4 an officer, a reasonable officer, if there is concern
5 that the subject had a weapon, perhaps concealed?

6 A. If there's belief that they've got a weapon the last
7 thing you want to really be doing is being within close
8 contact because the weapon can soon be produced and the
9 officer can be stabbed and even though you might have
10 the stab vest on, they only go down so far and they only
11 cover so many of the major organs. It still doesn't
12 prevent you being stabbed in an artery in like the
13 thigh, for example, or within the arms, or within the
14 neck area, here. So certainly you want to keep your
15 distance from a person who you think has got a weapon
16 because of your own personal safety.

17 Q. Thank you. You mentioned that sprays themselves have
18 potential -- the potential to injure the subject or
19 others.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Could you tell us a little about those potential
22 injuries?

23 A. So, for example, a person who has been sprayed, in
24 relation to say, for custody, they are considered
25 a higher risk detainee because of the impacts that can

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1 happen. From the physical aspects we've got potential
2 for -- some people can suffer a kind of burn to the skin
3 from them, but a main impact is panic and breathing can
4 be affected as well, so for some people that are highly
5 sensitive to the chemicals that are used within either
6 CS and PAVA and the spray can affect their breathing
7 capabilities, so particularly then if you've got people
8 with other conditions such as asthma, angina, you know,
9 those then would increase the risk further for the
10 person.

11 Q. And is there a difference, if it's CS or PAVA?

12 A. Well, CS works by -- you can get CS on clothing, or even
13 you could have CS on you and I could be affected here by
14 it. Different people are sensitive to it in different
15 ways.

16 The PAVA works more on the actual individual that it
17 strikes and it needs to be striking them in their eyes
18 rather than the effects of the spray coming off, coming
19 off -- the molecules coming off the actual spray.

20 Q. And we may have heard evidence at the first hearing that
21 some people can become more agitated or aggressive as
22 a result of --

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. -- having spray discharged towards them or on them.

25 A. Definitely, yes.

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1 Q. Is that the case?

2 A. Yes, and it can disorientate people as well,
3 disorientate them, because your eyes will typically need
4 to shut because of the pain that they can cause, so the
5 person then, if they're disorientated, now can't see and
6 that also affects them -- sorry, impacts upon the
7 police officers, because if they get the impact of the
8 CS it can also blind them and make them go into panic as
9 well.

10 Q. And we have heard that sprays can -- the impact of the
11 spray, or the effectiveness of the spray, can be
12 affected by the weather --

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. -- and the wind.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. I would like to move on and ask you about -- taking the
17 situation further now. If CS and PAVA sprays have been
18 used by the officers, so have been discharged towards
19 the subject, but the subject fails to react to either CS
20 or PAVA spray and continues to walk away from officers,
21 thinking again about the categories of behaviour, just
22 in that moment --

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. -- how would a reasonable officer categorise the
25 behaviour of the subject at that point?

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1 A. So that then, when I mentioned yesterday about all these
2 little mini check sheets that you're thinking about when
3 you're dealing with things, that alone would be ticking
4 off things like high intoxication potential, mental ill
5 health crisis potential, which then would link to the
6 likes of the ABD potential, or it's one of these rare
7 people who it just doesn't affect, but the majority of
8 the time the reason it doesn't affect tends to be
9 because of intoxication or mental health crisis.

10 Q. And, I think you explained yesterday, but just for
11 completeness, if a reasonable officer is considering
12 intoxication or mental health crisis, what does that
13 reasonable officer do?

14 A. Notify his control for medical attention.

15 Q. And you mentioned the ABD. Again, could you simply
16 remind us what that is?

17 A. So that's "acute behavioural disturbance" and that
18 terminology, certainly within the police in England and
19 Wales -- prior to that it was "excited delirium" was the
20 common terminology and then in 2002 the Police
21 Complaints Authority published a report and a decision
22 to -- because there were so many different kinds of
23 delirium, they wanted to use one umbrella term, which
24 then they looked at acute behaviour disturbance, so it
25 didn't matter then, medically, what kind of delirium it

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1 was, it would just all be accumulated under this one
2 heading, and at the end of the day, police officers are
3 not medical professionals. Therefore, it's just those
4 risk factors and a generalisation of thinking "This
5 could be that", and then looking at the control factors
6 around those risks.

7 Q. So if at this stage, in the scenario we're discussing,
8 we have reached a stage where the sprays have been
9 discharged and the subject has failed to respond, what
10 signs may have existed which a reasonable officer could
11 identify at that point?

12 A. So there you've got the collection of things now: you've
13 got the bulging of the eyes, you've got the
14 inappropriate clothing for the weather conditions,
15 you've got the lack of communication and response to the
16 officers, you have then got the CS and PAVA not working,
17 so all of that together then is -- there's more evidence
18 to indicate this is a medical requirement.

19 Q. And if a reasonable officer identifies a number of
20 warning signs and considers the possibility that the
21 person has ABD, or intoxication or mental health, what
22 would they do in response to that?

23 A. They must be dealt with as a medical emergency if
24 there's any indication or suspicion of ABD.

25 Q. So even any suspicion of the ABD?

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1 A. Yes, yes, because the police officers can't confirm it
2 is or it isn't.

3 Q. Right. And again, does that mean contacting ACR on the
4 radio asking for an ambulance?

5 A. Yes, yes.

6 Q. And as well as the factors you have mentioned, to what
7 extent would a reasonable officer recognise behaviour
8 that members of the public had phoned up and complained
9 about as a factor?

10 A. I think police officers should be quite well-practised
11 in recognising it because the amount of people that
12 police officers are dealing with on a daily basis, plus
13 the amount of -- percentage of those people who are then
14 under the influence, or suffering with mental health
15 crisis, I think a police officer -- a reasonable
16 police officer would readily identify that the person
17 may be experiencing either or both.

18 Q. To what extent would a reasonable officer, at that
19 moment, consider pulling back or withdrawing from the
20 subject?

21 A. Well, that would certainly be the reasonable officer's
22 instruction to do so because, certainly with officer
23 safety training, the emphasis is in relation to a person
24 suspected of ABD is that "contain" rather than
25 "restrain". The moment you go into a restraint with

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1 a person who is suffering from a delirium condition, it
2 significantly increases the risk of death during
3 restraint.

4 Q. Death to whom?

5 A. To the subject.

6 Q. Right. And can you explain what, if any, defensive
7 controls a reasonable officer would have open to them?

8 A. So, it's -- it's the body posture, it's the containment,
9 it's the dog, it's the -- it's the use of the baton, for
10 example, as a swing to try and keep the distance between
11 you and the person, so they would all still be
12 a defensive tactic, but without physically touching or
13 restraining the person.

14 Q. And to what extent would a reasonable officer engage in
15 a physical restraint, or touch the person, if they have
16 those concerns?

17 A. Well, the training is all focused on: you don't restrain
18 that person. It would be the absolute, sort of, final
19 straw to restrain that person because all other options
20 have either tried and failed or been discounted. So
21 then once if you went to the restraint there would be
22 all the control measures around that.

23 Q. What -- we will come on to that in a moment. What if
24 the reasonable officer suspects that the person may have
25 a knife on their person, although it is not visible?

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1 A. Again, if you believe a person has got a knife on them,
2 the last thing you want to do is be in close contact,
3 particularly then if the person is intoxicated or in
4 crisis because there might be issues around their
5 capacity to understand what's happening and their
6 thought process and so you could be at a higher risk of
7 actually being stabbed by the person as well.

8 Q. And if a reasonable officer is seeking to adopt the
9 minimum level of force, what would that reasonable
10 officer be likely to do?

11 A. It would be trying to just keep a containment and keep
12 the person contained in the space.

13 Q. What would they do in terms of communicating with --

14 A. Talking, constantly talking, trying to offer help,
15 asking the person to be calm, to talk to them. It would
16 be trying to -- trying to impart non-aggression because
17 if the person is in crisis you don't want to aggravate
18 a person, or instill extra fear in them.

19 Q. And why would you not want to do that?

20 A. Because then the person can become either aggressive
21 towards you, or more unpredictable in their behaviour
22 and again, they could try and flee the area which then
23 displaces the risk and may put members of the public at
24 increased risk.

25 Q. And if, during that moment in time, there is a dog unit

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1 available, what difference could that make to the
2 options open to a reasonable officer?

3 A. That the dog can easily contain a person and the
4 officers then can back right off and the dog can then --
5 the dog's got the ability to keep going around the
6 person and to keep them quite contained until the person
7 then gives up. Then once the person has given up and
8 sort of gone to their knees, put their hands up, the
9 officers can then move on in and handcuff and bring the
10 hands round and then a search of the person can be
11 conducted.

12 Q. Thank you. And again, if a reasonable officer is
13 endeavouring to observe the principle of preclusion,
14 what would -- the process they would go through?

15 A. It would be rapidly thinking about how can you resolve
16 this and bring it to a safe conclusion without the use
17 of force, if at all, or what's the minimal use of force,
18 so you're constantly thinking about "Can I try this
19 again?" and just because you have tried something once
20 and it has failed, doesn't stop you trying to again, so
21 it's about trying to exhaust that tactic, or it might
22 just be that that person isn't being successful with it
23 and somebody else could be, because we all have
24 different personality styles, traits, people will
25 respond differently to different officers as well, so

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1 just because one officer has tried a tactic that hasn't
2 worked, doesn't mean to say that nobody else should try
3 it.

4 Q. So, either one reasonable officer could try things more
5 than once --

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. -- or a separate officer who is at the scene could also
8 try?

9 A. Yes, and that's part of the teamwork, that if there's
10 more than one person involved in an incident, as part of
11 a team you can take turns. The key thing is that only
12 one person acts as the contact at any point, so that you
13 don't have multiple people trying to talk to the person
14 at the same time, because that's just going to cause
15 more stimulation and could then cause the person to be
16 more disorientated than they initially were.

17 Q. So would a reasonable officer, perhaps who arrived at
18 the scene a short time after initial officers, would
19 they say "Well, I couldn't do anything because those
20 other officers had adopted a particular approach"? Is
21 that --

22 A. No, you have still got the option. Any officer arriving
23 at the scene still has to decide for them what options
24 are appropriate, so just because another officer is
25 using force or not using force doesn't mean a new

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1 officer coming on the scene has to conduct the same
2 method that that person is doing.

3 Q. Thank you. We heard evidence from Mr Graves and I would
4 like to ask you if you agree with some of his comments.

5 A. Okay.

6 Q. He said that a reason -- in relation to what
7 a reasonable officer would be doing and thinking, you
8 would start thinking -- you would be happy that -- you
9 would have to be happy that you had hit the target:

10 "You [would] start thinking then: is this person 1
11 of 10 that isn't responsive, or is it something else
12 like intoxication, drug intoxication, or some sort of
13 mental health episode that's preventing this individual
14 from showing any signs of irritant or of -- effect from
15 those sprays."

16 A. Yes, with the sprays, yes.

17 Q. You agree with that?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And he indicated that the reasonable officer would:

20 "... now be starting thinking that this person is
21 suffering from some form of ... disorder, we're not sure
22 what, but I would certainly be now thinking that at this
23 point everything's not well and we need to try and deal
24 with this individual.

25 "... at some point when it is practical I am going

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1 to summon medical assistance."

2 Would you agree with that?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. So, moving on, as the subject walks away from the
5 officers, two other officers arrive at the scene. One
6 of them observes the scene and believes that at least
7 one of his colleagues has been slashed by the subject
8 and may be injured. Now, if you can assume for my
9 purposes for the moment that that's a genuine belief --

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. -- how would -- what sort of impact would that have on
12 a reasonable officer who had that genuine belief?

13 A. Okay, well, preservation of life is the top priority for
14 all police attending all incidents, so if you think that
15 one of your colleagues has been slashed with a knife
16 then your priority is going to be that officer, to make
17 sure, is it a life and death level? They're going to
18 need an ambulance whether it's minor or major, so
19 straight off you're going to be needing to be checking
20 on your officer, whether that's physically running over
21 to them or calling over to them while still trying to
22 contain the subject, but you would be on the radio as
23 well shouting "Officer down, ambulance required".

24 Q. Right. Thank you. For that officer, how would they
25 categorise the offender behaviour? We've got the --

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1 A. Yes, so if you believe a colleague has been slashed,
2 that's level 6.

3 Q. Level 6. Why do you say that?

4 A. Because we're talking now about serious aggravated
5 assault on a person.

6 Q. And at 4.6, can we actually see level 6 on the screen?
7 So it will be going back up the page.
8 (Pause).
9 We can come back to that in a moment.

10 A. Okay.

11 Q. And then, if the officer has considered that to be level
12 6, "serious aggravated assaultive behaviour", what would
13 a reasonable officer's response be to that behaviour?

14 A. Well, you want to make sure -- you mean excluding now
15 your colleague?

16 Q. Assuming that the officer has arrived at scene, has
17 a genuine belief that the colleague has been slashed,
18 categorises the subject's behaviour as level 6; what
19 options are open to that officer?

20 A. Okay. So, options would include, from the lowest end,
21 allowing -- depending on the numbers of staff now
22 available, even allowing the subject to flee the scene
23 whilst you administer life-saving response to your
24 colleague, or you have still got to think about -- if
25 you're going to deal with the subject, you have still

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1 got to think about your own safety as well because if
2 they have stabbed -- if you think they have stabbed
3 a colleague you have also then got to be thinking "They
4 could stab me", so they need to be thinking about how
5 can they try and bring this to a safe resolution for all
6 people involved. So again, it would be the basics of
7 "Can tactical communications work?" So, for tactical
8 communications now it might be more directive as in,
9 you know, "Drop the knife, get down on the floor", so it
10 might be more -- it might be more dominant than the TLC
11 aspect at the start, but you would still try the
12 tactical communications, you would still try for the
13 person to give up without having to get into close
14 quarter combat with a person, so if the person can
15 either, you know, discard the knife so that you can see
16 that the knife is discarded and they can lie on the
17 floor, or kneel on the floor and get their hands on
18 their head, then again you don't want to be going into
19 a person whom you don't know whether they're armed or
20 not and if you believe they have already slashed
21 a colleague.

22 Q. So, even with a genuine belief that their colleague had
23 been slashed, would a reasonable officer still bear in
24 mind the preclusion principle --

25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. -- and the minimum force principle?

2 A. Yes. It just means you've got the options now to go up
3 that higher, but that doesn't mean to say you discount
4 all of the others. You're still going to try and bring
5 it to a peaceful resolution for everyone concerned.

6 Q. And the example that you told us yesterday about the
7 person who had been stabbed and was lying in the
8 building, the flat, and the subject present, is that
9 a similar situation where it would appear the subject's
10 behaviour, I think, was level 6?

11 A. Yes, because at that point we believed he had stabbed
12 that person, so even though we believed that he had --
13 we were looking at to arrest him for suspicion of
14 murder, we still kept that distance and tried to bring
15 it to a peaceful resolution, yet still prioritised the
16 preservation of life of the victim as well.

17 Q. So those lesser forceful options remain open to
18 officers?

19 A. Yes, yes.

20 Q. And what sort of information, at this stage -- you have
21 said the reasonable officer would be on the radio. What
22 information would be shared with ACR, by the officer?

23 A. So here you've got the issues of the officer down aspect
24 wanting the ambulance and you're also wanting an
25 ambulance for the subject because of the volume of risk

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1 factors as well, so at this point you're needing two
2 ambulances to attend and you're also calling for -- in
3 relation to -- if you think your officer has been
4 stabbed you're going to be saying the "Officer down,
5 stabbed" because you want additional resources. You
6 want to avoid having to go hands-on into that close
7 quarter combat with a person who you think has already
8 stabbed a colleague and might still be armed because
9 it's demonstrating, in your mind, that they've got the
10 means and the intention to do that level of harm.

11 So again, this would be additional evidence for
12 tactical commanders to instruct officers even to back
13 off and withdraw, or saying, you know, "Hold the line,
14 the ARV or the dog is like 30 seconds away".

15 Q. Right. Would a reasonable officer in that situation,
16 where he believes his colleague has been slashed, still
17 be observing the subject and still looking to identify
18 warning signs of intoxication, mental health crisis or
19 ABD?

20 A. Definitely, yes, because all of that would be relevant
21 for the investigative phase as well, because then you've
22 got the aspect of, if there's a -- now an attempt murder
23 investigation against a person for trying to kill
24 an officer, or grievous bodily harm against the officer,
25 you're still then looking for the investigation side of

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1 proof of capacity, intent, so you're still looking for
2 all of the evidence gathering as well and thinking about
3 the safety of the subject as well because that person
4 would still need to go, for example, to hospital to be
5 dealt with before then going to the custody unit.

6 Q. And would that response be different if the officer is
7 towards the end of their probationary period?

8 A. Certainly length of service can impact people's
9 performance and sometimes it's -- sometimes the younger
10 the service means they've got the most current training
11 at the forefront of the mind, whereas the longer
12 service, you have come through many different changes in
13 guidance, so the current guidance might not be the most
14 dominant in the mind, but it's also about backgrounds of
15 each officer's experience, day-to-day, but also
16 experience through training, different roles that they
17 might have performed, so there's no hard-and-fast saying
18 because somebody has got more service than another, that
19 they're more or less competent than the other.

20 Q. Right. So again it will depend on their own personal
21 circumstances as well?

22 A. Yes, yes.

23 Q. I would like to ask you again, at this moment in time,
24 to what extent would a reasonable officer consider
25 pulling back or withdrawing?

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1 A. It would definitely be a tactical option because now if
2 you're seeing -- or you're thinking that a colleague has
3 been stabbed, your priority needs to be preservation of
4 life, so you might then want to pull back and think
5 "I will deal with the colleague", let the person either
6 go if they're going, but you're defending now your
7 colleague, knowing then that the person can be pursued
8 by police dog, ARV teams, and one of the other benefits
9 of not then following at times is for the track for the
10 dog, because the dog will follow scent, so if you've got
11 other people on the same path and officers putting their
12 scent onto the scene as well, that can sometimes cause
13 problems for the dog, so a clear scent path for the dog
14 is often beneficial. So if the officers remain, let the
15 person go, then the dog can be sent after them. It's
16 all about that level of risk and that's what a commander
17 then would make a decision on thinking about, do they
18 continue to put more officers at risk because if you
19 have already got one officer potentially stabbed, are
20 they then going to continue sending unarmed officers
21 after a person who has already shown intent to cause,
22 like, deadly harm.

23 Q. So even if the commander or the supervisor isn't at the
24 scene, is that one of the benefits of communicating on
25 the radio --

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1 A. Yes, yes.

2 Q. -- that those decisions can still be made?

3 A. Yes, yes, because the idea of the supervision levels is

4 to think about the safety -- the overall safety and

5 looking at competing demands in relation to different

6 safety and different tactical options, so they might

7 then instantly say, for the unarmed officers, because

8 they're low in numbers, they have not got the equipment

9 that's ideal, they could direct them to back off and not

10 pursue.

11 Q. Thank you. And again, even in that situation, would

12 a reasonable officer try and observe the principle of

13 preclusion?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And adopt the minimum level of force required?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And in relation to Martin Graves' evidence, I would like

18 to see whether you agree with this. He indicated this

19 situation would:

20 "... cement to [the] officer that the weapon [was]

21 present ... They [had] carried out..."

22 He took the view that they would have viewed it as

23 carrying out...

24 "... [a] serious assaultative behaviour on another

25 officer, who ... [could] to some degree ... [have had]

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1 life-threatening injuries ... you are including all of
2 this in the mix [in] the level of threat ... you are
3 considering what you may have to do to prevent further
4 injuries to that individual or ... to yourself or your
5 colleague who you've arrived with.

6 And:

7 "... at that point a reasonable officer may well be
8 considering basically any option that's open to them to
9 deal with that particular situation, and that would
10 include possibly causing serious injury or possibly
11 fatal injury."

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And do you agree with that --

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. -- that any option is open to them?

16 A. Yes, through preclusion, yes.

17 Q. Thank you. So moving on, if the subject then chases
18 an officer, so officers have perhaps mirrored the
19 walking away, but then the subject chases an officer,
20 a female officer, as she withdraws and strikes that
21 female officer to the back of the head --

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. -- which then causes her to fall forwards onto the
24 ground and, thinking again of the categories, if we can
25 look at 4.6, there we are, and if we can go towards the

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1 bottom there. This, again, profiled offender behaviour.
2 How would a reasonable officer categorise that
3 behaviour?

4 A. Level 6.

5 Q. Right. And why is that?

6 A. Because the head is a "red area". So, officers are
7 trained in relation to body code colours of red, amber
8 and green. I know Police Scotland just use the red and
9 green, but the head, throughout the UK, is a red colour
10 and it's the highest risk of the red areas as well. So
11 red means dead or serious disability risk. The head
12 area is a specific mention for safer custody as well in
13 relation to high risk and any impact to the head can
14 cause internal bleeding to the brain. Then, as the
15 person -- if they're knocked to the ground, again you
16 can get a second impact injury from that fall. In
17 addition to the second impact, you have also got the
18 shake of the brain during the impact, so potentially you
19 can have multiple injuries to the brain from that one
20 punch and we -- you know, we often hear about "One punch
21 kills", so then when you're thinking about the
22 demographics of people as well, if the person who has
23 given the punch is to a much smaller person as well,
24 then the impact could be more significant to that person
25 than if they were of significant, like, body size

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1 demographics, but certainly I would consider that
2 a level 6.

3 Q. And if we could have level 6 on the screen please just
4 for a moment, so if we go down the page, there we are.
5 That's a "Serious/aggravated assaultive resistance"
6 that's the highest level --

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. -- of offender behaviour?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Thank you very much. And if that is the subject's
11 categorisation, how would a reasonable officer
12 categorise the level of response?

13 A. Then again, you've got all the options up to level 5
14 with preclusion, thinking about what's the lowest level
15 that you can deal with this, so the officer's going to
16 be looking at defence of their colleague by the best
17 means possible, but also defence of themselves whilst
18 still trying to achieve a safe detention of the subject.

19 Q. So let's look at 4.7, level 6 -- 4.7, which is the --

20 A. Level 5, officer response.

21 Q. Sorry, level 5. If we can go into the 4.7 section
22 please. That's it. It's at the very bottom of the page
23 now, thank you. So this is the reasonable officer's
24 response to the subject's behaviour and it would be
25 level 5 "Deadly or lethal force"?

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1 A. Yes, up to that, yes.

2 Q. So, they don't have to -- a reasonable officer doesn't

3 necessarily have to go straight to that, they can still

4 bear in mind preclusion, minimum force --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- and look at any option underneath that level?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Thank you. And again, is this information that they are

9 putting into their National Decision-Making Model and

10 their risk assessment and assessing the threat?

11 A. Definitely, yes.

12 Q. And are they continuing to consider their observations

13 of the subject, considering issues of mental health,

14 intoxication, ABD?

15 A. Definitely, yes.

16 Q. And at this stage, to what extent would a reasonable

17 officer consider pulling back or withdrawing?

18 A. Well, again you definitely need to be calling to control

19 "Second officer down, ambulance required for this person

20 now, as well", and again hoping that they receive

21 additional instruction from the command structure

22 because now if the command structure are aware of

23 potentially one officer slashed, one officer now down

24 through a head punch, decisions need to be made from

25 a tactical level. The preservation of two officers'

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1 lives and safety and you've got this other officer. Do
2 you continue to put them in a position of danger when
3 again, the option could be all officers withdraw, allow
4 the subject to leave and the subject then will be
5 pursued by specialist forces, or specialist officers
6 rather.

7 Q. And if the officer who witnesses this does not contact
8 the ACR, is it still open to other reasonable officers
9 in the area to contact the ACR and share information
10 with them?

11 A. Yes. Anyone who has got the information to pass it
12 because we need -- we need that command -- the feeding
13 back to the command structure so that they can make
14 their decisions.

15 Q. And we have heard some evidence about the use of an
16 emergency button on the radio and again, is it open to
17 any officer to hit the emergency button --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- and that would alert the ACR?

20 A. Yes. Any officer can press that button and then it
21 stays live for a quantity of time, but it doesn't stop
22 the control still being able to speak over it, but it
23 allows then -- for the button to be pressed for the
24 environment to be heard, so if an officer can't
25 physically deal with holding the mic button in to keep

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1 talking, the quickest way is: press the red button, they
2 can continue dealing with the high risk event that
3 they're dealing with, but then other officers can hear
4 the commotion or the words that are going on and plus
5 pressing of the red button, it's not, you know, a daily
6 occurrence for officers, it's usually reserved for those
7 high risk incidents.

8 Q. Right, thank you. And I think you mentioned that
9 yesterday as well.

10 A. Mm-hm.

11 Q. If the subject stamps -- maybe once, maybe more than
12 once -- on the female officer as she is on the ground,
13 how would a reasonable officer categorise that
14 behaviour?

15 A. So again, that would be at level 6, potentially deadly
16 force, and that's because of the spinal cord. The
17 spinal cord is a red area as well and no matter where
18 the foot might go on the body, you could still get
19 trauma impact into the spinal cord, which is then
20 directly connected to the brain and part of the brain,
21 so any force to the spinal cord can cause disability or
22 death, but then you've got your other vital organs
23 nearby as well, such as your spleen, your kidneys
24 and ...

25 Q. So regardless of whether it's on the back, lower back,

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1 or in the kidney area, or any other area on the back,
2 that would still be --

3 A. Yes, it would still be considered like, potentially,
4 deadly force.

5 Q. Right. And again, if a reasonable officer is observing
6 that, up to what level of response would be possible for
7 that reasonable officer?

8 A. And again, the officer would have available up to level
9 5 for them.

10 Q. And again, maintaining the observance of the --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. -- the principles and the minimum force?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Thank you. So would that -- just to be specific, would
15 that include the option of -- in those circumstances,
16 the option of striking the subject with a baton?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. On multiple occasions?

19 A. If need be, but each strike would need to be --

20 Q. Justified?

21 A. Justified, yes.

22 Q. And could that include a strike, or more than one
23 strike, to the head?

24 A. It could. However, the caveat with any head strikes,
25 it's the final -- it's the final level because of the

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1 increased risk to that, so the baton strikes -- the
2 green areas are the primary target areas, so such as the
3 arms and the legs. Then red areas for Police Scotland
4 includes all of the torso and the head, whereas in
5 England and Wales the torso is split between amber and
6 red. But certainly the head would be a red area, but
7 it's not encouraged as a primary strike area. That's
8 sort of your final option because of the high risk of
9 death that's associated with it.

10 Q. Right. And if the first baton strike to the head causes
11 the subject to stop stamping, what would a reasonable
12 officer do in that situation?

13 A. So, you would instantly need to disclose to the control
14 room that you have struck the subject, a baton strike to
15 the head, "Ambulance required for this person now as
16 well", even if they're still on their feet and active
17 a baton strike to the head, because it's a red area and
18 the highest risk strike area, you need to get medical
19 attention for that person as soon as possible as well.

20 Q. So when you say "instantly", even as the person is --
21 the subject or the officer is standing up still, in the
22 moment --

23 A. Yes, if it's possible to, yes. If it's possible to make
24 that -- so it's as soon as practicable that the officer
25 can report this fact now as well.

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1 Q. Right. And would it make any difference to that answer
2 if the officer is a probationer towards the end of their
3 probation period?

4 A. No.

5 Q. No. And again, would the reasonable officer have to
6 provide justification for each of those strikes?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And would that be strikes whether they were to the head
9 or perhaps to other areas on the arm or body?

10 A. Yes, because you still need to justify what target area
11 you were going for, why you were going for it and then
12 if you missed the target area, where it actually hit.

13 Q. And you have said that the head is not encouraged as
14 a primary area, more as a final area.

15 A. It's final, yes.

16 Q. So, would it be an option open to a reasonable officer
17 to perhaps strike the -- use their baton, but strike the
18 subject who is stamping at the back of their knees, or
19 on their legs, or something along those lines?

20 A. Definitely and when you're thinking about target areas
21 you're constantly thinking about maximum impact, but
22 with lowest level of risk, because you want the
23 person -- especially if there's -- if they're in
24 a continuation of attack, you want that attack to stop,
25 but you want it to stop as safe as possible for everyone

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1 involved, so you will typically try less dangerous areas
2 before you escalate to more serious areas.

3 Q. And would the options open to a reasonable officer -- if
4 they observe the man stamping, the subject stamping on
5 the officer, would that also include the option of
6 shoulder-charging them to the ground --

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. -- away from the officer --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. -- on the ground?

11 For you personally, do you see any difference, or
12 any distinction, between your views about the profiled
13 offender behaviour if there is only the strike to the
14 back of the head, compared to if there's a strike to the
15 back of the head and a stamp?

16 A. No. If there's the stamp -- the head strike alone would
17 be level 6. If the stamps also occur, that's just
18 a continuation and a reinforcement of a continuation of
19 such behaviour.

20 Q. Right, so continuation of the most serious level --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. -- of the profiled offender behaviour?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And do you consider there's any difference, or
25 distinction, in the reasonable officer response options

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1 that are open to a reasonable officer, whether it's only
2 a punch or a strike to the back of the head, or it is
3 the strike to the back of the head plus the stamp?

4 A. I think the reasonable officer, even if there was
5 a continuation of behaviour, they would still be -- they
6 would still be considering where they're hitting and the
7 risk, so they're still going through the NDM of thinking
8 "What information am I receiving? What are the risks
9 and the threats?" So all of that would then be taken
10 into consideration before they make their action plan
11 then as to what -- so it would be very much an
12 individual decision based on the continuation of
13 behaviour, their risk, their own -- back to that POP
14 model of "person, object, place". So "person", if
15 they're then thinking "Well, two people are now out of
16 the game injured", they're the last person standing,
17 that will impact then on what level of response they're
18 going to opt for, because they might then believe that
19 they're -- that the intention and the means is there to
20 harm them.

21 Q. Thank you. And you have listened to Martin Graves'
22 evidence.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Do you see a distinction between his views on this
25 matter and yours?

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1 A. No.

2 Q. No. So, if he has suggested that perhaps the punch
3 to -- the strike to the back of the head is maybe of
4 less significance than the stamp or otherwise ...?

5 A. I wouldn't agree that the head strike is of less
6 significance. If anything, because of my background,
7 I would be saying the head injury is more, or at least
8 equal to, the back stamp, but neither is less than the
9 other.

10 Q. Right. It will be a matter for the Chair. It may be
11 that he has been saying, you would be looking at
12 a minimum of 4, a level 5, "assaultive behaviour", you
13 could be looking at a level 6, so he -- his evidence may
14 be interpreted that he is more variable on the subject's
15 behaviour category.

16 A. I -- yes, yes.

17 Q. But if that is his evidence, as it is interpreted, you
18 would maintain that you think it's still the highest
19 level.

20 A. Yes, especially when you're looking at the demographics
21 and if the force is such that it takes somebody off
22 their feet, then that, for me, is demonstrating that
23 additional aggravation to it and risk to the person
24 who -- the force has been such that it has taken the
25 person off their feet and to the floor.

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1 Q. Thank you.

2 Could you give me one second please.

3 A. Yes.

4 (Pause).

5 Q. Thank you. I was just checking something there.

6 I don't need to change anything.

7 If -- we have also heard other evidence from Martin

8 Graves in relation to the situation where there was the

9 strike to the back of the head, plus the stamp, and his

10 view was that:

11 "... stamping on an unprotected officer on the floor

12 ... shows a level of ongoing serious assaultive

13 behaviour."

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. "The risk to an unprotected officer on the floor being

16 stamped or kicked is very serious, internal injuries,

17 et cetera, head injuries, so we're looking at possibly

18 life-threatening injuries in that situation ... If that

19 was the case, and an officer was being stamped on the

20 floor, then I would expect a reasonable officer to do

21 anything within their capabilities to prevent that from

22 happening or to stop it from reoccurring."

23 And you would agree with that?

24 A. Yes, with the issue of preclusion.

25 Q. Preclusion and minimum force.

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1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And so a reasonable officer response, in relation to the
3 stamping and the strike to the head, that would be
4 a level -- and he agreed, that would be a level 5?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Thank you. I would like to move on to the next phase
7 where the subject has been brought to the ground, but
8 the subject continues to struggle.

9 I'm conscious of the time and --

10 LORD BRACADALE: Perhaps we should stick to the timetable
11 and have a break at this point, so 20-minute break.

12 MS GRAHAME: Thank you.

13 (11.23 am)

14 (Short Break)

15 (11.47 am)

16 LORD BRACADALE: Ms Grahame.

17 MS GRAHAME: Ms Caffrey, I would like to move on now to deal
18 with another situation, so to add further information
19 into this scenario we're exploring.

20 So at this stage the subject has been brought to the
21 ground.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Officers are trying to gain control of the subject and
24 trying to restrain the subject and the subject continues
25 to struggle against their attempts.

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1 A. Mm-hm.

2 Q. Before I begin by asking you questions, I wonder if you
3 can help the Chair understand how a restraint should be
4 performed, or how reasonable officers will carry out
5 a restraint procedure.

6 A. Okay.

7 Q. And I would like to do it first of all if there are
8 three officers available and secondly, we can look at if
9 there are four or more officers available.

10 A. Okay.

11 Q. Would you be happy to go through that with me?

12 A. Yes, absolutely.

13 Q. So let's look at how reasonable officers would conduct
14 a restraint of a subject where there are three of them.

15 A. Yes. So the first principle is a restraint is always
16 a combination of a use of force and a manual handling
17 process, so you're trying to combine both of these.
18 With three people, one person will instantly take the
19 role of what's often called a controller, which
20 sometimes doubles up with the supervisor as well, but
21 a person needs to take control as soon as possible when
22 a restraint starts and that's so that they can
23 coordinate the restraint techniques and the manual
24 handling process, otherwise it all becomes
25 counter-productive if each officer is trying to do their

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1 own thing, so --

2 Q. Now, if -- can I pause you there for a moment.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. If there are three constables, so the sergeant has not

5 yet arrived at the scene --

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. -- how do the officers go about identifying who the

8 controller would be?

9 A. So usually the head person is the controller, or if --

10 Q. When you say "the head person", what do you mean?

11 A. So usually the primary objective is the two arms, so

12 you've got an officer on each arm, and then the third

13 person who hasn't got the arm will hopefully be in

14 charge of the head, as in the head person is there

15 responsible for the safety as well, so as soon as

16 a restraint commences, then as soon thereafter the

17 medical checks by the officers need to be commenced, so

18 there's constantly safety checks going on throughout the

19 process of the restraint.

20 Q. Right, so we have heard some evidence of the name of

21 a safety officer.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Would that be akin to the person --

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. -- in charge of the head?

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1 A. Yes, so there's three roles which are typically
2 specified: we've got a controller, a safety officer and
3 a supervisor. Now, in an ideal world you've got
4 a different person doing each role, but often you have
5 to have those all combined into one person, but they're
6 the three roles. The controller is the person who is
7 directing in relation to the manual handling and the
8 technique. The safety officer role is to be conducting
9 the checks, the vital signs, and then the supervisor is
10 the umbrella overall supervision of what's happening,
11 but typically, especially in the early days if you have
12 only got a small number of officers, all of those
13 functions need to be conducted by one person.

14 Q. And that's usually the person at the head?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 A. So with three people, if the person is on the floor, the
18 primary objective is one person on each arm to get the
19 arms behind the back and handcuffed, and the third
20 person -- if it's safe for them to be at the head,
21 they're at the head, but if there's a lot of issues in
22 relation to securing the legs, then that person might
23 need to go to the legs as the third person, in which
24 case then one of the arm people need to be declared as
25 the controller and safety officer.

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1 Q. And how are they declared?

2 A. It's constant talking to each other and the person being
3 nominated or instantly saying, "I am the controller in
4 this use of force", and that might seem a bit sort of
5 false, but it happens regularly that as soon as an
6 intervention starts and a restraint starts, somebody
7 calls up "I am the controller", you know, "I am on the
8 right arm", "I am" -- so that you can hear who is doing
9 what and then you know if a certain act is being
10 conducted.

11 Q. And to what extent is there communication between the
12 officers during this process?

13 A. All the time. The more communication between the
14 officers and in a calm manner, the more then the
15 officers know what's happening, who is doing what, what
16 responsibilities are being conducted, but also it can
17 help the person who is being restrained to understand
18 what's happening. Otherwise if people aren't talking
19 and there's just a lot of movement going on, the
20 restrained person can be put in an even more heightened
21 state of distress because they don't know what's
22 happening.

23 Q. Right, so if an officer is, say, on the legs, what would
24 you expect that reasonable officer to be doing if
25 they're facing the other direction from the officers?

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1 A. If that officer is facing the other direction, if they
2 can face up the body, fine, but if they're facing away
3 from the torso, because of the communication they're
4 still all talking to one another, so if they get their
5 arms tucked around the legs they will then say, like,
6 "Legs are secure", and whoever is the controller will
7 say, you know, like, "received" or "roger that",
8 you know, "right arm secure", "left arm secure", so
9 people should be constantly talking through what's
10 happening so that there's no dispute in relation to who
11 is doing what and if it's happened or not.

12 Q. And if they're engaged in that process how do they then
13 go about securing the subject? Do they use equipment?

14 A. Yes, so it's the handcuffs to the hands which ideally --
15 the ideal position is to handcuff to the rear for
16 maximum control but sometimes it ends up at the front,
17 but rear handcuffing is the primary objective but
18 sometimes it will end up being at the front, so once the
19 arms are secure -- if the officers then believe that
20 they've got more control over the subject than the
21 subject has got over them, they might then deem that the
22 person is secured purely with the handcuffs and no
23 necessity for the legs, or if the level is such that
24 they also need to do the legs with the straps, they
25 might then do the handcuffs and the legs before

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1 announcing "secured", but the phrase "secured" implies
2 that the officers believe they've got more control over
3 the person than the person has, so there's no chance of
4 them escaping.

5 Q. So if there is a message to ACR saying "Male secure on
6 ground", does that mean something to police officers?

7 A. That would mean that they've got sufficient control to
8 prevent the person escaping or assaulting them.

9 Q. Right. And what if the officers experience difficulty
10 in getting the man or the subject's arms behind his back
11 and getting those handcuffs on?

12 A. So there's options. I mean, you can even do
13 chain-linking of handcuffs, so I know a particular
14 example that I had was we ended up using the three sets
15 of handcuffs to join, so one officer put their cuff to
16 the right-hand, one to the left hand, then with the
17 handcuffs they were used to get the hands behind and
18 then my cuffs went as the joining cuffs to those two
19 cuffs, just to get the initial control so that then as
20 time went on, we could then release the cuffs and make
21 them smaller, but sometimes with large men, for example,
22 body builders, because of the size of the chest it's
23 near on impossible to actually manage just with one set
24 of cuffs and you might need to link two sets to them.

25 Q. In what circumstances would you not handcuff to the rear

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- 1 but handcuff to the front?
- 2 A. Maximum control is to the rear. If the person's
- 3 handcuffed to the front it means then they have still
- 4 got movement with the hands, they can still attack
- 5 somebody, they have still got control over the body
- 6 dynamics. When you put the handcuffs to the rear it
- 7 also affects the balance of the person as well, so it
- 8 can reduce the amount of resistance, but things like
- 9 shoulder injuries, those kind of scenarios, it might be
- 10 that person's arm doesn't bend so if a person has
- 11 injuries already existent, or any physical disability,
- 12 it might not be practicable to get their arm to the back
- 13 anyway.
- 14 Q. Right. What position would the subject be in during
- 15 what you have described?
- 16 A. So officers are typically trained to get the person
- 17 initially into prone --
- 18 Q. On their front?
- 19 A. Onto the front, yes, sorry. Onto the front, in prone,
- 20 so that the arms can be brought to the rear and
- 21 handcuffed, depending then on whether their legs are
- 22 going to be strapped. But then as soon as the person is
- 23 secured, the person then needs to be turned onto one
- 24 side or the other.
- 25 Q. Right. Now, you have in your report a description of

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1 your understanding of prone. Are you able to just share
2 that briefly with the Chair?

3 A. Yes, so the basic prone is the person is laid fully on
4 their front, but there's variations of prone as well and
5 I know in the past, myths where it was only prone if the
6 face was actually looking at the floor and people used
7 to think well, if they just turn their head to the side
8 that meant they weren't in prone, but prone is just
9 meaning that the front of the body -- so basically from
10 the belly button up until the head area is towards the
11 ground. That means that the person is either in full
12 prone or partial prone, so it might be that you've got
13 the person on their front but they've got their torso
14 lifted up so there's just part of the torso to the
15 floor, that then would be a partial prone.

16 Q. And if the subject has perhaps tried to lift one
17 shoulder from the ground, would that be a partial prone?

18 A. Yes, it's still a prone, partial prone.

19 Q. Partial prone. Would a partial prone be treated in the
20 same way as a full prone by officers?

21 A. Yes, yes, it should be because the main thing about the
22 positioning is about then whether it impacts on
23 breathing functions and so even just with one shoulder
24 off we have still got potential of compression of the
25 like diaphragm area and the stomach, and even if it's

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1 just the bottom of the stomach, if people then have got
2 excess weight or pregnancy weight, that weight can be
3 pushed up and into the diaphragm and prevent the
4 breathing function occurring.

5 Q. So what advice are officers given about the prone
6 position?

7 A. That because of its high risk you get the person out of
8 it as quickly as possible, you get them secured, you get
9 them onto the side, so the person might not be safe
10 enough to get up into seated or standing, but they're
11 secure enough to get into a side position.

12 Q. And when you say high risk, is that because of the
13 impact -- possible impact on the breathing?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Right. We have heard some evidence about positional
16 asphyxia.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Can you tell us about that?

19 A. Yes, so if we're thinking about positional asphyxia it's
20 all about a position which impacts the breathing
21 capability, so if we've got the front of a chest and the
22 back of the chest, two sides, there's four parts of the
23 body from the waist up which needs to be able to
24 function in order for breathing efficiency.

25 Now, if you compress either the back or the front in

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1 any way, that means that one side doesn't move, but
2 likewise, even bent forward in a seated position because
3 now you have compressed the stomach, that can impact as
4 well, so that's a position which can start leading to
5 asphyxiation, so the asphyxiation is just connected to
6 a position. The person could be on their side which
7 would in itself be deemed a safe position, but then if
8 pressure is lent up against the person to then impede
9 the function of the front or the back expanding, that
10 would still be a position which is now impeding the
11 breathing, which could lead to asphyxia.

12 Q. So to what extent would simply lying on the pavement
13 say, in full or partial prone, compress breathing?

14 A. It would depend then because if you've got any
15 pressure -- in order for the breathing function to work,
16 you need everything from, you know, the very bottom of
17 the diaphragm to be able to function correctly, so if
18 there's any pressure going into the diaphragm, that will
19 impact, but then the muscles within the chest and
20 shoulder as well, they need to be without compression in
21 order to allow the lungs to inflate and deflate, so it
22 would depend on where the pressure is as to -- and then
23 the body weight of the person, because if the body
24 weight then is pressing in as well, their own body
25 weight, even if no officer is pressing against the

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1 person, if there's stomach weight there that's pressing
2 in and hanging in, then that can cause some compression
3 as well.

4 Q. And then if one was to apply any pressure to the back at
5 the same time, would that again compound the possible --

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. -- impact on breathing?

8 A. Yes, because it's impacting on the back's function to
9 expand and contract as well, so it's like a bellow, you
10 know, at a fire, you need the body to be able to expand
11 and contract in order to create the efficiency of the
12 breathing to happen.

13 Q. And when you talk about pressure, what type of things
14 are you talking about?

15 A. Even just leaning up against the person could be
16 creating pressure. It's something that's stopping the
17 full expansion of the torso.

18 Q. And could that also include putting weight on a person?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Applying force to a person?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And could that be in one area or over the whole back
23 area?

24 A. It could be any part of the torso, so again from
25 anywhere from like the belly button up, any part of

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1 pressure against any part of the torso could create an
2 impact.

3 Q. We have heard some evidence that sprays can also have an
4 impact on the respiratory system.

5 A. Yes, yes. So because of the nature of the spray and
6 a person's response to it, it can impact on the
7 breathing capability.

8 Q. And as well as that, if the subject is intoxicated or
9 under the influence of drink or drugs, could that also
10 have an impact on the respiratory --

11 A. Yes, that all affects the breathing capability as well.

12 Q. And is this something that officers are aware of in
13 terms of training about positional asphyxia?

14 A. Yes, definitely.

15 Q. You have told us earlier you're a first aid trainer --

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. -- and you have taught many courses. Is this the type
18 of information that officers are provided with?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Thank you. Can I ask now if this process is done by
21 more than three officers, so four or perhaps more
22 officers, can you explain to us how that changes this
23 type of --

24 A. Yes, so if we're looking now at a fourth officer, you've
25 got one officer on one arm, one officer on another arm,

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1 officer number 3 is on the legs, officer number 4 is
2 the head officer, so that may or may not need any actual
3 touching of the head, but that head officer is the
4 person who can look right down the torso and ensure that
5 there's no compression, so they're the safety officer.
6 They're also the controller coordinating the officers
7 and they might then be saying to the leg officer, for
8 example: can you move lower or higher, so if you know
9 their names you can be using the names of the officers,
10 but it's about that clear instruction so that the other
11 three officers, even if they're not actually looking in
12 at one another, they know exactly who is doing what.

13 Q. So again, still communication required?

14 A. Yes, absolutely, and controlling what's occurring so you
15 might then say "The officer on the left arm, you're
16 going to apply the cuff first", so that you will -- the
17 officer on the right arm stays in a holding position of
18 the arm, a physical holding, until the officer has got
19 the cuff on the left arm first, so you want it to be
20 coordinated, controlled and a nice, easy process so that
21 it all just happens nice and smooth.

22 Q. And again, if the officers are communicating, would that
23 then allow the subject to -- or the possible opportunity
24 for the subject to understand what's happening?

25 A. Yes, and often, you know, you're -- depending on the

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1 circumstances you can be talking to the subject saying
2 "We're going to start handcuffing you now, the officer
3 holding your left arm is going to apply a handcuff so
4 don't be worried", so it all depends on the
5 circumstances and is it -- are you able to speak to the
6 subject or at least try and speak to them, to let them
7 know what's going on to again reduce the fear and the
8 anxiety and hopefully reduce the opposition and
9 resistance.

10 Q. And again, yesterday, when you gave us the example of
11 attending at the scene with the man with the arterial
12 bleed, I think I commented then that you were talking to
13 the man and telling him. Is that the type of
14 communication you would expect during a restraint?

15 A. Yes, definitely, because -- the benefits are it allows
16 you as the person doing the talking to be thinking
17 logically about what are we doing, but it also then
18 allows you as a team to understand what's actually
19 happening, so you will often find officers, once they've
20 got their lock on, they will shout, you know, "Right arm
21 lock on", you know, "Left arm lock on", when the cuffs
22 have gone on they will shout "Left wrist cuffed", so it
23 is this constant talking and passing the information
24 between the team so that you know what's happened now
25 it's safe to move on to the next.

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1 Q. When you say "Lock on", what does that mean?

2 A. So, for example, if you were taking -- there's something
3 called a figure of 4 lock where manually you will take
4 the arm back, so it looks like a figure of 4, so you
5 might then say -- you know, once then you as the officer
6 have got tucked into that, you will say "Right arm lock
7 on", so that officer then on the left arm knows it's
8 ready for them, so if there's a controller there they
9 will then say, "Right arm lock on, left arm put your
10 lock on", so then they know to turn and get the left arm
11 lock on, and then they will say, "Left arm lock on",
12 when they have achieved it.

13 Q. If we're talking about four officers, again, there's one
14 at the head who combines the three roles of controller,
15 safety officer and supervisor?

16 A. Mm-hm.

17 Q. But if more officers arrive, would that officer at the
18 head, would the role be split again or --

19 A. So then you might have the next person coming along who
20 takes over as supervisor, so -- who will then, you know,
21 start doing that. It's very much -- it's a flexible
22 option, but you take that position, so for me as the
23 sergeant, for example, these type of controlled events
24 would occur regularly in the custody unit, so then as
25 the custody sergeant I would take the supervisor's role,

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1 but the controller has started, so then I would say,
2 you know, "I'm here now, I'm the controller" -- sorry,
3 "I'm the supervisor, confirming you're the controller",
4 you know, "Officer A, you're the controller", officer B,
5 C, D, then I would be moving around to keep looking
6 there and then saying to the controller, "Have you
7 checked the vital signs? Confirm to me that the vital
8 signs are still okay."

9 Q. So if a restraint is taking place with, say, four
10 officers and the sergeant arrives, when that's already
11 started --

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. -- what would you expect that sergeant to do on arrival?

14 A. That the sergeant comes along and takes the supervisor
15 role so they should be thinking then about all the
16 issues around the holistic safety, so thinking about the
17 safer custody aspect and the NDM again and thinking is
18 this person going to police custody unit or are they
19 going to hospital? Have we got an ambulance en route?
20 Do we need an ambulance en route? And then asking the
21 officers, you know, "What are you doing? Is that lock
22 on? Is that" -- so getting involved as a supervisor and
23 making those, like, management decisions.

24 Q. So an active role?

25 A. Yes, and checking what decisions have been made and

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1 confirming -- "Can you confirm the vital signs have
2 started?" You know, which are your DR ABC checks that
3 you're looking at so it is about the supervisor taking
4 that overview and thinking: you're doing that, you're
5 doing that, do they need additional people, is
6 an officer injured, because if you've got an injured
7 officer on a particular limb you might want to swap them
8 out for somebody else and then looking at how long has
9 this been going on, you know. In an ideal world, you
10 would instantly start clocking the time as well to be
11 thinking how long has this been happening now, where are
12 we at time-wise because that would be relevant for
13 the -- as a handover to the ambulance crews as well.

14 Q. And why would the controller be or supervisor be saying
15 "Where are we with the time?" Why is that relevant?

16 A. It would become relevant for clinical management at the
17 hospital. It may or may not end up being relevant, but
18 where possible, you always start clocking the time to
19 think where each stage has taken us, how long was the
20 ground restraint for.

21 Now, there is no mandate as to how long a restraint
22 lasts for, but it's also -- it should always be as short
23 as possible.

24 Now, in the past there's often been debate about
25 whether a time limit should be set as a warning mark and

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1 I know from a previous death in custody back in 1999 the
2 inquiry into the death of Mr Bennett, they recommended
3 at that one about restraints -- 3 minutes was the
4 warning time, but that's not a mandate, but time could
5 be relevant as part of the handover package for the
6 clinical care really to then be saying the person has
7 been on the floor in a side position or a prone
8 position, resisting for, you know, three minutes, five
9 minutes, ten minutes, before we were able to get them
10 into seated position and then from seated position as we
11 got them up into standing they then collapsed at that
12 point, so it's just -- it's relevant information for the
13 clinical care of a person.

14 Q. And could it also be relevant information with
15 justifying that minimum force has been applied?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Or could it be relevant information in relation to
18 issues surrounding positional asphyxiation?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And concern to avoid asphyxiation, particularly if the
21 person is in prone or partial prone?

22 A. Yes, definitely, and the supervisor might then decide
23 that because of the time ticking on they want to ensure
24 that the person -- you know, are they going to try and
25 manoeuvre into seated and standing because of the time

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1 issue and -- but again, it would be that decision on the
2 day, thinking about the NDM and thinking "Are we in
3 a position where we can attempt to get the person out
4 off the floor", even though they're out of prone or
5 supine, supine being on your back, they've been on their
6 side but there comes a point where when we need to now
7 try and get them into seated position, or the level of
8 consciousness, are we waiting on the ambulance. So it's
9 about those decisions and thinking "How long are we
10 waiting? Is this still a straightforward use of force
11 restraint, or are we in a medical emergency?"

12 So time can be relevant but it's not a topic just on
13 its own.

14 Q. And officers are still considering the possibility of
15 a medical emergency --

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. -- even during that process?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And moving someone onto their side or into a seated
20 position, does that also remove the pressure if they
21 were lying on the pavement?

22 A. Well, it can remove the direct pressure, for example, to
23 the front if they were in the front or on their back,
24 but if officers then go close, we have still got
25 compression into the stomach or the back, so the idea of

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1 the side roll is as a safe airway position. You're
2 holding the person up, but you create a little bit of
3 gap between you and them so that they can still expand
4 their torso in order to breathe.

5 Q. And so bearing in mind the risks of positional asphyxia
6 and the risk of compression --

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. -- are officers made aware of the risks of lying next to
9 a person, or lying on the person, or having parts of
10 their body up against a person?

11 A. Yes, it's -- because it's about not having any pressure
12 against any part of the torso, regardless of what
13 positions they're in.

14 Q. Right. Thank you. And even if there are four or more
15 officers, would they again be seeking to apply handcuffs
16 at some stage?

17 A. Yes, because in order to get the person from the ground
18 restraint you're going to look at handcuffs. The option
19 then of leg restraints, depending on the circumstances,
20 but then getting the person into a seated position as
21 soon as possible and getting them stood up as soon as
22 possible, so that's always the objective. So even if
23 they could be stood up with leg restraints and handcuffs
24 still applied, but we've got them off the ground now
25 from a ground restraint.

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1 Q. We heard from Martin Graves that he would recognise that
2 there's a control phase of restraint where officers are
3 attempting to control the subject and he would
4 distinguish that from the restraint phase where the
5 person is restrained.

6 A. Mm-hm.

7 Q. Is that a distinction you would recognise?

8 A. Yes. I mean, the initial bit is obtaining control, so
9 once you've got the handcuffs on then typically you've
10 got the basics of control then and you're into the
11 restraint. The restraint then is -- you know, the
12 person can still be moving and -- you don't have to wait
13 for a person to be passive, fully passive before you
14 consider moving them into a seated and standing
15 position.

16 Once you've got control of them, even if they're
17 trying to physically resist, if they're handcuffed and
18 their legs are restrained, there's nowhere they can go,
19 they can't run and they can't assault people, so it's
20 about trying to get them up. The officers are then
21 still holding their arms, so there's -- it's the safer
22 way to get them off the ground.

23 Q. And that moment arrives when handcuffs are fixed to the
24 wrists?

25 A. Typically, yes. You've got the person under control

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1 enough to be able to manage them.

2 Q. Right. I understand from your report that there are
3 different types of restraint, not all restraint is
4 physical?

5 A. Correct, yes.

6 Q. Do you --

7 A. So -- well, you've got the physical restraint. You have
8 also got, like, chemical restraint, which is more common
9 in the mental health units where the person will be
10 injected with something and often the police are called
11 to mental health units to assist with -- so officers
12 might be doing a physical restraint in order for the
13 medical staff to inject for a chemical restraint.

14 You have also got, like, psychological restraint
15 where the person is kept in a room but the person is at
16 the door, so there's no physical restraint on the
17 person, but the mere presence of an officer standing at
18 the only exit is still restraining and containing
19 a person within a room.

20 Q. Thank you. I would like to ask you about the options
21 for a reasonable officer -- to go back to our ongoing
22 scenario that we have been discussing yesterday and
23 today, so it's a knife incident, possible knife, there's
24 issues that we have discussed about the way the subject
25 appears and there was the punch to the back of the head

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1 and/or the possible stamp or stamps, and the subject has
2 been brought to the ground, and the officers are trying
3 to gain control of the subject and the subject is
4 resisting that control, perhaps at times forcefully.

5 What options would be open to three officers who are
6 taking part in that process, if they're reasonable
7 officers?

8 A. If you're looking at the full spectrum of options at the
9 very lowest end one option is withdraw from the
10 restraint.

11 Q. Under what circumstances would they do that?

12 A. If you think it's too dangerous for staff or subject
13 then it's still a tactical option that you can withdraw
14 from the restraint. Once you have commenced
15 a restraint, it doesn't mean to say you can never like
16 get out of it.

17 Q. Is it always an option to disengage?

18 A. There's always still an option to back off and consider
19 again other alternatives that you might have, or a fresh
20 approach again.

21 Other than that, you're trying to gain the
22 compliance, so it might be, for example, each officer at
23 each arm applies their single cuff to the relevant arm
24 that they're on to try and then get their arms brought
25 round into the figure of 4 type of lock.

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1 Q. And just to stay for a moment with the option of
2 disengaging --

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. -- you talked about a fresh approach, could that be
5 waiting for a dog unit to arrive or something along
6 those lines?

7 A. Yes, yes.

8 Q. So assuming that they don't adopt the disengaging
9 option, what other options do they have at that moment?

10 A. So it's still -- if you're continuing with the restraint
11 then you need to get the restraint achieved as quickly
12 and safely as possible and the only way to achieve that
13 really is then by the use of the handcuffs to bring
14 their arms in and the straps to the legs, so if there's
15 enough officers to be trying to get them going again
16 it's -- this is where the controller and supervisor's
17 role is important to make those decisions, how are we
18 going to do -- do we do one and then the other, or are
19 we going to go for then both together? Are they going
20 to go for the legs first -- typically it's always the
21 handcuffing is the first option.

22 Q. Why is that?

23 A. It's just to get the upper body secured.

24 Q. So that would be one officer on each arm?

25 A. One officer on each arm.

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1 Q. And the controller at the head?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And would you recognise a description of the
4 controller's role holding the head in a position where
5 it's secured against the ground to prevent the
6 individual from banging their head on the floor and
7 sustaining secondary injuries?

8 A. Yes, so especially the prison office, the prisons teach
9 immediate holding of the head to secure it. The holding
10 of the head is a taught technique within the police
11 service but it doesn't have to be a mandatory hold. If
12 the person isn't at risk of doing such things then you
13 may deem it not necessary to actually hold it. You can
14 still be the head officer without physically holding
15 the head.

16 Q. And then in terms of disengagement, would you recognise
17 the possibility that officers take the view it's
18 impossible to restrain a person and they should consider
19 other tactical options, or in a situation where the
20 restraint has been attempted and failed they could
21 disengage and then they could use things such as
22 irritant sprays, or nowadays perhaps a taser. Do you --

23 A. Sorry, can you just repeat that?

24 Q. Sorry. So thinking about disengagement and the options
25 open to officers in that regard --

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1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- would you recognise a description as a number of
3 officers decide it's nearly impossible for the officers
4 to restrain the subject and other tactical options have
5 to be considered, and in that situation, it may be the
6 case that where restraint has been attempted, has
7 failed, they will disengage and then use irritant sprays
8 or nowadays maybe use a taser?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. You recognise that as a possibility?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Obviously in 2015 there wouldn't have been the tasers
13 available with uniformed officers, but do you recognise
14 that that would be an option to disengage --

15 A. Yes, definitely --

16 Q. -- and go back to trying sprays or --

17 A. Yes. If the physical restraint becomes too high a risk,
18 either for officers or subject, then you need to
19 consider another option.

20 Q. Right, thank you. So the officers can consider those
21 other options. Assuming they're not disengaging --
22 we're talking about three officers, one at the head, two
23 on the arms -- they're trying to secure handcuffs. If
24 there's more than three officers by that stage what
25 would those officers be considering as options?

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1 A. So one on the legs.

2 Q. One on the legs as well as the two on the arms?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And one on the head?

5 A. Just to try and stabilise the person.

6 Q. Would the priority still be for those officers to secure

7 the handcuffs first?

8 A. Yes, that would still be the first option, unless it was

9 deemed necessary to secure the legs first, so that the

10 leg officer can be relieved of that role and come and

11 assist with the arms. So particularly if you've got

12 someone that's really strong, you might then need -- you

13 might decide secure the legs so that releases that

14 person to come and assist with the handcuffing.

15 Q. And when we say secure the legs, we have heard evidence

16 that not only can an officer lie over legs, but they

17 have leg straps or Fast Straps?

18 A. Yes, Velcro straps, yes.

19 Q. Right. And that's a means whereby officers can secure

20 legs?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. In terms of the pressure that those officers involved in

23 that process would be applying to the body, what would

24 reasonable officers be bearing in mind at that stage?

25 A. All pressure to the torso should be avoided. Pressure

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1 to the legs by the body laying over is an approved
2 technique and pressure to the arms to secure them and
3 bring them round is an approved technique.

4 There's also the knee to the back of the shoulder
5 blade there to help with the ground pin, that's an
6 approved technique, but other than that there should be
7 no pressure going into the torso anywhere.

8 Q. And would that include on the back of the body?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And when you say a ground pin, can you tell us what that
11 is?

12 A. So when the person is down on the ground, for example,
13 particularly with a single officer technique you might
14 get the person to the floor and then you've got the arm
15 out and you're trying to bring it in to commence the
16 handcuffing, the officers will be trained to then use
17 one knee to go down onto the shoulder blade to
18 facilitate the handcuffing coming in.

19 Q. That's a recognised technique?

20 A. Yes, but then as soon as you've got the cuffs applied,
21 that knee pin would be removed.

22 Q. Right. But apart from the knee pin to assist with the
23 ground pin, what would a reasonable officer be doing in
24 relation to applying any weight or pressure on the back?

25 A. No pressure to the back.

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1 Q. No pressure. Would they apply any weight, or their own
2 body weight to the back?

3 A. No, no.

4 Q. Would they lie over the subject?

5 A. No. The principle is no pressure to the torso.

6 Q. What about contact itself, if they were leaning over or
7 contact with the person's back?

8 A. It should be avoided and this is where if the head
9 person is there, if an officer is needing to lean over,
10 then is there already an officer on that side who can be
11 doing that task? And then you pass the arm over to the
12 other person. It's trying to keep like a sterile area
13 of the person. That's the principle. There will always
14 be exceptions to a principle, but the principle is you
15 don't put any pressure onto that torso.

16 Q. Right. Does it make any difference to your evidence
17 today if the person is on their back as opposed to on
18 their front --

19 A. Not at all.

20 Q. -- or partially --

21 A. Not at all. Because the same thing, you have to have
22 the front and the back of the body and the sides to be
23 able to expand in order for breathing function to work,
24 so whether the person is on their front or their back,
25 you need to keep those areas clear as much as possible,

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1 for as long as possible.

2 Q. Thank you. And you have gestured when you were
3 describing the role of the controller, the person at
4 the head, and you have gestured with your hands.

5 A. Yes, so they're looking right down the torso --

6 Q. From the head to the feet?

7 A. From the head, yes, and the benefits of all of this is
8 to ensure that it's clear, so when I use the word like
9 "sterile", that there's no compression, there's no
10 officer laying over, anything going on, but also that
11 there's an alignment of, like, the spinal cord, so if
12 officers are trying to twist the body -- if it's not
13 coordinated and some officers are trying to push them
14 onto a side and others are trying to keep them on their
15 front, then you might get a twisting, which again
16 increases their injury risk, so that head officer as the
17 safety officer needs to be able to keep looking down the
18 torso and see that there's an alignment and that it's
19 without compromise, so there's no compression anywhere.

20 Q. And that risk of injury is to the subject?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. What difference would it make, if any, to the evidence
23 you have given today if the officer -- sorry, if the
24 subject had continued to struggle against the officers
25 and had tried to bench press them off the subject?

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1 A. I think the issue there -- again, it comes back to your
2 options: you have still got the option to withdraw and
3 think about new tactics, you have still got the option
4 to carry on trying to get the handcuffing process done
5 to achieve, because until a person is handcuffed to the
6 rear, they will always have the capability -- or
7 potential to be able to press, even if they're
8 handcuffed to the front they have still got the
9 opportunity to be able to put their hands down and press
10 up, so your options there would either be still
11 continuing to try and get the arms to the rear to use
12 and that figure of 4 can either be done manually with
13 the officers' arms, or there's also an approved baton
14 technique to be able to use the baton to help get the
15 arms around, but the majority of officers prefer to use
16 their own limb to get in and get the arm under.

17 Q. And in relation to the bench pressing, is there any
18 difference to your evidence if the subject is seeking to
19 remove weight, or officers from his back?

20 A. I think for that if -- if a person is able to bench
21 press an officer up off the floor, I would be worried
22 there about the amount of strength they're showing to be
23 able to do that, but also I would be worried that the
24 officer was actually on their back in the first place as
25 well. It's just confirming that somebody was on their

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1 back, so then it would be trying to again, go back round
2 to the NDM and think "Do we need to all withdraw from
3 this and think about another tactical option, or do we
4 carry on trying to adapt what we've got to try and
5 secure as quickly as possible and get them out of the
6 ground restraint?"

7 Q. And would it only be the controller that could make that
8 decision, or would it be any of the officers involved?

9 A. Any of the officers involved could take over control.
10 If they feel whoever is controlling is not controlling,
11 then they need to declare -- but as a team they need to
12 work with this as a team, and that's where at times
13 we've got these specified roles, but that controller can
14 then hand over control function to somebody else, so
15 someone else might become involved who is more skilled,
16 for example, at this kind of coordination, so they can
17 agree to hand control over to that other person, then
18 everyone else involved in the technique knows now
19 they're listening to the new controller.

20 Q. And a moment ago when I asked you about the bench
21 pressing --

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. -- you said you would worry about that and why would you
24 be worried about that?

25 A. Just the demonstration of strength and thinking about if

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1 it we've got other ticks of risk, is this then another
2 tick of risk that again we need to be reporting back
3 because this could emphasise again that we need
4 specialist resources to deal with this. This is beyond
5 business as usual for operational officers. Do we need
6 the specialist resources and again, if we have not
7 currently got an ambulance en route, is this now extra
8 confirmation that we need an ambulance because if
9 there's that much strength being used, this person needs
10 to be checked by a healthcare professional before going
11 to police custody unit, or the decision to go to
12 hospital.

13 Q. When you're talking about the tick list or checklist,
14 are these the risks you mentioned earlier: intoxication,
15 mental health crisis or ABD?

16 A. Yes, yes, so it's this accumulation of more ticks coming
17 on those lists.

18 Q. And for a reasonable officer that maybe isn't involved
19 at that time in the restraint but standing and observing
20 at a nearby location, what action might that reasonable
21 officer have?

22 A. Contacting control room and passing the information back
23 because if they're then seeing the officers are not
24 doing it, somebody needs to be doing it, so when we
25 think about professional responsibility and curiosity of

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1 an event, they need to be passing that information back
2 to the higher ranks to be saying , "This is what we're
3 seeing, tactical advice, please".

4 Q. Seeking advice from the supervisors?

5 A. Mm-hm.

6 Q. Right. What difference would it make if the subject
7 remained non-verbal during that time, so wasn't speaking
8 during that time?

9 A. Well, non-verbal is always a risk because of the fact
10 you're thinking: well, why are they non-verbal? Is it
11 a disability -- you know, a life-long disability that
12 the person has got, or is it because of a medical issue,
13 such as the -- a high level of intoxication which is
14 preventing the person from being able to operate their
15 vocal cords, or have we got a mental health crisis,
16 which again, it's a medical issue.

17 Q. What difference would it make if the subject was making
18 roaring noises and shouted something similar to "Get off
19 me"?

20 A. So again, the basic warnings for people being unable to
21 breathe will be saying things like, "I can't breathe",
22 or "Get off me". Those are threaded throughout officer
23 safety training about listening to warnings from people,
24 to again take them into consideration because you're not
25 going to let go of every single person who says, "Get

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1 off me" or "I can't breathe", but you're looking then
2 and thinking, well, if they're now triggering this
3 I need to satisfy myself that there's nothing which is
4 causing a risk to the person.

5 Q. And if we think about the techniques that a reasonable
6 officer might be using in terms of their baton as part
7 of this restraint process, would you -- what techniques
8 would a reasonable officer be using?

9 A. It would be trying to get their arms round for the
10 handcuffing and that -- the majority of officers will
11 just attempt that with their arm into the subject's arms
12 to get them round, or the use of the handcuff to act as
13 a lever to get them round. Next level up would be
14 trying to maybe use the baton to get the figure of 4
15 position, but that can be quite technical and to be
16 honest, I have seen very few officers ever use the baton
17 for a figure of 4 technique, because it's not really an
18 easy option to do.

19 Q. Right. And what if an officer used a technique with
20 a baton that wasn't trained?

21 A. So there's always the scope for techniques to be adopted
22 and made up as the scenario goes on, but the purpose of
23 approved techniques means that if you're conducting an
24 approved technique, the organisation is saying: we have
25 approved this technique and we are satisfied that it's

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1 been medically risk assessed, and then we have listed
2 what the safeguards are around it, so if an officer is
3 then using a technique which is not on the approved
4 techniques, they then have to justify to themselves the
5 necessity to use that technique and also be conscious
6 and aware of the risk factors with it. So you tend to
7 find officers will try and use the techniques that are
8 actually approved and taught, rather than deviate.

9 Q. Thank you. Can I come back for a moment to breathing
10 and monitoring of breathing. We have heard evidence
11 about breathing and not breathing and I saw in your
12 report that there was a distinction that you drew
13 between normal breathing and not normal breathing.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Could you explain the distinction for us, please?

16 A. Yes, so basically every five years there's a new code
17 released by the Resuscitation Council as guidelines for
18 all first aid training and certainly from 2005 they
19 changed the breathing/not breathing to be breathing
20 normal/not normal, because what they were looking at
21 there was the decline at times in a casualty that it's
22 not often you go from being a normal breather to not
23 breathing, there's usually a decline.

24 So part of their cycle then would be early
25 recognition that something is going wrong as the first

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1 key stage in survival and you may see on posters these
2 little circles attached with, like, the defibrillation
3 at the end, but the first stage is early recognition
4 that something's going wrong, and that's where the
5 breathing/not breathing normal comes into it, so normal
6 breathing, for an average adult, is two to three breaths
7 within 10 seconds, and that sounds quite effortless and
8 what they say then is within a maximum of 10 seconds the
9 first aider or person who is monitoring the breathing,
10 within a maximum of 10 seconds they need to decide if
11 the person is breathing normally or unknown and if it's
12 unknown, then they treat them as not breathing normal,
13 so at that point of not breathing normal it's a medical
14 emergency and CPR is commenced.

15 Q. Right. So let me just ask you this: are all first aid
16 trainers aware of this guidance?

17 A. Well, if they follow the Resuscitation Council
18 guidelines, then they should be aware of it and it's in
19 the first aid manuals, particularly things like the
20 St John's manual, it all refers to not breathing
21 normally.

22 Q. And was that the position in 2015?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And when was that distinction introduced?

25 A. It was brought in certainly in 2005. So the guidance is

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1 every five years, so it was in the 2005 guidance as
2 breathing normal/not normal and then the 2010 guidance,
3 then the 2015 guidance and now in the current guidance
4 as well.

5 Q. Are you aware when the guidance is issued?

6 A. Every five years.

7 Q. So a month in a particular year?

8 A. I'm not sure which -- but certainly the 2010 version had
9 the normal/not normal interpretation.

10 Q. And the 2005?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Thank you. And when that breathing is not normal, you
13 say that's a medical emergency and CPR commences?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Even though the person may still be breathing to some
16 extent?

17 A. Yes, because for a lot of people -- they use the phrase
18 agonal breathing and a lot of people will still show
19 signs of some form of noise which might sound like gas
20 or snoring or moaning or -- there's one explanation
21 which says about like fish mouth where the person might
22 be going (indicating), and it looks like a fish mouth,
23 whereas if -- with the old interpretation of
24 breathing/not breathing, things like the fish mouth,
25 agonal breathing, the moaning, they would be incorrectly

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1 assumed to still be meaning the person's alive, where
2 this person was actually in life and death scenario.

3 Q. Right.

4 A. So breathing normally, breathing not normal was
5 certainly the version of the Resuscitation Council
6 guidelines in 2015.

7 Q. Thank you. Just to finish this scenario, is it safe for
8 me to say that a reasonable officer will, during the
9 struggle and restraint, still be seeking to use the
10 minimum level of force?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And still have regard to preclusion?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And moving on to if the subject is on the ground, either
15 prone or supine, the officers are trying to gain
16 control, the struggle has continued -- the subject has
17 continued to struggle against their attempts and that
18 has continued for a period of around four minutes,
19 during which time the officers ultimately manage to
20 secure handcuffs and leg restraints, the subject is then
21 turned onto his side and the officers see that he is
22 non-responsive or unconscious, but deemed to be
23 breathing. What would a reasonable officer be
24 considering at that stage?

25 A. So this is where your DR ABC comes into it all --

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1 Q. Remind us about that?

2 A. So D is danger, so that's danger not just from the
3 environment, like they're on the ground, on the road,
4 but danger in relation to any risks posed to them from,
5 say, officers being too close to prevent any movement.
6 The R then for the response, there's then another
7 acronym called AVPU, A-V-P-U, that gets taught, and the
8 first bit is alertness, what's the level of alertness?
9 Do they respond to voice at all? Do they respond to
10 pain? So pain there, they're typically taught to either
11 squeeze the shoulders or sometimes certainly the nipping
12 of the earlobe might be considered, but then if those
13 are showing no response, then the casualty is classed as
14 an unresponsive casualty at that point.

15 Q. And what would a reasonable officer do with an
16 unresponsive casualty?

17 A. So unresponsive casualty is ambulance and then
18 a suitable safe airway position so there's -- people
19 will often talk about the recovery position but it's
20 about a safe airway position, so any side lateral
21 position, so, for example, the position that officers
22 are taught to put the person in when they're restrained
23 anyway, on the side, as a barrel, that is still a safe
24 airway position as long as there's no compression up
25 against the torso, either front or back.

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1 Q. And would compression include an officer lying at the
2 side of the subject?

3 A. Yes, yes. So you want to be able to remove the weight
4 and you can still balance the person by holding onto
5 the, like, upper arm.

6 Q. As they're on their side?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Right?

9 A. So then at that point if they're deemed to be
10 unconscious you then have the A, B and C to do. So A is
11 the airway: is the airway open enough and no blockage
12 because it might be that you find the person is actually
13 suffocating, asphyxiating on an object, so if they had,
14 for example, a ball of drugs in their mouth and that's
15 now gone into the windpipe, so it could be an object or
16 it could just be that the airway is impeded by, for
17 example, the tongue or the position, so if you're sure
18 that the airway is clear, if the person is on their back
19 then it's a case of just you get hold of the forehead
20 and move the forehead backwards and that then should
21 ensure the alignment of the windpipe and that is all
22 open.

23 Then it's the breathing check, so this is where
24 you've got a maximum of 10 seconds to decide is the
25 person a normal breather or not normal, so if there's

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1 any doubt about that allocation, you go with not normal.

2 Q. And if they're not normal, what do they do?

3 A. Then it's C for compression/CPR, so you start the CPR.

4 So then you would have an unresponsive casualty, not

5 normal breathing, CPR commenced.

6 Q. And an officer -- a reasonable officer would also be

7 calling for an ambulance?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Treating it as an emergency?

10 A. So you would have called for the ambulance before

11 checking the airway, because as soon as you get to the

12 unresponsive, that's where you're saying "Ambulance,

13 unresponsive casualty", you carry on with your A, your

14 B, non-breather, so then you're updating control to

15 update the ambulance control, your unresponsive casualty

16 is not breathing normal.

17 Q. And we may look at something later that uses the term

18 "rousability" --

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. -- or "not rousable." Is that the same as

21 responsive/not responsive?

22 A. Rousing is commonly talked about within -- for

23 physically within police custody and rousing checks, so,

24 for example, anyone who is at high risk, they need to be

25 roused at certain time limits, so --

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- 1 Q. What does that mean?
- 2 A. So that means is the person -- so on every visit you
- 3 might need to mandatory rouse them, so you need to make
- 4 sure that they're awake, alert, they can speak, they can
- 5 hold a conversation, so they have to demonstrate
- 6 physical and neurological function, so it's no good me
- 7 just saying to you, "Are you okay?" and you going,
- 8 "Ugh", so I need you to be able to give a few words back
- 9 to form a sentence and show that you can respond, so the
- 10 first time I might say to you "What is your full name
- 11 and address?" The second time I might say to you "What's
- 12 the address of your workplace? What is your phone
- 13 number", on the next one, but a lot of people fail that
- 14 one with the phone numbers.
- 15 Q. Okay.
- 16 A. So rousability is showing about even if they're
- 17 physically awake, are they actually able to communicate
- 18 and can understand things, so --
- 19 Q. So it's not quite the same as responsive/not responsive?
- 20 A. No.
- 21 Q. Would a reasonable officer consider slapping the subject
- 22 in the face to determine if they are --
- 23 A. It's not taught within first aid or officer safety
- 24 training.
- 25 Q. Right. Would a reasonable officer step back -- so as

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1 the subject has been handcuffed and leg restrained,
2 turned onto their side, noticed to be not responsive,
3 but breathing, would a reasonable officer stand up, move
4 away to a small degree for an estimated period of
5 30 seconds to one minute, consider excited delirium for
6 a few seconds, and then return to have a closer
7 examination of the subject?

8 A. Well, preservation of life is always the top priority
9 for all police officers, so if you've got any doubts
10 about the life of your casualty, then you're going to
11 give them constant supervision, constant observation and
12 be dealing with them as a casualty, so it would look at
13 what is the priority of leaving the casualty. If it's
14 because, for example, they can't get a signal, or their
15 radio is over there so they have gone for the radio,
16 then that would justify leaving your casualty, so it
17 would all be looking at the prioritisation, but the
18 basic principle is you've got a casualty, preservation
19 of life is the priority, your casualty is constantly
20 monitored and then you're constantly monitoring your
21 DR ABCs and deciding on whether has breathing now
22 changed from normal to not normal.

23 Q. Would a reasonable justification be checking superficial
24 injuries on hands or --

25 A. No, because on the balance then of risk, the

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1 preservation of life would take precedence over that.

2 Q. Thank you. Could I ask you briefly to look at the care

3 and welfare of persons in police custody SOP, PS11014.

4 If we can begin with section 1.1.2. There we are, this

5 is "General", 1.1.2:

6 "It is essential that the care, welfare and security

7 of persons held in police custody be maintained to

8 consistently high standards."

9 And:

10 "... all custodies are to be treated with care and

11 consideration, ensuring that their fundamental

12 human rights are maintained. No custody should receive

13 less favourable treatment on the grounds of age,

14 disability, gender, race, religion or belief,

15 relationship status, sexual orientation or transgender

16 identity."

17 Can I ask you, does this SOP apply from the initial

18 point of custody or apprehension?

19 A. Yes, yes, from the initial contact and the initial

20 arrest, right through then all the transportation to the

21 physical custody unit.

22 Q. If we had heard it suggested that this has nothing to do

23 with a restraint which is taking outwith a police

24 station, would you agree with that?

25 A. No, definitely not.

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1 Q. Right, thank you. Could we look at page 12, please,
2 section 5, and if we can begin with 5.1.1, the first
3 part:

4 "Any person is considered to be in custody the
5 moment they are apprehended."

6 And is that -- does that set out why this SOP
7 applies?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And then can we look at 5.1.3:

10 "Any apprehension should be made with the minimum
11 amount of force necessary. Any use of force required to
12 affect an apprehension must be recorded in the custody
13 record in accordance with the criteria for the use of
14 force contained within the Use of Force SOP."

15 So does this suggest that there's a custody record
16 if they're in a police station?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. But again, links in with the use of force SOP that we
19 looked at earlier today?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And then 5.1.4:

22 "A person apprehended must be promptly informed, in
23 a manner he or she can understand, of the reason for the
24 apprehension. If a person is incapable of understanding
25 the reason for their apprehension or is so violent as to

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1 pose a risk to themselves, Police Staff or any other
2 person, this may be delayed until he or she has
3 sufficiently recovered, or an appropriate adult,
4 interpreter or translator is available to achieve this
5 aim."

6 So again, is this recognising the importance of the
7 person's understanding?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And then can we look at 5.1 -- sorry, 5.3.1. There we
10 are. This relates to "Custodies suffering from
11 injury/illness/intoxicated by drink/drugs":

12 "In certain circumstances a custody must be taken
13 directly to a hospital after apprehension rather than
14 being taken to a Custody Centre, to ensure suitable
15 medical assistance is provided at the earliest
16 opportunity and this may require the Arresting Officers
17 to summon an ambulance crew or remove the custody
18 directly to hospital."

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And is that consistent with what you said earlier?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And then 5.3.2:

23 "Any requirement for immediate or urgent medical
24 provision takes priority over apprehension. These
25 circumstances may include where the custody ..."

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1 And there are a number of bullet points there, let's
2 have those on the screen:

3 "Has suffered a head injury;

4 "Is, or has been, unconscious;

5 "Has suffered serious injury;

6 "Is drunk and incapable; (unless local arrangements
7 are in place...)

8 "Is believed to have swallowed or packed drugs;

9 "Is believed to have taken a drugs overdose;

10 "Is suffering from any other medical condition
11 requiring urgent medical attention;

12 "Is suffering from any medical condition that the
13 arresting officer believes requires treatment prior to
14 detention in custody; or.

15 "Has been exposed to CS Spray/PAVA Spray and they
16 experience difficulty in resuming normal breathing; or
17 if any other adverse reactions are observed."

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And again, is that consistent with what you said today?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Thank you. Can we now look on to the final -- back to
22 the scenario that we're exploring and discussing today,
23 but I'm thinking about the period from the moment that
24 the subject is noticed to be unconscious or not
25 responsive but breathing, and then a period of time

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1 elapses until they are noticed to be not breathing.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. So this is the distinction that was made where they're
4 breathing but unconscious, until they're not breathing,
5 so that period.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. If that period is around four minutes, what would
8 a reasonable officer be doing during that four-minute
9 period?

10 A. Okay. So that would be the ambulance is called because
11 of the unresponsiveness and then because it's an
12 unresponsive casualty they must be constantly monitored
13 and assessed, preparing for the -- in case CPR is
14 required.

15 Q. And does that have to be monitored by the controller or
16 the safety officer, or it could be any of the officers?

17 A. It could be any, it could be any of the officers, as
18 long as they then agree that that person is competent to
19 do so.

20 Q. And what does that constant monitoring look like on the
21 ground?

22 A. So you're going to be constantly right beside the
23 person's, like, head and looking down, listening to the
24 breathing, looking for signs, you might then even be
25 checking capillary refill of the fingers, but you're

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1 going to be constantly --

2 Q. What does that mean?

3 A. It means where you press the nail and you see it goes
4 from pink to white and then when you let go, the pink
5 comes back, so normal capillary refill is near instant,
6 but the slower the refill shows that the body's system
7 is closing down.

8 Q. What's that due to?

9 A. It means the heart isn't functioning correctly, so it's
10 showing that the cardiovascular system is failing in
11 some way, so again, as a first aider, you're not
12 a healthcare professional, it's just another indicator
13 that is indicating that the capillary refill isn't right
14 as well.

15 Q. And what's the purpose of this constant monitoring?

16 A. Well, twofold. One is that from the medical side, but
17 the other thing is any person who is restrained is
18 required to be constantly monitored anyway because of
19 the fact that at any point they may go into a medical
20 episode, but then the flip-side of that is in relation
21 to any medical, what the European standard says is that
22 any detainee must receive treatment comparable with if
23 they weren't a detainee, so if as a police officer you
24 came across a member of the public who has just
25 collapsed and become unresponsive, they would instantly

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1 get an ambulance called for them and what the European
2 custody standards say is that same principle should
3 apply to anyone within the UK who is held at the hands
4 of the state.

5 Q. And are those European standards -- I think you said
6 yesterday Scotland was seeking to observe those?

7 A. Yes, so all of the UK signed up to them to be mandated
8 from 2006.

9 Q. Right. And if during the period we're describing the
10 subject is handcuffed and has leg restraints and during
11 that period there is an Airwaves transmission that
12 officers -- it's open to officers to listen to -- that
13 the subject has been struck to the head with a baton and
14 may have been sprayed with CS and PAVA spray, what would
15 a reasonable officer do in light of that?

16 A. Ambulance.

17 Q. Ambulance. And again, would it need to be an officer
18 involved, or could it be an officer listening in?

19 A. It could be anybody. As soon as those risk factors are
20 mentioned then you know that person has got to go to
21 hospital.

22 Q. Could it even be an officer who is in a remote
23 location --

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. -- like in a police office --

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1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- or an ACR?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And what would a reasonable officer do with the
5 handcuffs?

6 A. Remove them, because if you have already established
7 that the person is unresponsive when you're thinking
8 then about the purpose of the restraints is to prevent
9 the person escaping or assaulting, but if you have done
10 your checks right and concluded they're unresponsive,
11 then there's no necessity to keep the physical
12 restraints on any more, because medical attention must
13 be prioritised over the restraint process.

14 Q. And would that include the leg restraints being removed?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. What would the reasonable officer do regarding perhaps
17 the subject is lying on the ground, it's been raining
18 that day, it's cooler weather, what would they do
19 regarding a blanket or maybe covering the subject?

20 A. So the preservation of life and the immediate, like,
21 first aid response would take priority over the other
22 welfare aspects, but then if you've got sufficient staff
23 then as well as staff dealing with the preservation of
24 life and the first aid monitoring, then basic things
25 like a jacket or a blanket over the lower part of the

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1 body or the upper until the ambulance crews or anyone
2 needed to get to the upper part, just basic things like
3 that and if for nothing else, for public perception as
4 well to show that the care and welfare is there in
5 relation to the casualty, but you're trying to keep the
6 casualty from losing body heat because the loss of body
7 heat -- if the heart is not pumping correctly, the body
8 is going to start cooling anyway, so then if the body is
9 exposed to the elements, that's going to increase the
10 cooling as well, so trying to keep the casualty with
11 some warmth isn't going to harm them.

12 Q. What access do reasonable officers have to jackets or
13 blankets or anything like that?

14 A. Well, I have seen officers take their own jackets off
15 and put them over the lower part of the body, or gone to
16 houses and asking do they have a blanket to put over
17 people, I have seen officers do that on occasions.

18 Q. We have heard some evidence that an officer went to ask
19 for a glass of water at one point.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. They could presumably equally go to nearby people,
22 residents...

23 A. Yes, "Do you have a blanket that we can use?"

24 Q. And after the person is noted in this position to be
25 non-responsive but not breathing, again, is your

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1 evidence the same as you have just described --

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. -- in what a reasonable officer would do?

4 A. You would commence the CPR and you would have all the

5 restraints removed.

6 MS GRAHAME: Thank you.

7 I'm conscious of the time, would that --

8 LORD BRACADALE: Would that be a convenient point to stop

9 for lunch?

10 MS GRAHAME: Yes.

11 LORD BRACADALE: 2 o'clock.

12 (1.01 pm)

13 (The luncheon adjournment)

14 (2.04 pm)

15 LORD BRACADALE: Ms Grahame.

16 MS GRAHAME: Thank you.

17 Ms Caffrey, I would like to move on to another issue

18 and this relates to the time things take over which

19 decisions are made by officers and actions are taken, so

20 if we can look at a scenario where, following on from

21 what we have been discussing yesterday and today, that

22 the first officers arrive at the scene at 7.20.23 to be

23 precise.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And those are the first officers at the scene in the

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1 time and they're looking for a subject in light of the
2 grade 1 calls about the knife incident.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. By 7.21.19 -- now on my calculation that's about
5 56 seconds in total, but I'm very happy to be corrected
6 on that, but the time is 7.21.19 that -- that is at the
7 time an officer has pressed an emergency button and by
8 that stage the man is on the ground.

9 A. Mm-hm.

10 Q. During that period of time, CS and PAVA have been
11 discharged six times, the man has been struck to
12 the head and body multiple times with a baton and has
13 been shoulder-charged to the ground.

14 Now, bearing in mind your evidence about the actions
15 of a reasonable officer, or reasonable officers, and
16 bearing in mind the minimum force principle and the
17 attempts by reasonable officers to observe preclusion,
18 do you have any comments about the duration at which
19 those events took place, the period of time over which
20 those events took place?

21 A. My initial feelings when looking at how many uses of
22 force were used in that period of time was that that was
23 a lot of use of force within that period of time,
24 especially when you start thinking about some of the
25 timing with the CS and PAVAs because the average -- if

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1 the CS is full there should be six seconds of use in
2 a can of CS, and if the PAVA is full to empty, it's
3 about 10 seconds of use in PAVA, so thinking about it,
4 if they used -- that's time as well and then --
5 everything just seemed to be a lot in a small period of
6 time. Now, that's not to say it wasn't necessary, but
7 it's a lot in that time and all the time thinking about
8 preclusion, the amount then of tactical communication,
9 for that to occur as well. Tactical communication can
10 be a lengthy process, or it can be a short process, but
11 it's trying -- it's trying to use the lower levels
12 before the use of force.

13 Q. And are there any limits on the time that officers,
14 reasonable officers can take to communicate, build
15 rapport with a person?

16 A. There's no time limit at all.

17 Q. So again, it depends on the circumstances?

18 A. Yes, and it can be beneficial to, in some ways, stretch
19 out the communications, especially if you're aware of
20 other resources attending and specialist resources. The
21 more that you can delay having to approach the person
22 and delay it through communication, then that can be
23 beneficial.

24 Q. And is that what you were saying yesterday about buying
25 time?

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1 A. Buying time, yes.

2 Q. For other units, other resources, other specialist
3 resources to attend the scene?

4 A. Yes, and it gives you thinking time. It's buying time
5 for other resources to get there but it's buying you
6 time to think and start thinking about what
7 checklists -- you know, what options do I have?

8 Q. And to feed that back to ACR?

9 A. Yes, yes.

10 Q. And perhaps if you're buying time and able to buy time
11 that that gives time for those resources to arrive and
12 gives you more options if you're a reasonable officer?

13 A. Yes, yes.

14 Q. Thank you. Now, there may be some comment that although
15 we're talking about hypothetical scenarios today that
16 perhaps it's easy for us to sit in the calm of an
17 inquiry hearing -- some of us may feel calmer than
18 others -- but that fails to recognise the reality on the
19 ground and, you know, events can escalate very quickly,
20 they can deteriorate very, very quickly.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. What -- have you had regard to that reality or possible
23 reality in your evidence today?

24 A. Definitely. I mean another example I can think of is
25 I was on patrol as the sergeant with a male constable.

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1 He had lengthy service. He was taller than I was. We
2 went to what we thought -- we were going to arrest
3 a person in relation to breach of bail. We knew the
4 particular male in question and usually he was of no
5 high risk. We knew where he was living, so the male
6 officer went to the front door for knocking on and
7 I went round to the rear door just in case he tried to
8 slip out the back, and based on previous knowledge,
9 I was thinking about, you know, the NDM and thinking
10 about the risk, I was quite happy as a young, fit woman
11 at that point that there was no high risk to me if he
12 came out at the back door.

13 So then I was next aware of a commotion within the
14 property of just loud bang, bang, bang, bang coming
15 closer and the next thing the back door opened and this
16 male officer and the subject came hurtling out of the
17 door and it looked like -- this young man that we had
18 gone to arrest, he was smaller than I was, but the
19 officer who was in excess of 6-foot -- it's -- the
20 impression I got was that he had the officer off his
21 feet. I know in reality he wasn't off his feet, but it
22 was as though he had just picked him up with this,
23 again, this like superhuman strength and that then --
24 I mean it was a shock to me because it was outside of
25 what we had assumed would occur. Seeing how he was

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1 handling the male officer, I instantly then got my baton
2 out and racked it, and at that point this one was the
3 PR24 baton which is the one with the side handle bit,
4 not the asp, the asp replaced that one, so I racked the
5 baton as the young man just seemed to throw the male
6 officer across this back yard. Then he turned to me and
7 he just stood there and made himself -- he just appeared
8 as though he suddenly went 6-foot tall and just pumped
9 up, and I had my hands out and I just said, "Keep away",
10 or words to that effect, and he just started slowly,
11 like in slow motion moving towards me and growling, in
12 effect.

13 I knew the male officer was in a heap over in the
14 corner area and I swung the baton as I said "Get back",
15 and I swung across at his leg which was the primary
16 target area. As the baton came back up and he is still
17 just slowly walking towards me I said again about "Get
18 back" and hit the thigh on his right leg, and at that
19 point I looked at the baton because I thought "Has it
20 racked?" I thought it had maybe failed to open and I was
21 just swinging into air, but it hadn't, so at this point
22 his arms were up like this (indicating) and I hit across
23 at what would be his left arm and again, nothing
24 happened and then he just seemed to do a -- I don't know
25 whether it was a smirk or what, but just his face just

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1 changed and by this point he is sort of this distance
2 (indicating) but it was just a really slow but very
3 intimidating move towards me, and at this point I was
4 still thinking where next to hit and I just thought
5 I don't want to hit the head because I was thinking "Red
6 is dead", but the other area then that I struck,
7 I struck into the chest, because although the English
8 version was the red, amber, green colour, so the sternum
9 was red, around the sternum was the amber, so I hit
10 across the chest as hard as I could thinking
11 now: I don't know what else and at that point he just
12 seemed to drop to the floor and again, at that point,
13 two other officers came running in because -- sorry, as
14 this had gone on, I had called up for urgent assistance
15 as the two of them came out, so the other two officers
16 then arrived and my other colleague who had been thrown
17 across the yard, he was then there and the four of us
18 managed to quickly get him under control, but then one
19 of the first things I asked for was an ambulance to the
20 location because it instantly -- it was out of character
21 anyway but it was specifically out of character for him.

22 We then ended up going to hospital with him with the
23 ambulance and then once he was cleared from hospital we
24 took him to custody and then the healthcare
25 professional, the FME, came to custody to examine him as

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1 well because of the use of force that was used against
2 him and he was bruised across the chest and the arms and
3 the legs from the baton strikes, so I knew the strikes
4 had hit, but it turned out -- because then afterwards he
5 apologised to me for his behaviour and said he couldn't
6 remember anything and I had been custody sergeant for
7 him at times as well, so we had that sort of
8 professional relationship, but he couldn't remember the
9 actual event at the house.

10 Q. How long did those -- that sequence of events take at
11 the scene, not as you went to the hospital?

12 A. Very quick really, because even though I'm saying he
13 walked towards me slowly, it was like time slows down in
14 your mind as you're seeing things happen because you're
15 still looking at these checklists and thinking,
16 you know, "Is this really happening? What do I do now?"
17 So I think my mind was working quicker than reality was.
18 It was a very quick event.

19 Q. Could you give us an estimate of the duration?

20 A. You're maybe talking about 10 seconds from them flying
21 out of the door to him hitting the floor, we're probably
22 only talking about 10-20 seconds tops.

23 Q. And in that experience were you observing the principle
24 of preclusion?

25 A. Yes, thinking that there was only -- he was -- the fact

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1 that he had thrown this male officer like he did, I just
2 knew straight away with my demographics if he could pick
3 this officer up, he could pick me up no problem. If he
4 was able to throw this officer, he could throw me no
5 problem, so then thinking about the risks, then the fact
6 he was just purposefully then just staring straight at
7 me and coming for me, he could have easily gone by to
8 the gate but he was just coming straight for me, so
9 thinking about then going straight to defensive tactics,
10 I was still saying "get back" but then I drew the baton
11 ready in case he didn't.

12 Q. So you were demonstrating with your body language and
13 communicating --

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. -- what you wanted and also you mentioned you were
16 giving feedback, or you were on your radio, I should
17 say?

18 A. That was as they first came out, I then called out for
19 urgent back-up to the location. I don't remember the
20 exact message. I do remember saying "urgent back-up" to
21 the location.

22 Q. And you have also mentioned you were pressing your
23 radio --

24 A. Yes, the radio.

25 Q. -- for the ambulance at the end?

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1 A. Yes, when we then ended up on the floor one of the first
2 things I did was call for "Ambulance required at the
3 scene".

4 Q. And at that -- in those circumstances, were you bearing
5 in mind minimum force? You have talked about the
6 different areas you tried?

7 A. Yes, because I was thinking there I tried -- I mean I --
8 I thought I was only at the back door as an over --
9 I wasn't actually expecting anyone to come out the back
10 door, but then I tried the -- you know, the hands up,
11 the backing off, because I think if -- I slightly moved
12 back, but there was clear access he could have gone out
13 of the gate of the yard as well, but he didn't opt to go
14 that way, so I wasn't blocking the exit there.

15 Q. And you went for the legs first, the arms next, but not
16 the head?

17 A. Not the head, no. I've never struck anyone in the head.
18 Only because I keep thinking back to basic training all
19 the time about "Head is red, red is dead".

20 Q. Right. So is it fair to say that in considering these
21 circumstances, the hypothetical scenarios I have put to
22 you, you have borne in mind that reasonable officers
23 could be in a situation where events occur very quickly?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And does that minimise or diminish any of the evidence

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1 you have given today?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Thank you. Can I ask you about -- take you back to the

4 National Decision-Making Model and the risk assessment.

5 Would a reasonable officer consider that a person's race

6 was a relevant factor in assessing that risk assessment?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Why is that?

9 A. Because race shouldn't bear an issue on it at all.

10 Q. Right. If there is intelligence, the police are

11 notified of a threat level at the time and -- would

12 that -- would the existence of that threat level or

13 intelligence about, say, a terrorist threat be something

14 that could be factored by a reasonable officer into

15 their National Decision-Making Model?

16 A. No, because then you would just be putting a blanket --

17 a blanket on something rather than it being

18 intelligence-led, as in this particular person, or this

19 particular group of people, names are, so then you --

20 you can't just say because of the colour or the sex or

21 the gender of the person that that would be a blanket

22 application.

23 Q. If there's information at the time that there is

24 a severe threat level for police officers, is that

25 something that reasonable officers would consider when

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1 they're processing their NDM risk assessment?

2 A. They may consider the fact, the raised level, but then
3 it would be wrong to apply that just to one group of
4 people without any specific intelligence about that.

5 Q. And what would a reasonable officer be looking for to
6 perhaps provide more of a link between the intelligence
7 or the threat level information they had with
8 a particular incident they were attending?

9 A. So you're particularly meaning the terrorism side?

10 Q. Mm-hm.

11 A. Well, if there was an indication of terrorism because of
12 the serious national threat of terrorism, any indication
13 of a potential link to terrorism, that should be the
14 command and control system all over that and they
15 wouldn't then be directing officers, unarmed officers
16 straight into that and one of the things all forces will
17 have available are plans in relation to different levels
18 of terrorism threat.

19 Q. So if there is a genuine terrorism threat in relation to
20 a particular incident, would a reasonable officer be
21 right in thinking that would be information shared by
22 ACR?

23 A. Definitely, because then you would need instantly
24 a strategic lead on this, and the likes of the counter
25 terrorism security advisors, the -- the officers who are

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1 involved in the terrorism strand would be all over this
2 as principal partners.

3 Q. In the absence of any of that, would a reasonable
4 officer be able to assume that it wasn't a terrorist
5 incident?

6 A. Yes, because you would assume that the first filter of
7 risk assessment and dynamic risk has been conducted by
8 the ACR, and that they have now decided it's not
9 terrorism which is why you're getting it. It shouldn't
10 come out of ACR with any -- with any concept that it's
11 still terrorism. So that's not to say it wouldn't be,
12 but it shouldn't be coming out of the ACR if there's any
13 indication that it's linked to terrorism.

14 Q. Thank you. From your experience in training officers
15 I'm interested is there any training that you know of,
16 or indeed that you have delivered, that would assist
17 officers in minimising the risk of them factoring racial
18 stereotypes into their risk assessment?

19 A. Well, if we look back over the history of policing and
20 diversity training, I attended the Home Office diversity
21 train the trainer course, which was six weeks, in
22 I think it was 1996 I attended and it was six weeks down
23 in Bedfordshire at a place called Turvey, it was one of
24 the Home Office training sites.

25 That then permitted me to deliver any kind of

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1 diversity training within any of the Home Office
2 establishments. Now, at that point because I had
3 already -- in order to do that I also needed prior to
4 that the Home Office law course so that was a 13-week
5 course and then that was six weeks on top of that, so
6 you built these things up as different modules.

7 I then went back to Cumbria and I designed and
8 delivered some of the roll-out of the initial -- they
9 called it community and race relations training at that
10 point. I delivered during the first year of the
11 roll-out. Now, the initial plan was after that that all
12 training courses would be incorporating all the relevant
13 strands of diversity, so then years later when I was
14 then designing and delivering the custody training, for
15 example, I would then ensure that as often -- as much as
16 possible it was as diverse as possible and we were
17 looking at all issues which would include race, sex,
18 sexuality and disabilities as much as possible
19 throughout the whole thing.

20 Q. So was there specific training that you're aware of from
21 your own experience that assists officers in avoiding or
22 guarding against any racial bias?

23 A. No, not specifically. It would be very much down to
24 each force to design their own -- looking at performance
25 needs analysis and training needs analysis, it would be

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1 down to each force to establish at what level they
2 wanted their staff trained. There was no one national
3 standard that said "Every police officer has to have
4 this", so you would find differences between each force
5 in relation to whether the focus, for example, was
6 mostly internal in relation to race relations or
7 equality and diversity, or whether it was external or
8 a mix.

9 Q. And as I understand, we will hear more evidence about
10 training in the future, but can I ask you one final
11 thing: in relation to -- we have heard about annual
12 reaccreditation or recertification of officers.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And I think at one point I had said officers in Scotland
15 do one day; I think that was incorrect, it's now
16 two days --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- every year. We heard some suggestions that equality
19 and diversity is taken into account when they're doing
20 use of force training, or OST training. What's your
21 views on that?

22 A. Well, it's supposed to be, but then it's down to -- it's
23 down to each individual trainer then and what emphasis
24 they give on it, because they have their training
25 objectives to meet but it's mostly around: can the

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1 delegate do this technique, that technique, rather
2 than: have you included an example about this and about
3 that? So yes, the training is more aimed at performance
4 task rather than the process within it.

5 Q. Thank you. Could you allow me one moment, please.

6 A. Yes.

7 (Pause).

8 Q. Could I ask you about your awareness, if you have an
9 awareness, of deaths of black men in custody, perhaps
10 after restraint, and whether that's something that's
11 covered in OST, officer safety training?

12 A. Yes. The main case that was significant for me was the
13 death of Christopher Alder which -- it was released --
14 the inquiry into it was released in 2006 by the
15 Independent Police Complaints Commission, in conjunction
16 with the launch of the safer detention guidance, so that
17 one became quite a national, well used case study
18 throughout custody training, but it was custody training
19 rather than officer safety training, but then in custody
20 training you're also teaching the theory of officer
21 safety training and how it fits.

22 The downside is the only people who go on the
23 custody track are either the custody officers, or the
24 civilian detention officers, not all your mainstream
25 constables, but Mr Alder, he -- he had been the victim

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1 of an assault with a scenario of the one punch outside
2 a nightclub. Because of his behaviour then he was
3 considered to be disorderly. He had been taken to
4 hospital. Again, his behaviour was considered to be
5 disorderly rather than the by-product of a head injury.
6 He was then released from hospital. The officers then
7 took him to custody on the grounds of a breach of the
8 peace. By the time they got to the police custody -- he
9 was handcuffed to the rear but unconscious but they
10 believed he was faking it and lay him face down in the
11 booking-in area at the custody unit and it was some sort
12 of 12 minutes later before staff realised that he wasn't
13 actually fully conscious. The noises they thought was
14 breathing was actually signs of -- it was not breathing
15 normal and believed to be heading into cardiac arrest
16 and then unfortunately he died.

17 So that incident was used by a lot of custody
18 training in relation to the emphasis of the use of
19 force, the first aid, the head injuries, looking at the
20 racial aspects as well because that was brought up in
21 the investigation as well about the racial aspects, the
22 first aid aspects. It sort of held a lot of the topics
23 which then safer custody was covering.

24 Q. Again, we will probably hear more about this at a later
25 hearing, but does this also tie back to what you said

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1 earlier today about the distinction between breathing
2 and not breathing and normal breathing --
3 A. And not normal.
4 Q. -- and not normal breathing?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And the current view, or the view in 2015 would have
7 been whether the breathing was normal or not normal?
8 A. Or not normal, yes, because throughout that footage you
9 can hear him -- you can hear him breathing on the
10 custody CCTV recording, but it's not normal. It was
11 described as being something between a snore and
12 a groan, but it wasn't normal breathing.
13 Q. Right. And that was in the situation where the man had
14 a head injury?
15 A. Yes, but officers hadn't appreciated that there was
16 a head injury.
17 MS GRAHAME: Right.
18 Thank you very much, Ms Caffrey.
19 Thank you very much.
20 LORD BRACADALE: Thank you. I'm going to adjourn to consult
21 with my Assessors at this point.
22 (2.30 pm)
23 (Short Break)
24 (2.38 pm)
25 LORD BRACADALE: Now, are there any Rule 9 applications?

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1 Mr Jackson and the Dean.

2 Ms Caffrey, I wonder if you could withdraw to the
3 witness room while I hear some submissions.

4 A. Yes.

5 (The witness withdrew)

6 Application by THE DEAN OF FACULTY

7 LORD BRACADALE: Yes, excuse me, Dean of Faculty.

8 DEAN OF FACULTY: My Lord, your Lordship will, I hope, have
9 seen a fairly lengthy Rule 9 application was submitted
10 timeously on behalf of those that I represent. That was
11 responded to by the Solicitor to the Inquiry indicating
12 that the number of questions that had been raised by
13 ourselves and by others were such that Counsel to the
14 Inquiry didn't feel it was going to be possible to put
15 all of the matters to the witness herself, and so it has
16 transpired.

17 My Lord, there are a number of issues in the Rule 9
18 application that have fallen away, but there remain
19 various issues that I would like to explore with this
20 witness, and in addition to that, given her commentary
21 on Mr Graves' evidence today, I would like to explore
22 the extent to which she agrees with certain other
23 aspects of Mr Graves' evidence that we haven't heard
24 about.

25 I'm not sure, my Lord, if your Lordship wants to

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1 hear from me on all of the paragraphs. I can certainly
2 outline the various paragraphs that remain extant, but
3 that will take some time in itself, or your Lordship
4 might just trust that I will exercise all due economy in
5 asking the questions of this witness.

6 LORD BRACADALE: Well, I mean the Rule 9 is designed to
7 apply to lines of questioning rather than a whole series
8 of specific questions, and I would welcome a submission
9 from you as to what lines of questioning you consider
10 have not been covered.

11 DEAN OF FACULTY: So the first of those, my Lord, relates to
12 the qualifications of the witness to offer the opinion
13 evidence that she does in a number of different aspects,
14 and that might be said to be the first 28 paragraphs in
15 the Rule 9, although, as I say, an awful lot of those
16 have fallen away.

17 LORD BRACADALE: Well, that's my point. I wonder to what
18 extent that issue, now that she has given evidence, is
19 one for submission as to what weight I can place on her
20 evidence.

21 DEAN OF FACULTY: Well, we have considered that, my Lord.
22 The view I took and that I continue to take is it would
23 be quite unfair for me to attack the credentials of this
24 witness in a submission without putting to her the basis
25 upon which I challenge her expertise and, my Lord,

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1 I don't want to be unfair and I'm sure the Chair doesn't
2 want to be unfair either, so in my submission that
3 wouldn't be appropriate.

4 The second aspect, my Lord, really relates to the
5 question of waiting for the dog unit.

6 The third relates to ABD, or excited delirium and
7 the extent to which --

8 LORD BRACADALE: Just before you go on to that --

9 DEAN OF FACULTY: I'm sorry.

10 LORD BRACADALE: -- in relation to waiting for the dog unit,
11 her report was compiled on the basis of the evidence
12 available to her at 31 October.

13 DEAN OF FACULTY: Yes.

14 LORD BRACADALE: And then there's subsequent evidence which
15 clarifies the amount of time that would be available for
16 the dog unit to come which she has now taken account of.

17 DEAN OF FACULTY: Well, the evidence available to the
18 witness would have included the evidence of Mr Stewart
19 which said it would have taken 25 minutes.

20 LORD BRACADALE: Yes, yes, precisely.

21 DEAN OF FACULTY: This witness thus far has proceeded on the
22 basis of 10 to 15 minutes. So it would be appropriate
23 to explore with her the extent to which it would be
24 appropriate to wait for the dog unit. As I understand
25 it, she is still saying it would be appropriate to wait

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1 for the dog unit. Now, that is a view that requires to
2 be explored further, in my submission.

3 LORD BRACADALE: Well, I can't precisely remember what she
4 said, but my impression was that she had taken account
5 of a longer time, but I could have a look at that.

6 DEAN OF FACULTY: Well, certainly -- we can get the precise
7 aspects -- certainly my impression from the evidence
8 given by her yesterday and today is that she still holds
9 to the view it would have been appropriate to wait for
10 a dog unit.

11 LORD BRACADALE: Oh, yes, that may be the case, but for
12 a longer time.

13 DEAN OF FACULTY: Yes, and that is something that requires
14 to be explored, in my submission.

15 The third relates to what the witness has said about
16 ABD or excited delirium, and that in part relates to her
17 own expertise, but also in part relates to the actual
18 available evidence regarding what the officers saw or
19 should have seen at the time.

20 Then we move, my Lord, to the question of
21 containment and the extent to which -- because that is
22 again -- I mean, that's closely allied to the dog unit
23 point, the extent to which containment was feasible.
24 It's obviously this witness's view that containment was
25 feasible; that is not something that is shared -- a view

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1 that is shared and again, requires to be explored.

2 Then leading from that we then have --

3 LORD BRACADALE: So what questions does containment -- what
4 questions relate to containment, sorry?

5 DEAN OF FACULTY: So containment, that begins, my Lord,
6 with -- it's basically paragraph 79 onwards, through to
7 89, and then moving on from that we have the assessment
8 of, first of all, the approach to Mr Bayoh; secondly --

9 LORD BRACADALE: Sorry, can you just expand on that a little
10 bit: the approach to Mr Bayoh?

11 DEAN OF FACULTY: Yes, so this is paragraph 83, through to
12 88, and then we have the deployment of CS spray or PAVA,
13 that's 91 onwards. Again, a lot of this has fallen
14 away, so, for example, 97, 98, 99 have all gone, but
15 again, it is appropriate that we explore that aspect of
16 the witness evidence.

17 Then we have the reaction to Mr Bayoh chasing and
18 striking PC Short. That's 100 to 102.

19 Then a few questions on the restraint itself,
20 primarily 119 and 120.

21 I don't intend to put any of the miscellaneous
22 points at the end, so that's 132 onwards, but -- and
23 I would intend to wrap things up under reference to what
24 Mr Graves has said and to see to what extent she agrees
25 or disagrees with Mr Graves. We have had a lot of

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1 agreement with Mr Graves today but not necessarily with
2 the points in which the Inquiry will be most interested.

3 LORD BRACADALE: Well, we -- I departed from the ordinary
4 arrangements for Rule 9, as you say, because of the
5 scale of the applications, written applications, and in
6 further pursuit of that exercise, I suggest that when
7 I rise, after hearing from Mr Jackson, you and
8 Ms Grahame should sit down and go through this
9 application and identify precisely what the areas are
10 that you require to -- you require to apply to me to
11 allow examination, so if you can return to your seat,
12 Dean, I will hear from Mr Jackson now, please.

13 (Pause).

14 Yes, Mr Jackson.

15 Application by MR JACKSON

16 MR JACKSON: Like the Dean of Faculty we have lodged a very
17 lengthy Rule 9 application, and like him, much of it has
18 been dealt with, and I had anticipated that when he had
19 finished, more of it would have been dealt with, leaving
20 me with less, and of course that remains to be seen.

21 I can direct you to the paragraphs in my Rule 9
22 which I'm particularly interested in, which are broadly
23 speaking from 52 -- 52 and then from 66 to 86. These
24 tend to deal with the situations involving PC Tomlinson
25 and PC Smith and are all to do with what I might say are

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1 criticisms of those two officers in the report by the
2 witness and in her evidence.

3 What I thought might be better, subject to you of
4 course, was I would cover the -- rather than doing them
5 individually, but I think it would receive the same
6 result -- what I wanted to do -- want to do is to put to
7 the witness what has been said by Officer Tomlinson in
8 his evidence about the matters she is critical of to see
9 if she would comment on that in the light of what his
10 evidence actually was, and I would also want to do the
11 same as far as Officer Smith is concerned. That seemed
12 to me to be better than going through, as it were, the
13 individual paragraphs but by simply and reasonably
14 quickly, I hope, putting that evidence that's been given
15 by the officers to this witness, that would in effect
16 cover all the individual things that I have raised in
17 the Rule 9.

18 Now, I don't know if that makes sense or not.

19 LORD BRACADALE: Just before I turn to that, you made
20 reference to paragraph 52, that relates to the
21 practicality of diagnosing -- oh no, I'm sorry, I'm
22 looking at the Dean's. Yes, let me just get your Rule 9
23 application out. Yes, 52, and is it just 52 or is it
24 after -- apart from the second tranche that you
25 mentioned?

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1 MR JACKSON: No, I just said 52 and then I went to 66.

2 LORD BRACADALE: Yes.

3 MR JACKSON: Could I just add this: like the Dean, it seemed
4 to me to be fairness in some ways to the witness to be
5 able to put this sort of material I was intending to put
6 to her for her comments. You may, Chair, say to me
7 "Well, a lot of these things could be done just in
8 submissions", and I get that, I do understand that, and
9 like the Dean, I have given some thought to that, but
10 I was left with the view, which I think he had too, that
11 there is fairness to a witness also involved. I know
12 these are not normal proceedings, but in any proceedings
13 it is fairness to a witness in evaluating their evidence
14 to put the sort of things that we were suggesting,
15 albeit they could be made in submissions without putting
16 them to the witness I suppose, but fairness perhaps
17 suggested that we should put these things to the
18 witness.

19 I may say I have already discussed with Ms Grahame
20 what I intend to do in general terms and what I'm saying
21 to you is how I wanted to approach it in general terms,
22 rather than the individual paragraphs. I have already
23 indicated that to Ms Grahame at the luncheon
24 adjournment.

25 LORD BRACADALE: Well, what I will do is I will consider

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1 your application, Mr Jackson, while the Dean and
2 Ms Grahame spend some time on his and hopefully come to
3 a decision in due course.

4 MR JACKSON: I should add again, I think I have said this,
5 of course to some degree I was anticipating that what
6 the Dean did might affect what I would then be asking to
7 do.

8 LORD BRACADALE: I can see that. Thank you, we will
9 adjourn.

10 (2.54 pm)

11 (The Inquiry adjourned until Friday 2nd December 2022)

12

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