



ARMED POLICING OPERATIONS

Standard Operating Procedures

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1. PURPOSE

- 1.1 The [ACPO Authorised Professional Practice \(Armed Policing\) \(APP\(AP\)\)](#) , as adopted by The Police Service of Scotland (PSoS), is the source of firearms policy and practice within the Service.
- 1.2 Whilst a policy of 'Contain and Negotiate' may be a preferred response to many firearms incidents, it should be clearly understood that there is no single policy or tactic contained within the [APP \(AP\)](#) or National Police Firearms Training Curriculum (NPFTC) (available via the Chief Firearms Instructor) that can provide an all-encompassing response to meet all types of threat that may be anticipated or encountered.
- 1.3 Therefore, when determining policy and tactics, it is necessary to be aware of all of the options available in the [APP \(AP\)](#), and any additional options currently approved by the PSoS Strategic Firearms Lead Officer.
- 1.4 Operationally, there is a requirement, when dealing with all firearms incidents, for policies, powers and tactical options to be assessed and reviewed on an on-going basis to ensure that they continue to provide the most proportionate, legal, accountable, necessary and least intrusive response to developments in information and circumstances.
- 1.5 Accordingly, the tactical option identified as the most appropriate in the early stages of an incident may require to be amended to an entirely different option, as a result of updated intelligence or as a consequence of the actions of the subject(s).
- 1.6 [APP\(AP\)](#) is available to all officers via the Intranet and is accessible to the public via the internet.

2. ARMED POLICING STRATEGIC THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT

- 2.1 During 2003 the Home Office developed [Codes of Practice on the Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weaponry](#), which were circulated to all Chief Constables in England and Wales.
- 2.2 The Codes of Practice were established under Section 39 of the [Police Act 1996](#) and permit the Secretary of State to issue such [Codes of Practice](#) relating to the discharge by Police Authorities of any of their functions.
 - Chapter 3.1 of the Codes of Practice requires the Chief Constable to nominate a lead Chief Officer for the Force on firearms matters, who must be of at least ACC rank;
 - Chapter 3.2 of the Codes of Practice placed a requirement on Chief Constables in England and Wales to undertake a Firearms Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment (STRA) to establish the link between the threat from the criminal use of firearms and a Force's ability to respond effectively to that threat.

- 2.3 As a consequence, prior to disaggregation, ACPOS agreed to implement the '[Statement of Intent](#)', which also acknowledges the need to conduct an Armed Policing Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment.
- 2.4 The Superintendent, Armed Policing and the nominated Senior Intelligence Analyst, will collate and deliver the findings of the STRA for consideration and approval.
- 2.5 The findings/results of the STRA will be used to confirm that the on-going provision of human resources, weapons, equipment, tactical options and firearms training within the PSoS is proportionate to the identified threat.
- 2.6 In order for the contents of the STRA to maintain validity under the National Intelligence Model, following initial submission, it will be continually reviewed, and regular updates will be provided at each Armed Policing Monitoring Group meeting.
- 2.7 The strategic overview of this process will remain the responsibility of the Assistant Chief Constable Operational Support (ACC OS).

3. ARMED POLICING MONITORING GROUP

- 3.1 The PSoS Armed Policing Monitoring Group (APMG) has the following terms of reference:
 - The group will regularly review specific operations, where learning points have been identified;
 - In addition, the group will regularly review, as a standing agenda item, the Service firearms deployment model to ensure that it is 'fit for purpose';
 - In so doing, it will consider the prevailing operational policing environment, the criminal use of firearms and the threat from domestic and international terrorism;
 - In considering this regular review, reference will be made to the Service Strategic Assessment and the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment in relation to armed policing;
 - To examine and consider matters of policy published by ACPO AP in a Scottish context;
 - Where relevant recommendations in relation to change will be referred to PSoS Executive for consideration.
- 3.2 The membership of the Armed Policing Monitoring Group will comprise the following post holders:
 - ACC Operational Support (Chair);
 - Detective Chief Superintendent Serious Organised Crime & Counter Terrorism (CT);
 - Detective Chief Superintendent Intelligence;

- Detective Chief Superintendent Serious Crime & Public Protection;
- Chief Superintendent Divisional Policing;
- Legal Services Manager;
- Chief Superintendent Contact, Command and Control;
- Superintendent Armed Policing;
- Chief Inspector Armed Policing;
- Chief Firearms Instructor;
- Head of Service Training;
- Detective Superintendent Criminal Use of Firearms Steering Group;
- Federation Representation;
- ASPS Representation;
- Health & Safety Representation;
- Analyst;
- ACPO AP Representation;
- College of Policing Representation;
- AP Policy & Compliance/Service Delivery Unit.

3.3 In discharging their function, the APMG will consider incidents and operations where Authorised Firearms Officers (AFO's) have been deployed and firearms or other relevant incidents which have concluded without the provision of armed support.

4. CRIMINAL USE OF FIREARMS STEERING GROUP

4.1 Whilst in general terms the remit of the Criminal Use of Firearms Steering Group is to disseminate intelligence threats, trends and analysis throughout the Service the following accurately represents its aims and objectives:-

- To receive and assess information on the on-going threat to public safety from illegally held firearms and misuse of such weapons;
- To promote the development of accurate information and intelligence systems in relation to the threat;
- To ensure that identified areas of concern are addressed by relevant agencies and where appropriate, a co-ordinated approach is taken;
- To develop an action plan to address the availability of illegally held firearms, the misuse of firearms and any developing trends in relation to such matters;
- To allow such flexibility in membership and objectives so that the group provides a meaningful input.

4.2 The membership of the Criminal Use of Firearms Steering Group will comprise of representatives from the following specialist areas:

- ACC Crime (Serious Organised Crime and Counter Terrorism)(Chair);
- ACC Crime (Serious Crime and Public Protection);
- Counter Terrorism Intelligence Section (CTIS);
- Operational Support (Armed Policing);
- Armed Policing Training;
- Analyst (Strategic Analysis Unit);
- Forensics Firearms Section (Ballistics);
- Community Safety (Licensing);
- Corporate Communications (Media)
- Serious Organised Crime Agency;
- Crime Division (Policy Unit) (Secretary).

4.3 In discharging their function, the Criminal Use of Firearms Steering Group will consider crime recording, armed deployments and all intelligence recording systems.

5. AVAILABILITY OF AFO'S

5.1 Where AFO's are required for operational firearms duties, this role takes precedence over Area or Departmental duties.

5.2 In these circumstances, AFO's are to be considered a Service asset and not an Area or Departmental resource.

5.3 Correspondingly, it is essential that AFO's are not precluded from selection for Area/Departmental posts or career advancement as a result of their AFO status.

5.4 In addition to the PSoS, the individual AFO has a responsibility to monitor qualification dates for weapons, fitness testing, Officer Safety Training, Scottish Police Emergency Life Support (SPELS) / first aid, Occupational Health (OH) medical and annual renewal approval to ensure that they qualify or are approved timeously.

6. AFO - PERFORMANCE IMPAIRMENT

6.1 Each AFO has a positive duty to inform their Line Manager(s) of any condition(s) that may affect their performance at the start, or at any time during their shift.

- 6.2 This responsibility covers not only professionally diagnosed 'medical' conditions, but also all other circumstances which could have a detrimental effect on their ability to discharge their duties e.g. relationship or debt management issues.
- 6.3 Where AFOs are in any doubt about disclosure of such issues, they should consult their General Practitioner, OH or their Line Manager(s).
- 6.4 Failure to inform Line Manager(s) of any such impairment is a breach of the [Police Service of Scotland \(Conduct\) Regulations 2014](#) namely; failure to report any matter which it is the Constable's duty to report or to account for any act or omission occurring in the ordinary course of duty which he/she has a duty to account for.
- 6.5 All officers considering applying to become an AFO and all officers renewing their prevailing firearms authorisation **must** take the content of this chapter into account before submitting the application form.
- 6.6 Where an AFO has reason to visit the Service OH provider, it is essential that the officer informs them of their firearms status.
- 6.7 All 'High Risk Posts' within PSoS are subject of 'with cause' substance misuse testing and random alcohol testing. High Risk posts include AFOs, Firearms Instructors, Commanders and Tactical Firearms Advisors (TFA). Full details are contained within the [Substance Misuse SOP](#).

7. FITNESS FOR DUTY

- 7.1 The use of drugs in medical treatments or the consumption of alcohol can reduce an officer's alertness and performance. The standards of professional behaviour provided under the [Police Service of Scotland \(Conduct\) Regulations 2014](#) address the importance of officer fitness for duty and issues associated with the consumption of alcohol, illegal drugs and prescription drugs. These standards are particularly important in respect of officers undertaking firearms duties. An officer who is receiving a course of drug treatment must seek the advice of their own Doctor or Service OH provider if they are concerned about side effects of the drugs. Any other concerns or medical advice given to an officer must be brought to the attention of their Line Manager or Service OH provider, who should take appropriate action.
- 7.2 AFOs, Commanders, and TFAs, without prejudice to the role they undertake, can request to be temporarily stood down from such duties. This is particularly relevant where there are medical, emotional, or other life stresses which may interfere with the discharge of critical decision making or their overall effectiveness. This process should also apply to those involved in key support roles.

- 7.3 AFOs have a personal responsibility to inform the issuing officer or a supervisor of any circumstances where they believe that they may be unfit to carry out their duties as an AFO. The issuing officer or supervisor is responsible for deciding whether that officer should be issued with a firearm and record their decision and the rationale for it.
- 7.4 A fitness for duty declaration in support of the obligation contained within paragraph 7.3, together with a warning reminder of their responsibilities and powers for use of Police Firearms in Scotland shall be delivered to officers prior to them deploying with firearms (see Appendix P).

8. THE OBJECTIVES AND MANAGEMENT OF A FIREARMS INCIDENT

- 8.1 

- 8.2 During many armed deployments complete neutralisation of the threat will only be achieved after the subject and any weapons have been secured by the police. The deployment of firearms officers, although an essential risk control measure, does not necessarily prevent a subject from discharging a firearm or detonating an Improvised Explosive Device (I.E.D) etc.

8.3 OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES

- 8.3.1 It is the duty of the police service to safeguard the public. However, police officers must not be expected to endanger their own lives or the lives of their colleagues in ill-considered attempts at rescue, or to effect an early arrest.
- 8.3.2 In keeping with the principles of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) the rights of all people must be considered, including those of the subject. However, potentially lethal force may be used if it is absolutely necessary for the legitimate aims outlined in Article 2 of the ECHR.
- 8.3.3 Whilst an armed subject's right to life must be given due consideration, the lives of members of the public and police officers must not be placed at greater risk in an effort to save the life of someone carrying out a criminal or terrorist act likely to cause loss of life or serious injury.

8.4 SPONTANEOUS FIREARMS INCIDENTS

- 8.4.1 A Spontaneous Firearms Incident can be described as:
- An incident that takes place without warning, the circumstances of which demand that armed support to the initial police response must be considered;

- It should be borne in mind that this may include situations where the subject is not in possession of a firearm or other potentially lethal weapon but is 'otherwise so dangerous' that the deployment of police firearms resources may be required to safely control the situation e.g. in some situations where persons are in possession of edged weapons, hostage situations etc.

8.5 PRE-PLANNED FIREARMS INCIDENT

8.5.1 A Pre-planned Firearms Incident can be described as:

- An incident where information is gathered about something that will or may happen in the future, thereby providing time to plan and develop an appropriate armed response or take other action to mitigate the threat.

9. INITIAL UNARMED RESPONSE TO A SPONTANEOUS FIREARMS INCIDENT

9.1 SERVICE CENTRE OR PERSON RECEIVING REPORT

- Where information is received to the effect that a firearm is involved or is suspected of being involved in an on-going incident, then a command and control incident with an appropriate identifying coding should be raised at the earliest opportunity, and forwarded to the relevant Area Control Room (ACR).
- The incident should be updated with as much information that can be obtained from the reporter including:

INITIAL INFORMATION

- Location of incident;
- Location of suspect;
- Has the person threatened to use the firearm, presented it at anyone or has it been discharged?;
- Has the reporter seen the firearm?;
- Are there any injured persons?;
- Is an ambulance required? If yes, assessment will be made whether ambulance attendance requires to be delayed or to be co-ordinated with the police response;
- Description of the person with the firearm;
- Description of the firearm;
- Last known direction of travel;
- Any vehicle(s) involved.

- The call taker should also attempt to obtain the under noted additional information from the reporter but prior to doing so must immediately forward the above listed initial information to the ACR.

9.3 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

- Reporter's knowledge of firearms;
- Is suspect known to reporter?;
- Does the suspect have any known communication difficulties, non-English speaking etc?;
- Are there others with the suspect? Provide descriptions;
- Suspect and associated demeanour
- Is area concerned busy with vehicular and pedestrian traffic;
- Are there any other persons of a similar description in the area that firearms officers should be aware of when deployed;
- Any other information the reporter provides in relation to the incident;
- Any other information the person taking the report considers necessary.

9.4 On receipt of a suspected firearms incident the Controller **will** immediately alert the Initial Tactical Firearms Commander (ITFC) of the incident.

9.5 The ITFC will ensure that it is clearly highlighted that they are in command of the incident.

9.6 Each and every incident will require to be progressed on its own merits and as such, much will depend upon the quality and quantity of the information that is available. Any deployment of police resources to alleged high threat situations should follow safe response procedures unless there are sound and objective reasons to discount the allegations. The facts that a reporter appeared to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or chose to remain anonymous are not objective reasons to disregard established safe procedures.

9.7 These procedures will also apply where the incident does not involve a person in possession of a firearm, but where they are considered 'otherwise so dangerous' where the incident would not be assigned suspected firearms incident status.

9.8 AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY: CONTROLLER:

- The controller receiving the suspected firearms incident **will** immediately inform the Duty Officer within the Area Control Room;
- The Area Supervisors i.e. Patrol Inspector and or Sergeant **must** be informed;

- They should be informed that on arrival at scene, they will become the Police Incident Officer (PIO) for the incident until stood down and their appointment as PIO will be clearly highlighted on the command and control incident;
- A check of any closed circuit television (CCTV) in the area should be carried out along with any telephone enquiries that can be conducted;
- Any unarmed resource directed to attend the locus should be instructed to make/consider safe observations/enquiries' in line with [College of Policing \(COP\) Stay Safe at Firearms Incidents](#) only and not to approach or detain persons who may be armed;
- A broadcast should be made informing resources of the on-going incident on the relevant talk group and talk groups being used in adjoining areas, including roam talk groups, in order to prevent resources inadvertently attending the scene of an on-going firearms incident. Similarly any Event talk groups being used should be advised of the incident;
- Background checks, including whether the subject is a firearms or shotgun certificate holder, require to be carried out for any named suspect or address via Scottish Intelligence Database (SID), Police National Computer (PNC)/Criminal History System (CHS), Scottish Operational Management Information System (ScOMIS), and any previous incidents checked on the command and control system. The Crime Management System, Vulnerable Persons Database (VPD) where available, and Prisoner Processing System should also be considered as potential sources of intelligence. If the incident occurs at a time when the Service Intelligence Department are on duty, they may be in a position to assist with further information and intelligence. Dependent upon circumstances, consideration should also be given to contacting the Counter Terrorism Intelligence Unit (Scotland) (CTIU(S)). CTIU(S) out of office hours contact details can be obtained from the ACR;
- Consideration is to be given to utilising specialist resources such as the Helicopter, Dog Section and Road Policing resources;
- If the incident becomes protracted and there is the possibility of road closures then the Ambulance Service and Fire Service will require to be notified;
- Consideration should be given to having an ambulance placed on stand-by at the RVP or other suitable area.

9.8.1 The incident should be updated timeously with every action or allocation of resources, inclusive of any general intelligence updates from the scene or intelligence from background checks (details from SID logs should not be entered on incident log – see para 9.11), which could impact upon the requirement for armed policing, tactical options or police powers.

9.8.2 It is essential that any relevant information from the SID or CTIU(S), that could impact on the safety of the public, police resources or the subject, is clearly communicated to Firearms Commanders, TFCs and AFOs. Such information must also be communicated to any new resources upon their involvement in the incident.

- 9.8.3 Whilst, information from the SID system or CTIU(S) **should not** be recorded on the command and control system, a text entry should be inserted stipulating relevant SID log reference numbers or stating that CTIU(S) information requires to be accessed. This text entry should be preceded and followed by a line of asterisks.

9.9 AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY: AREA CONTROL ROOM DUTY OFFICER

- 9.9.1 Dependent on the initial information received, and following application of the National Decision Making Model (NDM), AFOs can be deployed to a spontaneous firearms incident, in such circumstances, the Duty Officer will assume the role of ITFC
- 9.9.2 When determining the need to deploy armed or unarmed officers to respond to potential firearms incidents, consideration should be given to whether the information or intelligence they would be expected to gather could be enhanced by other methods such as remote monitoring of any CCTV coverage of the location, long range observations from the Service helicopter, telephone contact with reporters/witnesses, etc. These may facilitate safer distribution of any unarmed or armed ground units, or indeed negate the immediate need to deploy unarmed units.
- 9.9.3 However, taking consideration of the geographical size of the Service area, limitations in CCTV coverage, availability of the helicopter, availability of armed resources and the volume of reported firearms incidents, there are likely to be many occasions, where there is a requirement to allocate unarmed resources to carry out initial unarmed observations or enquiries.
- 9.9.4 On all such occasions, the unarmed observations or enquiries should be conducted by the **safest possible means**. Where available, it may be beneficial to deploy plainclothes officers in unmarked cars. However, it should be borne in mind that at close quarters many unmarked police vehicles are identifiable as such due to the additional radio aerials fitted to the vehicles.
- 9.9.5 The Service Generic Risk Assessment for Armed Policing Operations and the recognised safe system of work for firearms incidents recommend that **unarmed officers do not approach or secure subjects who are suspected to be in possession of firearms for criminal purposes**. Officers should be aware that firearms, especially handguns, can be easily hidden about the person, even under light clothing, and can be quickly and readily accessible.
- 9.9.6 It should be clearly understood that PSoS currently has no acknowledged safe or effective method for unarmed officers to approach, control or secure a subject where there is **reason to suppose** that the subject may be in possession of or have immediate access to a firearm.
- 9.9.7 It is essential that ACR staff monitor incidents and ensure that clear instructions are broadcast that unarmed officers are to carry out safe observations or enquires only and are not to approach or secure subjects who pose a potential firearms threat. Responding officers should confirm that these instructions have been broadcast and are being complied with.

9.10 ACTIONS OF THE FIRST UNARMED OFFICER AT THE SCENE

- 9.10.1 In many situations the first officers on scene at a spontaneous firearms incident will be unarmed. In these situations the officers should, in accordance with this standard operating procedure and the content of the [College of Policing \(COP\) Stay Safe at Firearms Incidents](#) follow the SEE, TELL, ACT guide;

STAY SAFE - Think about your own and the public's safety;
 SEE - What is happening and where;
 TELL - Communicate, describe incident/type of weapon;
 ACT - Stay Safe, update, observe/contain.

- 9.10.2 The first officer at the scene of a spontaneous firearms incident should ensure that the ITFC is updated of a potential firearms incident in order that the ITFC can arrange:

- Armed support to be considered, which will normally be Armed Response Vehicles (ARV) ;
- A RVP and safe route are established and communicated ;
- Local procedures for implementing command structure have been initiated i.e. first line manager informed of circumstances ;
- Other resources have been considered e.g. helicopter, Dog Section, Negotiators etc;
- A paramedic ambulance and other emergency services have been requested where necessary;
- On duty TFC or in their absence an officer from the on-call Armed Policing Cadre have been informed of the incident.

- 9.10.3 In most spontaneous firearms incidents, where the subject is believed to be in a particular location, the initial tactic will be to contain the location with the objective of holding the subject there. This may also provide additional planning time, which will allow Commanders and Advisors to consider all tactics to bring the incident to a safe and successful conclusion.

- 9.10.4 If the police deployment involves only unarmed officers, then the safest option will be visual containment or observing the subject from a safe position of cover and reporting their movements.

- 9.10.5 The officers should ideally select covert observation positions offering cover from fire and cover from view. They should try to avoid isolated cover positions that could not be safely abandoned if an armed subject approached. Officers should be aware that noise activity may be enough to compromise a covert position and should wear radio earpieces or turn down the volume and/or cover the speaker to reduce noise.

- 9.10.6 The deployment of police dogs can provide additional support until the arrival of armed resources. However, if the dogs are noisy, this could compromise covert positions.

- 9.10.7 Particularly during the hours of darkness, officers should turn off or cover the light up display screen facility on their Airwave terminals to avoid identifying their positions.
- 9.10.8 An assessment of initial information may result in the utilisation of unarmed officers to take observations on the most likely location of the armed subject but without a 100% guarantee that the subject is there. In such situations, officers must remain alert to all of their surroundings, in case the armed subject is near to, but out-with the location being observed. Incidents have occurred, where the subject was out-with the location being observed and, rather than making off, approached from behind the containment group posing a threat to the officers.
- 9.10.9 For the majority of spontaneous firearms incidents, the first officers at the scene are likely to be uniformed constables from the local area. The very first officers at the scene may find that they need to deal immediately with a specific element of the incident e.g. maintaining observations on an armed subject.
- 9.10.10 However, as soon as practicable, an officer should take on responsibility for managing the incident and co-ordinating police activity. This will normally, but not always, be a supervisory officer who attends the scene to take charge and will perform the role of the PIO. This officer should provide relevant information to the ACR in order that they may:
- Assess the situation;
 - Identify the police objectives e.g. preserve life, locate witnesses, preserve a crime scene, arrest offenders, minimise congestion, etc;
 - Prioritise the objectives;
 - Request, direct and co-ordinate resources to achieve the objectives, nominating officers to command and co-ordinate specific groups where required, e.g. Outer Cordon Public Control, Inner Cordon Containment etc;
 - Keep the ACR updated;
 - Monitor the effectiveness of the police response and make appropriate adjustments.
- 9.10.11 Where there is a need to administer first aid to a casualty, officers should quickly assess whether there is an on-going threat to themselves, the casualty or other persons at the scene. Whilst a natural reaction may be to immediately deal with injured parties, approved first aid principles clearly recognise that first aider must give due cognisance to any on-going dangers before attempting to administer first aid. Officers should follow the guidance provided in paragraph 9.10.1 above in relation to STAY SAFE, and seek guidance from the ITFC prior to taking any further action.
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9.11 ACTIONS OF THE FIRST SUPERVISOR AT THE SCENE

9.11.1 The actions of the first supervisor at the scene are to:

- Gather, record and provide regular intelligence updates on the subject, the premises, any innocent parties, the subject's vehicle and any background detail;
- Gather available officers to contain the incident safely and provide public control. Ensure that officers have been deployed to effect safe observations of the subject, and report any developments. Direct that all possible escape routes are identified and observed;
- Cater for immediate contingencies, e.g. escape, pursuit, hostages, casualties, etc;
- Update officers, including those already on containment, on intelligence, plans, options and contingencies;
- Review the legal powers available to deal with the situation e.g. powers of arrest/detention and warrants;
- Record all details and decisions.

9.12 RENDEZVOUS POINT

9.12.1 A suitable Rendezvous Point (RVP) should be selected, which affords cover from both fire and view. It is also appropriate to assign a specific 'route in' to ensure that officers will not pass the incident scene en route to the RVP.

9.12.2 The RVP should be at a location that provides reliable radio communications, to allow early warning to resources if the RVP is compromised as a result of an armed subject escaping the containment area or being seen approaching the RVP.

9.12.3 The following should therefore be considered when nominating an RVP:

- Easily Identifiable;
- Out of line of sight of the locus/suspect(s);
- Suitable size for attending resources;
- Nominated safe route in and safe route out;
- Good reception/transmission area.

9.13 INITIAL CONTAINMENT

9.13.1 Containment has two basic intentions:

- To isolate the subject and;
- To ensure the safety of the public including family, friends, media and so on.

9.13.2 To effectively achieve this, two groups of officers can be used:

- Outer cordon/perimeter group and;
- Inner cordon/cover group.

9.13.3 **Outer Containment:** This may well be the largest group, usually of unarmed uniformed officers. Members must be thoroughly briefed as to their responsibilities, which are:

- a). To allow the operation to take place in a controlled environment thereby ensuring that persons in the vicinity are not exposed to unnecessary danger;
- b). To control the access of all resources arriving at the scene and direct them via safe routes to appropriate locations;
- c). To permit access into the control/sterile area through the minimum number of entry points, with a system of passes if necessary.

9.13.4 **Inner Containment:** This is the armed inner cordon (cover group) that provides the immediate containment of the subject. In the case of spontaneous incidents, a visual containment might initially be undertaken by unarmed officers however, armed support should be deployed as quickly as possible to provide an effective response if the armed subject becomes active.

9.13.5 In carrying out this role the following are important considerations:

- The cover group should be deployed as a priority to prevent the escape of the subject. Ideally its members should work in pairs, and ensure that all aspects of the building or area are effectively observed and covered if possible;
- There must be an effective means of communicating both within the group and with other relevant personnel;
- As soon as is practical, the inner cordon should be supplied with sufficient armed resources to replace unarmed officers;
- Where there is a necessity for firearms officers to be deployed to containment positions singly, additional armed support should be deployed as a matter of urgency. A firearms officer deployed without a second armed officer in immediate support may not be able to deploy less lethal options as a result of the need to maintain conventional firearms coverage;
- Communications should be kept to the minimum necessary and priority allocated to messages from the inner cordon or any messages regarding sightings of the subject out with the inner cordon;
- Where possible, the positions selected by the inner cordon should be such that the subject will not be able to detect movement in and out as well as providing effective cover from fire;
- If appropriate, steps should be taken to prevent the use of any motor vehicle to which the subject might have access;

- In their observation role the inner cordon can report developments in their respective areas of responsibility. Information gained in this way may prove invaluable in the formulation of any plan. In addition, the presence of further subjects or innocent parties may be revealed.

9.14 INITIAL TACTICAL FIREARMS COMMANDER (ITFC)

- In respect of spontaneous incidents, where circumstances as outlined in the Criteria for the Deployment of AFOs (paragraph 10.2) are met, the ITFC should authorise the deployment of AFOs;
- The ITFC should fully brief and clearly communicate any tactical parameters associated with the authorisation via the ARV/Firearms Unit dedicated Airwave talk group;
- Consultation with a Tactical Firearms Advisor (TFA) should be made at an early stage;
- The ITFC will accurately record their decisions on the command and control system;
- The ITFC should liaise with the PIO and inform them of the authorisation and assigned tactical parameters. The PIO should be informed that the ITFC will retain Tactical Command of the incident until an accredited Pre Planned Tactical Firearms Commander (TFC) takes command. It should be made clear that the Operational Firearms Commander (OFC) and PIOs should keep the ITFC fully updated on information, intelligence and proposed actions. This dialogue should continue until the conclusion of the incident;
- The ITFC should develop the tactical plan and periodically update the ARVs concerning available information and intelligence, until they transfers command to an accredited Pre Planned TFC;
- Consideration should be given to the deployment of service Negotiators;
- Consideration should be given to allocating a dedicated talk group during a prolonged incident and consultation should be made with the Control Room Supervisor in relation to this. It may be more appropriate to move the area resources to another talk group;
- It may become necessary for the ITFC to advise Corporate Communications of any on-going incident.

9.15 TACTICAL ADVICE

- 9.15.1 The ITFC should consult with a TFA at an early stage. When tactical advice is provided, the TFA will complete a [National Command Log](#). These logs should be submitted via the Support Inspector, Armed Policing to the Chief Inspector Armed Policing Operations who has responsibility to monitor the tactical advice given.

- 9.15.2 Where an operation involving Dynamic Entry or Dynamic Intervention is being considered, where practicable and time permitting, qualified Dynamic Entry/Intervention advisors should be involved in the planning process. However, in urgent circumstances the deployment should not be unnecessarily delayed for such involvement as all Specialist Firearms Officers (SFO's) are trained in Dynamic Entry/Intervention tactics.

10. AUTHORISATION FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF AUTHORISED FIREARMS OFFICERS

- 10.1 AFOs are considered as being deployed when they are required to conduct a specific task during which the possession of a firearm, with appropriate authorisation, is a required element. This includes when they self-deploy as provided under the guidance set out in the [APP\(AP\)](#).
- 10.2 The deployment of AFOs should only be authorised in the following circumstances:
- (a) Where the officer authorising the deployment has ***reason to suppose*** that officers may have to protect themselves or others from a person who:
 - Is in possession of, or has immediate access to, a firearm or other potentially lethal weapon, or
 - Is otherwise so dangerous that the deployment of armed officers is considered to be appropriate; or
 - (b) As an operational contingency in a specific operation based on threat assessment; or
 - (c) For the destruction of animals which are dangerous or are suffering unnecessarily.
- 10.3 The use of the words '***reason to suppose***' sets the level of knowledge required (about the existence of a threat justifying the deployment of AFO) at a far lower level of probability than that which would actually justify the use of firearms.
- 10.4 There can be no justification therefore, for making use of a weapon based solely on the fact that firearms, Launcher or Conducted Energy Device (CED) have been issued. In effect the authority for issue merely authorises the carrying of the weapon.
- 10.5 The decision as to which weapon(s) to deploy rests with the individual AFOs.

11. AUTHORISATION

11.1 STANDING AUTHORITY

- 11.1.1 ARV crews, ARV OFC and Tactical Firearms Unit (TFU) officers have a standing firearms authority for the issue and carriage of firearms when employed on routine general patrol i.e. the authority to overtly carry their police issue Self Loading Pistol (SLP) and CED.
- 11.1.2 The standing authority will be reviewed as a standing agenda item at each meeting of the Armed Policing Monitoring Group.

11.2 PRE PLANNED OPERATIONS

- 11.2.1 In respect of pre-planned operations, firearms, Launcher and CED will not be issued without the authorisation of an accredited Strategic Firearms Commander (SFC).

11.3 SPONTANEOUS INCIDENTS – ITFC

- 11.3.1 In respect of spontaneous incidents, where circumstances as outlined in paragraph 10.2 above are met, the ITFC should authorise the deployment of AFOs.
- 11.3.2 The ITFC **will** contact a SFC as soon as practicable. The SFC, when in a position to do so, should then review, agree or amend the strategy and any tactical parameters set and where necessary, confirm or rescind any given authority.

11.4 SPONTANEOUS INCIDENTS – PRE PLANNED TFC'S

- 11.4.1 An accredited Pre-Planned TFC has the same authorising powers as the ITFC.
- 11.4.2 An accredited Pre-Planned TFC **will** contact a SFC as soon as practicable. The SFC, when in a position to do so, should then review, agree or amend the strategy and any tactical parameters set and where necessary, confirm or rescind any given authority.

11.5 SELF DEPLOYMENT

- 11.5.1 Where AFOs encounter a situation where they believe that the criteria for deployment of AFOs has been met, and delay in seeking authority to deploy would be detrimental to public or officer safety, officers should deploy and take the necessary and appropriate action in accordance with their training.
- 11.5.2 The fact that a decision had been taken not to authorise officers when they were initially actioned to an incident would not preclude them from self-authorising during a situation whereupon they suddenly encounter a person and the criteria for deployment is met.

- 11.5.3 Where this occurs, the AFOs should inform the Area Control Room as soon as practicable so that an ITFC can be informed. The ITFC should assess and review the actions of the AFOs in line with the national decision making model (NDM) and determine whether continued deployment is appropriate. The ITFC should also consider what further resources may be required and inform a SFC as soon as practicable.

11.6 ISSUE OF FIREARMS – NON EMERGENCY SITUATIONS

- 11.6.1 Issuing officers at all service armouries will issue the appropriate number of firearms, launcher(s), CED(s) and ancillary equipment as authorised and should complete the relevant firearms issue documents accordingly.

11.7 ISSUE OF FIREARMS – EMERGENCY SITUATIONS

- 11.7.1 In emergency situations there may be a requirement to urgently despatch firearms, launcher(s) or CED(s) in sealed, ready boxes and the associated personal protection equipment to a designated RVP, in order that they may be issued near to the scene of the incident. Should such an occasion arise, the number of firearms, launcher(s) or CED(s) and the appropriate quantities of ancillary equipment requested should be despatched timeously.
- 11.7.2 In such circumstances the relevant firearms issue documents will be used at the RVP to record the details of the officers subsequently issued with firearms.

Note: Officers transporting firearms, launcher(s) and CED(s) do not require to be Authorised Firearms Officers.

12. COMMAND STRUCTURE

- 12.1 Where it appears that police are unlikely to achieve an early resolution to the incident, the ITFC should assess the situation. The assessment should include a review of the command structure, ensuring that suitable officers are employed in command roles.
- 12.2 **It is essential at all times that the TFC is clearly identified.** Senior officers and specialist support personnel who attend the scene should report to the PIO in the absence of the TFC at the scene. Unless they take over the role of TFC or SFC, they must act under the directions of the TFC, irrespective of rank.
- 12.3 Any hand-over of Strategic, Tactical or Operational command roles must be accurately recorded on the firearms incident log and command and control system, recording the time the handover was effected and the identities of those concerned.
- 12.4 Command of a firearms operation, whether spontaneous or pre-planned, must be an immediate and integral consideration within any police response.
- 12.5 An effective command structure contains:

RESTRICTED

- **Strategic Firearms Commander (SFC)** – [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- **Tactical Firearms Commander (TFC)** – [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- **Operational Firearms Commander(s) (OFC)** – [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- **Tactical Firearms Advisor (TFA)** - [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

- 12.6 Where the issue of firearms has been authorised, it is the responsibility of the authorising officer to ensure that an appropriate command structure is instigated. This must be clearly recorded within the authorisation process.
- 12.7 The establishment of a command structure in pre-planned operations is not necessarily easily replicated in spontaneous incidents. For the majority of spontaneous incidents, the first officers at the scene are likely to be local uniformed patrol officers. The very first officers at the scene may find that they need to deal immediately with a specific element of the incident, such as maintaining safe observations on an armed subject.
- 12.8 Where AFOs have self-deployed, the officers should contact the ITFC at the ACR, as soon as practicable, to instigate command.
- 12.9 It is imperative that a command structure is put in place at the earliest opportunity. The ITFC will perform the role in the early stages of the incident; however, it is essential that a TFC takes responsibility for managing the incident and co-ordinating police activity as soon as practicable. Where a change of command occurs this must be fully recorded and documented.
- 12.10 In the case of spontaneous incidents a PIO, who will normally be an appropriate local supervising officer, will attend the scene to take charge of most elements of the deployment e.g. outer containment. This officer will identify themselves to the ITFC and will be allocated the PIO call sign. This officer will be supported by the OFC. All resources deployed to the incident should be made aware that the ITFC is commanding the incident.
- 12.11 Any transfer of roles to other officers must be fully documented and must also include the reasons and considerations of the action taken, together with the time and date of such a transfer.

- 12.12 At the early stages of a spontaneous incident, the role of SFC and TFC is likely to be combined, until a dedicated and appropriately qualified SFC assumes strategic command.
- 12.13 The SFC may need a suitable support structure to support the strategic command elements of the operation. For example, one or more of the following may be considered, TFA, Media Liaison Officer and log keeper.
- 12.14 Police diversity staff associations can provide advice on issues covering gender, gender identity, race, sexual orientation, some religions and disability. The Service has access to a group of Community Advisors, who can also provide advice. They can be contacted via the supervisor at the ACR.
- 12.15 An Independent Advisor should never attend the scene of an incident, be involved in the proactive phase of an enquiry, or be party to information regarding the specifics of police tactical plans, operational capabilities or limitations.
- 12.16 Firearms Commanders should, where appropriate, consider a Community Impact Assessment for all firearms incidents.

13. TACTICAL FIREARMS ADVISORS

- 13.1 TFAs are contacted by the ITFC, who holds the list of officers trained in this crucial area of expertise. **Consideration should be given to contacting TFA at the earliest stage possible of any firearms incident.**
- 13.2 The role of a TFA is to advise on the capabilities and limitations of the AFOs and other police resources being deployed. Provide advice on the available tactical options for consideration by the Commander within the existing strategy and any tactical parameters set. Advise on the tactical considerations, contingencies and implications for each tactical option.
- 13.3 While the need for tactical advice will always exist at the level of TFC as a priority, SFCs may wish to seek the advice of a TFA concerning the potential operational effect of setting tactical parameters.
- 13.4 TFAs do not make any decisions or take independent action. The responsibility for the validity and reliability of the advice lies with the advisors, but the responsibility for the use of the advice lies with the Commander.
- 13.5 It is the role of the TFA to give the Commander all the assistance available, which may include advising them against a course of action they may be about to take, if the Advisors do not believe it is appropriate.

14. BRIEFING IN FIREARMS OPERATIONS

- 14.1 All staff involved in situations where AFOs are deployed must be given as full a briefing as possible. The briefing should include Information/Intelligence, Threat Assessment, Strategy, Powers and Policies, Options, Contingencies and Actions, Review as per the NDM. These should provide officers with as much clarity as possible for the role they have to undertake, and any tactical parameters which have been set. The level of additional detail given will depend on the circumstances prevailing at the time, and the time available. Where time permits, briefings should inform officers of the procedures to be followed on the conclusion of the deployment.
- 14.2 The key headings in the NDM should be used as the basis for briefing and provides continuity of approach during the planning and operational stages of the deployment. The use of the NDM also enables any additional information to be reviewed or updated as the situation develops. Other models such as Information, Intention, Method, Risk Assessment, Communication and Human Rights (IIMARCH) can be used to develop the content of the briefing.
- 14.3 The TFC should ensure AFOs and other deployed officers are briefed using the most appropriate means of communication. Commanders should confirm their lines of communications with officers (AFO and unarmed) once they have been deployed.
- 14.4 The TFC should ensure that the information, intelligence and grading is included in the briefing where it is relevant to the working strategy. They should also consider drawing on the expertise of other staff in briefings where this may be of assistance e.g. OFCs and Intelligence Officers.
- 14.5 A record should be maintained of all briefings, including the persons present and information given. The method of recording may include:
 - Contemporaneous notes;
 - Use of formal briefing documents;
 - Audio recording;
 - Video recording;
 - IT Systems;
 - Command and Control logs.
- 14.6 As far as practicable, the most comprehensive method for providing an accurate record of the briefing should be used. Where officers are being briefed while travelling or are in a remote area, consideration should be given to the use of radio or telephone recording to provide a record of the briefing. The absence of secure communications may however place constraints on this option where classified information is being referred to.
- 14.7 **Officers providing briefings should be mindful that the content of the briefing may directly affect the response of armed officers to any subsequent perceived threat from the subject.**

- 14.8 Where possible consideration should be given to providing a briefing hand-out or other appropriate measure, to support officers with specific learning difficulties e.g. dyslexia.

15. DEBRIEF OF FIREARMS OPERATIONS

- 15.1 Once an armed deployment has been concluded, a full debrief should be considered to identify opportunities for operational and organisational learning. Large or protracted operations should include arrangements for a specific debriefing session so that any aspect of the command structure, tactics or equipment used, which may demonstrate good practice, or learning opportunities can be identified and lessons learned. Debriefs should be documented within the National Command Log.
- 15.2 The debriefing process is important to the development of future strategies and tactics. The objective in firearms operations is primarily to identify any immediate or long-term firearms or safety issues. To ensure firearms and safety matters are focused upon, such debriefs should be held separately from any evidential or welfare debrief that may be conducted.
- 15.3 Only in exceptional circumstances should debriefing take place when the criteria for post incident procedures have been met, and this should only take place with the agreement of any investigative body involved.

15.4 CONTENT AND TIMING OF DEBRIEF

- 15.4.1 All operations will be the subject of a 'hot debrief' and the TFC will be responsible for completing notes in relation to de-brief points, unless instructed by the SFC that the circumstances of the operation require documentation under a more secure classification.
- 15.4.2 In the following instances full, formally structured debriefs must be held and comprehensively documented:
- Hostage-taking incidents including incidents resolved without firearms support;
 - [REDACTED]
 - Multi-agency incidents;
 - All occasions where PSoS AFO's are deployed in their units to incidents in other Home Office Force areas;
 - Incidents where shots are fired from conventional firearms, or less lethal weapons whether by police or other persons;
 - Incidents where specialist munitions are discharged, activated or initiated;
 - Incidents where significant concerns are raised in relation to the strategy, tactics, operational deployment etc;
 - Operations that have obvious future implications for officer safety.

15.4.3 The debrief should be directed to examine current and future needs and structured to at least cover the following subjects:

- Armed and unarmed response policy issues;
- Strategic and tactical decision making within the operation ;
- The roles performed by officers to implement those tactics ;
- Equipment;
- The need to obtain ideas for improvement in future operations.

15.4.4 As the 'hot debrief' should have identified any immediate considerations, the objective of the full debrief is to confirm the points already raised and to identify any additional considerations and longer-term issues. It will not normally be necessary to conduct a full and formal debrief immediately after the operation but it should be held at an early opportunity. It is the responsibility of the SFC to ensure the debrief takes place and that all relevant personnel or their representatives attend. Officers being represented at any briefing should ensure their nominees are fully briefed.

15.5 SPONTANEOUS INCIDENTS

15.5.1 Each spontaneous incident in which firearms are deployed will be debriefed at its conclusion or as soon as practicable afterwards. The OFC in conjunction with the ITFC will ensure an operational report outlining details of the operation, is submitted for the attention of the Chief Inspector, Armed Policing Operations prior to going off duty.

15.6 PRE-PLANNED OPERATIONS

15.6.1 All pre-planned operations will be debriefed at their conclusion. The timing of the de-brief and the location at which it is to be held should be an integral part of the initial operational planning process.

15.6.2 Officers deployed on protracted authorised operations that take place perhaps over a number of days, for example hospital guards or long-term surveillance operations, will be given the opportunity of a 'hot debrief' prior to the conclusion of each tour of duty. This is to ensure that all relevant information and any operational advantages or difficulties are timeously identified and addressed where appropriate.

15.6.3 Where necessary, an additional full de-brief will be conducted at the overall conclusion of the operation. This does not remove the responsibility of individuals to highlight issues that require immediate action if or when they arise.

15.7 DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL COMMAND LOGS AND DEBRIEF REPORTS

- 15.7.1 The SFC will sign the National Command Log and have sight of any additional debrief report. These will then be considered by the ACC OS who will determine whether they require to be discussed by the APMG. The Firearms Lead Officer will ensure that the National Command Log and debrief records are brought to the attention of the Superintendent, Armed Policing, who will be responsible for arranging for the original to be filed and copies distributed to relevant parties, including investigating officers where applicable.
- 15.7.2 **ARV Operational Report:** ARV officers who attend firearms related incidents or operations will submit an ARV Operational Report prior to going off duty.
- 15.7.3 A copy of the report can be obtained from the ARV Database, which is maintained by the [REDACTED], [REDACTED]
- 15.7.4 **TFU Operational Report:** TFU officers who attend firearms related incidents or operations will submit a TFU Operational Report prior to going off duty.
- 15.7.5 A copy of the report can be obtained from the TFU Database, which is maintained by the [REDACTED], [REDACTED]

16. ARMED RESPONSE VEHICLES

- 16.1 [REDACTED]
- 16.2 The operational remit of ARVs is to provide an immediate armed response to appropriate incidents and to carry out armed deployments in keeping with the SFC or TFCs stipulated tactical parameters.
- 16.3 During any armed deployment, circumstances may occur that necessitate the adoption of different tactical options or actions from those originally stipulated. ARV officers should, if practicable have such changes approved by the TFC. However, it is recognised that certain time critical events may occur that require ARV officers to change tactics and actions immediately. In such circumstances, it is expected that the officers would implement the safest, most effective, lawful and proportionate tactics and update the TFC as soon as possible. As is always the case in firearms operations, the officers may be required to explain their actions and confirm that they were justified and necessary.

- 16.4 It is important that ARVs are deployed to incidents requiring a firearms response in sufficient numbers to effectively implement any tactical parameter. ARVs should normally be deployed in pairs to an incident requiring a firearms response. However, there will be occasions when this criterion is impossible to meet. Where only one ARV can be deployed initially, every effort should be made to quickly provide additional armed support.
- 16.5 To ensure that the Service maintains a response to spontaneous incidents, AFOs should relieve ARVs if an incident is likely to become protracted. Where the tactical situation requires that the ARVs remain at the incident, consideration should be given to utilising AFOs to provide an armed response to any other spontaneous firearms incidents. This decision will be made by the TFC, following consultation with the TFA. Consideration should also be given to deploying additional ARVs from resources held.
- 16.6 As soon as the ARVs have been dispatched and/or authorised the ITFC, is to closely monitor the incident in order that they may review the need for firearms to ensure that the police response remains lawful, effective and proportionate. It is essential that the ITFC be given frequent situation reports as the incident progresses and that the relevant information is passed to the units responding.
- 16.7 On taking the decision to authorise ARV crews, the ITFC is to transmit the instruction, for authorisation, to the ARV OFC and the PIO as soon as practicable using clear and unambiguous radio procedure. These officers are to acknowledge receipt of this authorisation also using clear and unambiguous radio procedure. The PIO must ensure that all unarmed resources involved in the incident are made aware that armed officers will be attending/ deploying.
- 16.8 It is imperative that the ITFC is advised on all occasions when firearms are drawn from lock fast or numbered security sealed transport boxes. They must also be informed immediately when firearms are returned to lock fast or numbered security sealed transport boxes.
- 16.9 UNMARKED ARMED RESPONSE VEHICLE**
- 16.9.1 The PSoS have the ability to deploy unmarked ARVs in support of the existing marked deployment model.
- 16.9.2 SFC and TFC's retain the authority to deploy the unmarked ARV at any time, as one of the tactical options available to them.
- 16.9.3 Experience has demonstrated that unmarked vehicles have a distinct benefit in street interceptions and rapid deployments. It can provide ARV officers with an advantage, which can be the difference between a successful interception and an armed pursuit situation. This is particularly relevant to Extreme Threat response tactics.

16.9.4 Where unmarked ARVs are deployed operationally, the ITFC/TFC will ensure that all officers involved in the operation are informed of the vehicle's deployment. This will include a full description of the vehicle inclusive of make, model, colour and registration number.

16.9.5 Similarly, where officers crewing this vehicle are of the belief that their actions or deployment has contributed to the reporting of a firearms incident, the officers will **immediately** inform the ITFC/TFC of their suspicions and report their previous movements and current disposition.

16.10 ARMED RESPONSE VEHICLE OFC

16.10.1 When the decision is taken to authorise ARV crews, this will include the ARV OFC.

16.10.2 The OFC:

- Must have knowledge and clear understanding of their role and the overall aim of the operation;
- Must, where practicable, ensure that their staff are appropriately briefed;
- Should be located where they are able to maintain effective command of their area of responsibility;
- Ensures implementation of the TFCs tactical plan within their territorial or functional area of responsibility;
- Updates the TFC, as appropriate, on current developments;
- Makes decisions within their agreed level of responsibility, including seeking approval for any variation in agreed tactics within their area of responsibility;
- Must ensure clear channels of communication exist between themselves, the TFC and those under their command;
- Should consider declaring and managing the event as a critical incident;
- Should be available to those under their command, however, they should allow them sufficient independence to carry out their specific role in accordance with the strategy and tactical plan;
- Should ensure decisions taken are recorded, where possible, to provide a clear audit trail.

16.11.2

[REDACTED]

16.11.3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

16.11.7

[REDACTED]

17. ARV/TFU WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT PROCEDURES

17.1 COMMENCEMENT/CONCLUSION OF DUTY

- 17.1.1 On commencing duty officers shall attend, in uniform and with all personal protective equipment (PPE) including CS. Officers shall wear their ballistic body armour and be in possession of ballistic helmets. They will then take the warning and declaration regarding their confirmation of suitability to perform the AFO role. This will be given either in person to or over a recorded telephone line to the ITFC at the Area Control Room. ARV crews will attend at the nominated local weapon change over room/area. When in use this location will be restricted to all officers not engaged in the handover process taking place.
- 17.1.2 A ballistic ammunition trap suitable for the weapons and ammunition being loaded and unloaded shall be provided at this location. Ballistic body armour, eye and ear protection shall be provided for the use of all persons and the relevant loading and unloading aide memoirs shall be clearly displayed.

- 17.1.3 Where no shift is currently on duty from whom to receive weapons and ammunition, the oncoming shift shall draw these from the relevant armoury in accordance with the [Armouries SOP](#).
- 17.1.4 With the exception of having the corroboration of the off going shift, where no shift is currently on duty from which to receive weapons and ammunition, all other processes and procedures described herein shall be adhered to.
- 17.1.5 On arrival of the shift commencing duty, the crew(s) from the shift finishing duty will, under the direction of their Safety Officer (SO) (designated officer who will ensure all directions contained within the safety briefing and load/unload procedures are adhered to by the AFO(s) present), undertake the following in accordance with their training and utilising the aide memoirs which are provided to support the process;
- Remove the weapons from the vehicles to the weapon changeover room/area;
 - All officers will wear ballistic body armour, ear and eye protection provided when unloading weapons;
 - Unload their Glock handgun and replace the chambered round with a new round from the stock carried by each individual vehicle;
 - Unload their Taser CED;
 - Unload their issued Carbine;
 - Unload the AEP Launcher (Baton Gun);
 - In those locations where ARVs carry additional sets of weaponry, the officers shall also prove these clear using the same methodology as above.
- 17.1.6 All weapons will be laid down unloaded, having completed the procedures as per the respective aide memoirs for each, along with all ammunition, radios, vehicle keys and phones for inspection by the oncoming shift.
- 17.1.7 The officers commencing duty will, in the presence of the officers going off duty ensure that all the weapons, ammunition, vehicles and equipment are in order. Thereafter each oncoming officer in the presence of their nominated Safety Officer will do the following in accordance with their training and utilising the aide memoirs which are displayed at this location.
- Check all weapons and ammunition ensuring that all serial numbers are correct as detailed on the ARV Issue Sheet;
 - All officers will wear ballistic body armour, ear and eye protection provided when loading weapons;
 - Load and holster the Taser CED;
 - Load, make ready and holster the [REDACTED]
 - Load but do not make ready the AEP Launcher (Baton Gun) NB see paragraph 17.1.13;

- Load but do not make ready the Carbine. N.B. Where the construction of the vehicles gun box does not allow for storage of the weapon in this configuration the weapon shall be stored unloaded with the magazines held separately within the gun box;
 - In those locations where ARVs carry 2 additional sets of weaponry, the officers shall also prove these clear using the same methodology as above. These additional weapons will be carried in an unloaded and safe condition;
 - Once all of the above duties have been carried out, each officer will sign the ARV Issue Sheet confirming that all weapons and ammunition are in order. In addition officers will confirm that they have the vehicle keys, the mobile phone, airwave sets and also mark their own individual CS spray canister number by updating the Issue Sheet accordingly;
 - Where present, the ammunition safe within the vehicle should be checked that it is secured by a padlock and the seal number corresponds to the ARV issue sheets and that the seal is secure. Where these are stored within the gun safe these shall be removed with all other weapons and ammunition for checking;
 - All spare ammunition and distraction devices should be removed, physically checked and recorded weekly by the Sunday Early Shift.
- 17.1.8 Unless no such officer is on duty, the entire changeover procedure will be overseen by the Shift Supervisor or in their absence the nominated OFC for that day.
- 17.1.9 No officer shall engage in the loading or unloading of weapons during handovers without the use of a Safety Officer.
- 17.1.10 Where officers have received an authorisation during their tour of duty which has necessitated the loading/making ready of weapons not otherwise subject to the standing authorisation, these weapons shall be unloaded and returned to their previous state as soon as practicable after the authorisation has been rescinded. Officers should consider returning to their operational office to utilise the facilities at that location unless this would unnecessarily delay this process. In either case this process shall be conducted with the use of a Safety Officer using a suitable ballistic ammunition catcher, eye and ear protection.
- 17.1.11 Within those offices where more than one vehicle may be involved in a changeover of weapons and equipment, the handover process should be staggered to ensure an immediate response remains available.
- 17.1.12 In circumstances where the oncoming shift should be performing a handover with the previous shift but that shift is not present for operational reasons, consultation shall take place with the ITFC to determine the actions to be taken which may include;
- Deploying as additional ARVs in support of any on-going operation;
 - Deploying to relieve currently deployed ARVs – arming prior to attendance;

- Deploying to relieve currently deployed ARVs – performing handover at or near locus;
- Holding in anticipation of the operation being stood down to allow normal handover.

17.1.13 In any of the foregoing circumstances officers will still receive the warning and declaration from the ITFC prior to receiving firearms.

Officers should only use firearms which they have personally loaded and made ready. Officers should not therefore load or make ready weapons on behalf of another officer. N.B. In the case of the AEP Launcher, a nominated user should be identified for this weapon at the outset of the day. It is accepted that this may change depending on the dynamics of any individual incident.

17.1.14 Weapons and ammunition not required for delivery of the Standing Authority, should then be placed within the vehicles safe which should be locked and secured. Personal equipment should then also be placed in the vehicle.

17.1.15 The vehicles shall be checked by the oncoming and off going shifts together. Vehicles shall be fully checked with any damage being immediately notified to a supervisory officer or in their absence the nominated OFC for that day. In addition it shall also be immediately recorded in the vehicle drivers log and Damage to Vehicle register.

17.1.16 The equipment within each vehicle should be fully checked and the ARV Equipment List signed by the crew member concerned. Any faults or missing equipment should be detailed on the form and a supervisor informed immediately and action instigated to trace the item.

17.1.17 All oncoming ARV officers should attend the briefing room for a briefing by the shift supervisor or in their absence the nominated OFC for that day.

17.1.18 Whilst not all aspects of the above will be required to facilitate staff handovers at certain locations i.e. those without supervisors or OFCs, all arrangements regarding safe handling of weapons, individual officers being responsible for only their own weapons and checking of vehicles and equipment will apply. Within such locations, officers must contact their line managers or nominated OFC at the commencement of their duty in order that they receive any relevant briefing and report any issues arising.

17.1.19 **Re-Chambering of Ammunition in Self Loading Weapons:** All ammunition chambered in self-loading weapons will be removed from operational service. It is the responsibility of the officer issued with each weapon to confirm receipt of the required number of rounds as recorded in the Firearms Weapons Issue Sheet.

17.1.20 Once a self-loading weapon is unloaded the chambered round shall be retrieved, removed from operational service and replaced from an additional stock.

- 17.1.21 Chambered rounds will be examined for any signs of damage but where none is apparent these rounds will be re-cycled for future use within the firearms training environment.
- 17.1.22 All such rounds will be returned to the Service Armourer who will provide sufficient supplies of new ammunition to either departments e.g. Firearms Unit or specific deployments e.g. Operation Contour to maintain this policy.
- 17.1.23 The Service Armourer will further examine the returned ammunition prior to it being allocated to training use.

17.2 VEHICLE ARMOURY

- 17.2.1 Weapons remain the responsibility of the officer who has signed for them for the duration of their tour of duty.
- 17.2.2 All designated ARVs contain a suitable purpose built armoury with secure lock/s. When not in use the weapons and ammunition within an ARV will be kept within this armoury which shall be locked.
- 17.2.3 Wherever possible at least one ARV officer shall remain with the vehicle at all times. Where this cannot take place and alternative recognised arrangements are available at the specific location these will be utilised. Where no such facility exists officers shall conduct a risk assessment for leaving the vehicle including consideration of:
- Location;
 - Persons present;
 - Time of day;
 - Duration of absence;
 - Immediacy of requirement to leave the vehicle e.g. operational deployment.
- 17.2.4 Regardless of the circumstances for which the vehicle may be left officers **must** ensure it is locked and secure and the alarm set prior to leaving it.
- 17.2.5 Where ARV officers are authorised to deploy during their shift they will complete the ARV Firearms Issue Form for each weapon they deploy with. This may be done retrospectively if a delay caused by completing the form may have a significant impact on the police response. All completed [ARV Firearms Issue Forms](#) will be submitted to the Inspector Armed Policing and thereafter forwarded to the Chief Inspector, Armed Policing Operations.

17.3 ATTENDANCE AT ARMED POLICING TRAINING PREMISES OR EXTERNAL TRAINING VENUE

- 17.3.1 Officers attending Armed Policing training premises or at any other firearms training venue whether on Police or Private premises for any reason other than an authorised deployment shall remove their loaded handgun, CED and any ammunition and place these into the armoury within their vehicle. This procedure is to be carried out on arrival and **prior to** entering any relevant training area or premises.
- 17.3.2 Under **NO** circumstances will loaded or loaded and made ready weapons, be stored within or brought into any Armoury/Weapon maintenance area within any training premises or which holds weapons used for training. Weapons prohibited warning signs with the words “NO OPERATIONAL WEAPONS BEYOND THIS POINT” are appropriately located at entry points to these locations and must be complied with at all times. The only exception to the foregoing would be where this is done with the express permission and scrutiny of a firearms supervisor.
- 17.3.3 The foregoing guidance applies equally to those locations where armouries may be shared between operations and training. Following operational weapons issue, operational officers should not thereafter return to the training area or armoury other than at the conclusion of their tour of duty. Where this takes place the guidance contained in paragraph 17.3.1 will apply.
- 17.3.4 Within these locations it is essential that areas used for the loading and unloading of operational weapons must be entirely free of training personnel, weapons, ammunition and equipment prior to any handover processes commencing.
- 17.3.5 Additional information regarding these measures is contained within the [Armed Policing Training SOP](#) in relation to **On Duty Firearms Training Protocols – Weapons**.

17.4 COURT ATTENDANCE

- 17.4.1 If officers are cited to attend Court as a witness whilst on duty they should be relieved from operational AFO duties and any equipment or weaponry issued to them should be returned to the appropriate armoury or issued to a replacement AFO in line with the safety procedures outlined for the conclusion or commencement of a tour of duty.

Firearms will not be taken into Court Buildings by AFOs cited to attend as witnesses.

- [REDACTED]
- 18.1 [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

[illegible]



22. IDENTIFICATION OF PLAIN CLOTHES OFFICERS

- 22.1 Officers deployed in plain clothes at a firearm incident need to be clearly identifiable as police officers. For this purpose, the following identification system will be utilised:
- Plain-clothes officers who are **armed** will be issued with a dark blue or black baseball cap with police markings;
 - Plain-clothes officers who are **unarmed** will be issued with a high visibility (bright yellow) baseball cap with police markings.
- 22.2 If plain-clothes officers are deployed to provide observations or visual containment, this information, their deployment positions and any subsequent changes must be clearly and unambiguously relayed to firearms officers and the TFC. This is especially important on any occasions where the plain clothes officers do not have possession of the approved high visibility 'Police' baseball caps.
- 22.3 The requirement to show a warrant card must still be observed, although it is acknowledged that, for firearms officers in certain tactical situations production of a warrant card may only be possible after the situation has been controlled. Baseball caps should not be considered to be uniform for the purpose of police powers which may only be exercised by an officer in uniform e.g. stopping a vehicle or requiring a breath test.
- 22.4 Where the use of caps is anticipated at a pre-planned event, the briefing should remind officers about the directions for wearing and security of the caps and the need for full identification to members of the public and police colleagues where necessary.

[illegible]

[REDACTED]

24. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

26. CS INCAPACITANT SPRAY

26.1 AFOs will, when deployed carrying firearms, carry CS Irritant Spray, however, in firearms situations, AFOs must remember that the use of the CS requires careful consideration and due regard to the subject's likely reaction, cross contamination issues, as well as the possible outcome of any action taken with CS.

27. LESS LETHAL CAPABILITIES - L104A2 AEP LAUNCHER (BATON GUN), CED X26 TASER

27.1 Crew members from each of the ARVs will deploy on authorised firearms operations as follows:

One crew member from each ARV in possession of a:

- Carbine;
- SLP and;
- CED (X26 Taser).

Whilst the other crew member is in possession of a:

- Carbine;
- SLP;
- CED (X26 Taser) and;
- L104A1/A2 Variant AEP Launcher.

The officer designated as OFC will deploy in possession of a:

- Carbine;
- SLP and;
- CED (X26 Taser).

27.2 When considering the operational deployment of the Launcher and CED, officers attached to the TFU will deploy in accordance with the approved plan.

27.3 The tactical option of Launcher(s) and CED(s), as a less lethal options, will be governed by the overarching principles and guidance contained within the APP(AP)

27.4 Launcher(s)/CED(s) will not be authorised or deployed for use in public disorder situations, unless there are specific circumstances associated with the public disorder incident which meet the criteria for the deployment of AFOs.

27.5 Launcher(s)/CED(s) will not be regarded as direct replacements for conventional firearms. As with conventional firearms, the NDM should be considered and the 'Criteria for the Deployment of AFOs must be met before the appropriate authorising officer authorises the issue of Launcher/CED. As the Launcher(s)/CED(s) can only be issued in circumstances which merit the issue of conventional firearms, it will not be deployed in isolation. It must be clearly understood that conventional firearms must be deployed along with less lethal capability.

27.6 The level of authority required to issue Launcher /CEDs will be the same as that specified for conventional firearms.

28. CED POST INCIDENT MANAGEMENT

- 28.1 CEDs are hand held devices, which in their **primary mode** discharge two barbs at an individual. The barbs are intended to attach to the individual's skin or clothing on the torso and/or lower limbs. The barbs are attached to the device by thin insulated wires. A sequence of short duration high voltage pulses pass through the wires connecting the handset to the barbs. The current flows into the body and results in a loss of muscular control, this effect is called 'electro muscular disruption'.
- 28.2 The CED can also be used in a **secondary mode** by bringing the device into direct contact with the subject's body. Two closely spaced fixed electrodes pass the current into the subject's body. This manner of application is called 'Drive stun' and the principal effect in this mode is pain compliance.
- 28.3 In the event of a CED being discharged at an incident, all officers in attendance have a responsibility to take all necessary measures to ensure the safety of the public, the subject and themselves. In instances where supervisors are in attendance at incidents they have overall responsibility for ensuring that all procedures regarding the care of the subject, scene management and the seizure of productions are complied with.
- 28.4 Where a subject has sustained an injury or there is concern for the subject's wellbeing as a result of the use of the CED medical attention must be sought, full aftercare guidance is contained within Appendix 'N'.
- 28.5 Whilst conveying the subject to hospital the officer in attendance must ensure that visual and verbal contact is maintained with the subject at all times. This is to ensure that the welfare of the subject is always considered and to ensure they do not attempt to remove any barbs themselves.
- 28.6 If following the discharge of a CED, barbs are attached to the subject's clothing and there is no other injury or concern for their wellbeing, it will be the responsibility of the AFO's in attendance to ensure the safe retrieval of the CED barbs from the clothing. Care should be taken not to further damage the subjects clothing.
- 28.7 Close monitoring of a subject throughout the period following use of the CED is of the utmost importance and an assessment **must** be made by the custody officer as to the best methods of caring for any such person in accordance with the [Care and Welfare of Persons in Police Custody SOP](#).
- 28.8 It is the responsibility of the custody officer to determine the response to any specific risk assessment of a prisoner who has been subject of the effects of a CED discharge. This information should be recorded on the prisoner processing system by way of a custody officer's note. The care plan must record any relevant factors in relation to the care and welfare of the prisoner.

29. UNINTENTIONAL DISCHARGE OF FIREARMS

- 29.1 An unintentional discharge is when a firearm is discharged through an involuntary action (involuntary discharge), human error (negligent discharge), or weapon malfunction (accidental discharge).
- 29.2 If the unintentional discharge satisfies the criteria as described in Module 07-006 of [APP\(AP\)](#) as replicated in paragraph 29.3 below, full post incident procedures may be invoked.
- 29.3 Post incident investigations will be commenced in all situations where there has been a discharge of a weapon by the police (including those involving a conventional firearm or less lethal weapon), whether intentional or unintentional which has, or may have:
- Resulted in death or serious injury;
 - Revealed failings in command;
 - Caused danger to the public.

29.4 OPERATIONAL/ROUTINE ARMING/OTHER NON-TRAINING CIRCUMSTANCES

- 29.4.1 In the event of an unintentional discharge the weapon will be left in the state immediately following the discharge, no further loading or unloading is to take place. Thereafter addressing any injury that has resulted from the discharge, with an overriding priority on the provision of medical assistance to the injured party. After the supervisor's assessment the weapon should be made safe by an AFO in accordance with module G2 of the National Police Firearms Training Curriculum (NPFTC) and a record made of the condition of the weapon i.e. whether the working parts are forward/back, safety on/off, magazine in/out, how many rounds, etc. The spent case and round should be retrieved and preserved for any future investigation.
- 29.4.2 **Operational** - If the discharge has occurred in operational circumstances, the TFC will be notified at the earliest opportunity by the OFC or any other AFO. In the event of an unintentional discharge occurring when the operation has progressed to the point where a subject has been engaged or is about to be engaged by officers, then the TFC or OFC may consider continuing the operation until the threat is neutralised and the initial objective of the operation has been achieved.
- 29.4.3 **Routine Arming** - If the discharge has occurred during the course of routine arming of AFOs, the ITFC and the Chief Inspector, Armed Policing Operations should be notified immediately of the occurrence.
- 29.4.4 **Non Training** – In the event of an unintentional discharge by an officer or member of police staff not involved in operational firearms duties e.g. receipt of surrendered weapon at a police station or by a firearms enquiry officer, the incident must be immediately notified to the ITFC, who will treat the incident as an unintentional discharge.

29.5 **In all cases the immediate scene must be secured at the earliest opportunity.**

29.6 In all cases the circumstances should be reported either by the ITFC or Chief Inspector Armed Policing Operations, whichever is appropriate to the SFC who will consider the extent of any investigation. This would include the consideration of the appointment of an initial investigating officer (IIO) and or a post incident manager (PIM), both of whom would be given a clear remit.

29.7 RESPONSIBILITY OF REPORTING

29.7.1 In the event of an unintentional discharge there will be three levels of investigation.

29.7.2 In all cases a subject report will be submitted to the Superintendent, Armed Policing within seven days for onward transmission to the relevant parties.

29.7.3 A copy of the report must also be forwarded to the CFI who has the responsibility for notifying ACPO Armed Policing and the Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST) where appropriate.

29.7.4 Consideration should also be given to contacting the Service Health and Safety Department to allow Health & Safety Advisors to assess the circumstances.

29.7.5 In circumstances as outlined above assessment will be made as to whether there is a requirement for the AFO to be withdrawn from subsequent operational deployment pending the result of any further enquiry.

29.7.6 **Level 1 - Round fired unintentionally into the ammunition catcher/ballistic bag within an armoury – no injury or damage caused:** Under these circumstances the supervisor will consult with the Inspector, Armed Policing Operations. The Inspector will investigate and report from a firearms procedure viewpoint looking at whether the drills for loading and unloading were complied with and whether the officer was acting in accordance within the remit of their training. The Chief Inspector, Armed Policing Operations should be notified immediately of the occurrence.

29.7.7 **Level 2 - Round fired unintentionally in any other circumstances – no injury or damage caused:** Under these circumstances the supervisor must make contact with the Chief Inspector, Armed Policing Operations, or in his or her absence an Armed Policing Operations Inspector. The Armed Policing Operations supervisory officer, in consultation with the Superintendent Armed Policing will consider the appointment of an SIO from Crime Division. Due to the very nature of the incident the supervisor must consider sealing off the area and the Chief Inspector, Armed Policing Operations should be notified immediately of the occurrence.

29.7.8 The Chief Inspector Armed Policing Operations, senior investigating officer (SIO) or deputy will attend the scene of the incident and investigate whether there are any disciplinary elements or other matters that could be considered criminal.

- 29.7.9 The Chief Inspector Armed Policing Operations will submit a report of the incident to the Superintendent Armed Policing within 7 days. The Superintendent Armed Policing or SIO will submit a full report of the incident to ACC OS within 28 days.
- 29.7.10 **Level 3 - Round fired unintentionally in circumstances that warrant the appointment of a Senior Investigating Officer:** A Senior Investigating Officer from Crime Division will be appointed to investigate the circumstances surrounding the unintentional discharge of a police firearm which:
- Resulted in death or injury;
 - Revealed failings in command or;
 - Caused danger to the public.
- 29.7.11 Where the unintentional discharge resulted in death or serious injury, the circumstances will be subject to mandatory referral to the Procurator Fiscal (PF) and the Police Investigations and Review Commissioner (PIRC).
- 29.7.12 Where life is not endangered, the SIO will investigate and report from a firearms procedure viewpoint looking at whether drills for loading and unloading were complied with and whether the officer was acting in accordance within the remit of their training.
- 29.7.13 The SIO will submit a full report of the incident to the ACC OS within 28 days.

30. OPERATIONAL DISCHARGE OF WEAPONS

- 30.1 In the event that an AFO is required to discharge their firearm while engaged on operational duties that AFO will be withdrawn from subsequent operational deployment pending the result of any associated investigation as detailed in section 29 above.
- 30.2 In the event that an AFO is required to discharge their Launcher or CED while engaged on operational duties, the circumstances of use will be ascertained and thereafter relayed to the SFC. The SFC will determine whether there is a requirement for the AFO to be withdrawn from subsequent operational deployment pending the result of any further enquiry.
- 30.3 Unless, in particular circumstances, it is deemed inappropriate, the officer may continue to take part in any non-operational firearms or firearms training duties.

30.4 INTERIM SUSPENSION OF AFO STATUS

- 30.4.1 Where an existing AFO, or an officer approved for training as an AFO, is subject to any of the following changes of personal circumstances, deemed capable of prejudicing performance as an AFO, authorisation will be suspended immediately:

- Changes in domestic circumstances, e.g., death or serious illness of a close family member, separation or divorce/dissolution;
- Formal disciplinary proceedings or complaints against the police deemed capable of prejudicing an officer's performance as an AFO;
- The occurrence of illness or other medical condition, including courses of medication, deemed by the Chief Medical Officer to be incompatible with AFO status. Guidance on specific cases may be obtained, via the Human Resources Department;
- Any deterioration in operational performance considered incompatible with AFO status;
- Any other change of personal circumstances, which, after consideration of all relevant factors, is deemed to place the officer concerned under an undue level of additional stress;
- Any perceived change in nature or personal character, which may give rise to, grounds for withdrawal of Divisional/Departmental support.

30.4.2 All officers granted authorisation as AFOs, or approval for firearms training, shall, as a condition of authorisation/approval, be obliged to report any change of personal circumstances, which may be deemed to place him/her under any undue level of additional stress or be otherwise detrimental to his/her ability to perform firearms training or operational duties. This is to be reported to their immediate supervisor or divisional/departmental personnel officer.

30.4.3 The interim suspension of AFO status in respect of items bulleted in paragraph 30.4.1 above will not in itself be taken into account in assessment of any individual's job performance or future career development.

30.5 REINSTATEMENT OF AFO STATUS

30.5.1 Following assessment over a suitable timescale, of all related factors surrounding the reason for suspension of AFO status, consideration will be given to reinstatement of AFO status if appropriate.

31. RECORDING AND DISSEMINATION OF SAFETY CRITICAL INFORMATION

31.1 **Reporting of Near Misses:** A near miss is defined as an incident where no injury or damage was sustained but where there was potential for serious injury or damage.

31.2 Details of any such near misses occurring within the training, operational or general firearms policing environment should be recorded on System for Co-ordination of Personnel and Establishment (SCOPE).

- 31.3 **Reporting of Firearms/Ammunition Failures:** All failures or suspected failures of weapons or ammunition will be reported to the Chief Instructor, Firearms Training who after consultation with the Service Armourer will report the matter to the CAST.
- 31.4 **Reporting of Shots Fired by Police:** All shots fired by police from a conventional firearm, including the discharge of a Taser or Baton Gun, and unintentional discharges, will be reported to the ACPO Armed Policing Secretariat without delay. It will be the responsibility of the Chief Firearms Instructor to inform the ACPO Secretariat who will also collate data on the Service use of firearms for the destruction of animals.

32. FIREARMS ASSISTANCE TO OTHER POLICE FORCES AND AGENCIES IN SPONTANEOUS AND PRE-PLANNED INCIDENTS

32.1 SPONTANEOUS CROSS BORDER INCIDENTS

- 32.1.1 A spontaneous incident is an event for which the police have not had sufficient prior warning or notification to develop strategies, tactics and contingency plans before an anticipated event or incident. Such incidents will, by necessity, require an initial response and the development of immediate plans. Information may be limited, therefore, the initial plan should, where possible, be one of increasing the level of intelligence available while containing the threat.
- 32.1.2 Where an operation for which firearms have been issued requires AFOs to follow a subject into another police area the initial authorisation will remain valid. However, an SFC in the “receiving” police area must be informed at the earliest opportunity.
- 32.1.3 This will allow the SFC to consider:
- Authorising AFOs from the originating police service area, together with their command to continue running the operation;
 - Assuming responsibility for the operation, including command and the provision of AFOs;
 - Reviewing the firearms authority, assuming the responsibility of SFC (or appointing a new SFC from within their police area) and dealing with the incident using the armed officers from the originating police service;
 - Assuming responsibility and curtailing the operation.
- 32.1.4 These considerations should be reviewed as appropriate, and particularly when the location of the on-going operation becomes more precise and/or containment of the threat has been established.
- 32.1.5 Transfer of command of the incident will normally occur at the earliest opportunity from the accredited SFC in the ‘originating’ police area to an accredited SFC in the ‘receiving’ police area.

32.1.6 This transfer of command will not, however, occur until the 'receiving' police service accredited SFC:

- Is suitably located with the ability to effectively communicate;
- Has information/knowledge of the circumstances, access to all available intelligence/information and tactical advice if this is required;
- Has had the opportunity to objectively consider how best the 'receiving' police service can effectively resource the incident.

32.1.7 Until the foregoing criteria are satisfied, strategic command of the operation, associated resourcing implications and vicarious liability for the actions or omissions of the officers involved remain with the 'originating' police service.

32.1.8 The 'originating' police service policy and standard operating procedures will be applied until transfer of command.

32.1.9 Transfer of command from SFC in an 'originating' service area to an SFC in the 'receiving' service area should be formally documented and include the time and date of transfer. Whenever transfer of command has been completed the guidance within the Armed Policing Policy and the [APP\(AP\)](#) will be applied.

32.2 INITIAL NOTIFICATION OF SPONTANEOUS CROSS BORDER OPERATIONS

32.2.1 Where the ITFC in charge of the Area Control Room determines that a mobile incident is one which may subsequently cross force boundaries, information of that incident must be passed to the officer in charge of the control room of those Police services likely to be affected at the earliest opportunity.

32.2.2 Following initial telephone contact all relevant information together with a copy of the command and control incident should be transferred to the relevant control room.

32.2.3 Regular intelligence updates should be provided throughout the operation until it becomes clear that the operation is no longer likely to transcend Police service boundaries or the incident is resolved.

32.3 ACTION ON RECEIPT OF NOTIFICATION OF SPONTANEOUS CROSS BORDER OPERATIONS

32.3.1 Where the officer in charge of the Area Control Room receives information that a mobile incident is one which may subsequently cross Police Service boundaries, that officer should:

- Confirm the information/intelligence;
- Consider the "criteria for the deployment of AFOs" and the urgency with which armed resources need to be deployed;
- Identify available resources;
- Inform the SFC;

- Inform the TFC;
- Inform an available TFA;
- Inform the Area Commander.

32.3.2 The TFC in liaison with the SFC of the originating Police Service should consider the options as above.

32.4 PRE-PLANNED CROSS BORDER OPERATIONS

32.4.1 Where requests are received for the assistance of PSoS AFOs to operations initiated by any other organisations e.g. another police service, Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) or Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC), the person making the request should be directed to an appropriate TFC in accordance with the following procedure:

- If the intention is that the operation is to take place within the boundaries of the PSoS Area, the duty SFC should be informed and will nominate a TFC to consult with representatives of the organisation making the request and with PSoS TFA before determining tactical options and requesting Strategic authorisation;
- Where the operation is likely to cross Police boundaries, the initial application must be referred to the relevant SFC with responsibility for the Police Area where the operation is to start. Where a live mobile operation enters another Police Area the relevant SFC for the area entered must be informed.

32.4.2 In all cases, the authorising officer will appoint a suitable TFC who will:

- Liaise on behalf of the PSoS with the relevant investigative unit and;
- Command and co-ordinate the deployment of the AFOs who have been authorised in accordance with the above instructions.

32.5 SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS

32.5.1 Where it is known that an armed surveillance operation will transcend one or more police service boundaries, each of the Police Services should be notified in advance and prior authority sought for the carriage of firearms.

32.5.2 This notification should include:

- Time, date and place of commencement of operations;
- Police vehicles, make, registration numbers and number of occupants;
- Direction of travel;
- Authorising officer;
- TFC and contact details;
- OFC;
- TFA.

- 32.5.3 If for security reasons this cannot be complied with the SFC from the originating Police service or Organisation (SOCA) will contact an SFC in each Police service area concerned and personally inform them of the operation.
- 32.5.4 If at the outset of an operation it is the intention to arrest or disrupt subjects at a known location then responsibility for that action rests with the host Police service where the arrest or disruption is to take place, if practical to do so.
- 32.5.5 Sections 136 – 141 [Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994](#) make arrangements for police officers within the United Kingdom to exercise their powers to and offer their assistance outside their home jurisdiction. Reference should also be made to the cross border powers protocol, which provides guidance for pre-planned operations and pursuit situations.

33. MUTUAL AID

- 33.1 A pre-planned operation is one for which the police have had the opportunity to develop strategies, tactics and contingency plans before an anticipated event or incident. The aim is to form a plan, which will contain all the information necessary to conduct the operation.
- 33.2 Where possible, Police services requested to provide mutual aid should be provided with a written briefing package containing the preferred option, contingency plans and relevant information necessary for the safe execution of the operation. Unless exceptional circumstances prevail, aiding detachments will not be deployed other than as a complete unit. Such exceptional circumstances will only be identified by the host service incident commander following discussion with the aiding detachment firearms tactical advisor.
- 33.3 All members of the assisting Police Service should be briefed in accordance with the [APP\(AP\)](#) and the policy on Armed Policing. This briefing should, where possible, be recorded.
- 33.4 Where deemed appropriate, all assisting Police services should be accompanied by their own TFA. Early and comprehensive consultation between TFAs and incident commanders is essential.
- 33.5 In cases of Mutual Aid, authority for the issue of Firearms will be given by the host police service in accordance with the requirements of the [APP\(AP\)](#).
- 33.6 In cases where armed assistance is requested by one service to meet a spontaneous incident, such request should be addressed to the officer in charge of the control room of the service supplying assistance. Authority to issue firearms will be granted or refused by the host service in accordance with their procedures and the [APP\(AP\)](#).
- 33.7 The Executive of the Police service supplying such assistance **must** be informed of such a request.
- 33.8 Requests for mutual aid should include the following:

- The number of officers required;
- The role those officers would be required to perform and therefore their firearms qualifications e.g. ARV, TFU/SFO, Rifle, Close Protection Officer;
- Dress requirements, e.g. plain clothes, coveralls, camouflage etc. which should all meet requirements and recommendations made in the [APP\(AP\)](#);
- All pertinent forms of identification should be available, especially if officers are to be deployed in plain clothes;
- Specialist equipment that may be required, including weaponry and method of entry equipment;
- Other specialist assistance e.g. Firearms Support Dog, Air Support etc;
- Where practicable, an indication of the potential duration of the commitment, together with an acknowledgement of arrangements regarding cost recovery should be included.

33.9 SPONTANEOUS

- 33.9.1 Where an incident occurs on British Transport Police property, Ministry of Defence property, or Civil Nuclear Constabulary property, and support in the form of a Police firearms response is required, the appropriate control room will pass the request to the ITFC who will assign ARVs or TFU as per procedures.
- 33.9.2 The ITFC will make contact with the senior PSoS officer at the scene and establish effective liaison at an early stage.
- 33.9.3 It is extremely important that officers from each Force are aware of the presence of AFOs from PSoS, with particular emphasis on the presence of any plainclothes AFOs.
- 33.9.4 The ITFC will act as liaison officer and command and co-ordinate the deployment of the PSoS AFOs, taking the necessary advice from a PSoS TFA.



- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

34.5 PLANNING AND COMMUNICATIONS

- 34.5.1 The confidential nature of many of these vehicle escorts is an essential factor to their successful conclusion but it is most important that police officers involved in decisions regarding such operations should be able to discuss and identify the problems affecting a specific movement. Each Police Service Area through which the convoy intends to move should be notified at an early stage.
- 34.5.2 Consideration should be given to the appointment of liaison officers from those Police services involved who may communicate by telephone as to the tactics to be employed, taking into account local considerations.

34.6 PERSONS AT RISK, VALUABLE, SENSITIVE, VULNERABLE LOADS

- 34.6.1 Whenever escorts of this nature are being carried out, the positions of escorting vehicles, speed and convoy behaviour will be at the discretion of the OFC, depending upon the route to be followed, traffic density and other relevant considerations.

[illegible]

34.8 HIGH RISK PRISONERS

- 34.8.1 Uniformed officers normally provide protection for prisoners during movements between court, prison or police premises.
- 34.8.2 Where the possibility exists of threat to life, or the violent rescue of a prisoner, additional security measures en-route and at either terminus may be necessary.
- 34.8.3 The degree of threat, both from and to a prisoner is expressed in the form of category coding (e.g. Category A/ Category B), initiated after an assessment.
- 34.8.4 Within the escort, officers with the sole responsibility for the custody of prisoners subject to high-risk categories cannot be responsible for their protection from attack or rescue.

35. SECURITY OF FIREARMS AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT

- 35.1 Once firearms, ammunition and specialist munitions have been issued to an AFO they are individually responsible for the security and safe handling of those items.
- 35.2 The safe storage and condition of firearms, ammunition and specialist munitions within armouries, storage sites or vehicles and the security of armouries, storage sites and vehicles contained within the [Armouries SOP](#) is the responsibility of all users.

RESTRICTED

- 35.3 The procedures and supervision for the safe storage and condition of non-police firearms, ammunition and specialist munitions within any category of armoury will be the responsibility of the relevant Area Commander.
- 35.4 The procedures and supervision for the safe storage and condition of firearms, ammunition and specialist munitions within the Specialist Operations Firearms armouries and vehicles will be the responsibility of the Chief Inspector, Armed Policing Operations, including where the firearms unit is based within an office that also has an Area Commander.

36. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Category	Should Take Action (%)	Should Not Take Action (%)
All respondents	85	15
Age		
18-29	88	12
30-49	85	15
50-69	82	18
70+	78	22
Gender		
Male	83	17
Female	87	13
Education		
High school or less	80	20
Some college	85	15
Bachelor's or higher	88	12

APPENDIX 'I'

LIST OF ASSOCIATED LEGISLATION

- United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials;
- European Convention on Human Rights;
- [Equality Act 2010](#)
- [Health and Safety at Work Act 1974](#);
- [Police Health & Safety Act 1997](#)
- [The Management of Health Safety Regulation 1999](#).

APPENDIX 'J'

LIST OF ASSOCIATED REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

- [Police Service of Scotland Armed Policing Policy](#);
- [The ACPO, COP Authorised Professional Practice \(Armed Policing\)](#);
- [The PSoS Statement of Intent on the Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons in Scotland](#);
- [The ACPO Manual of Guidance on Keeping the Peace](#);
- The ACPO Terrorist and Allied Matters Manual;
- The National Police Firearms Training Curriculum;
- Firearms Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment;
- [Protocol Agreement Between SOCA and the Scottish Police on the SOCA Use of Firearms within Scotland](#);
- [Civil Nuclear Constabulary \(CNC\) memorandum of understanding \(MOU\)](#);
- Ministry of Defence Police (MoD) SOP;
- Royal Air Force Search and Rescue (SAR) SOP;
- [National Health Service \(NHS\) Protocols](#).
- [Civil Aviation Publications 612 and 613](#) - Police Air Operations Manual Parts 1 and 2
- [College of Policing \(COP\) 'Stay Safe at Firearms Incidents'](#)

APPENDIX 'K'

LIST OF ASSOCIATED GENERIC PSOS FORMS



- [ARV Spontaneous Debrief Form;](#)
- [ARV/TFU Firearms Issue Form;](#)
- [Warning Declaration Form;](#)
- [Damage to Police Vehicle Form.](#)

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

ACC OS	Assistant Chief Constable Operational Support
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers.
ACPOS	Association of Chief Police Officers Scotland
ACR	Area Control Room – Service communications and command centres
AEP	Attenuating Energy Projectile – a type of round fired from a Launcher (previously known as the baton gun), which includes a collapsible portion that will dissipate energy if it strikes a solid object such as the head.
AFO	Authorised Firearms Officer – an officer trained in the use of police firearms and tactics.
APMG	Armed Policing Monitoring Group
APP(AP)	Authorised Professional Practice (Armed Policing) – an ACPO/ COP publication giving generic guidance to those involved in planning and conducting firearms operations.
ARV	Armed Response Vehicle – a vehicle crewed by AFOs who have immediate access to firearms. ARV officers are trained in additional firearms tactics.
CAST	Centre for Applied Science and Technology
CBRN	Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear – Trained officers who can respond to potential incidents involving CBRN elements
CCTV	Closed circuit Television
CED	Conducted Energy Device – Taser
CFI	Chief Firearms Instructor – is responsible for firearms training in the Force or in his/her absence the Deputy Chief Firearms Officer
CHS	Criminal History Record
CNC	Civil Nuclear Constabulary
COP	College of Policing (formerly NPIA)
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
CT	Counter Terrorism
CTIS	Counter Terrorism Intelligence Section
CTIU (S)	Counter Terrorism Intelligence Unit (Scotland).
ECHR	European Convention on Human Rights.
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
GP	General Purpose
H&S	Health and Safety
HRMC	Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs

IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IIMARCH	Information, Intention, Method, Risk Assessment, Communication and Human Rights
IIO	Initial Investigating Officer – Police investigator who will be responsible for initial evidence gathering and scene preservation
ITFC	Initial Tactical Firearms Commander – An officer trained and accredited to command spontaneous firearms operations.
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NDM	National Decision Model – Decision model utilised by PSoS to inform decision making
NHS	National Health Service
NPFTC	National Police Firearms Training Curriculum.
OFC	Operational Firearms Commander – An officer trained and accredited to command firearms operations at an operational level.
OH	Occupational Health – Service Occupational Health Provider
PF	Procurator Fiscal
PIM	Post Incident Manager – An officer trained and accredited to facilitate command firearms operations post incident procedures.
PIO	Police Incident Officer – Unarmed police commander at an incident
PIRC	Police Investigations and Review Commissioner
PNC	Police National Computer
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
PSoS	Police Service of Scotland
RVP	Rendezvous Point – Pre-arranged location where resources gather prior to deploying to an incident.
SAR	Search and Rescue
ScOMIS	Scottish Operational Management Information System
SCOPE	System for Co-ordination of Personnel and Establishment
SFC	Strategic Firearms Commander – An officer trained and accredited to command firearms operations at a strategic level.
SID	Scottish Intelligence Database
SIO	Senior Investigating Officer
SLP	Self-Loading Pistol – a semi-automatic handgun.
SO	Safety Officer – Designated officer who will ensure all directions contained within the safety briefing and load/unload procedures are adhered to by the AFO(s) present

RESTRICTED

SOCA	Serious and Organised Crime Agency
SPELS	Scottish Police Emergency Life Support
STRA	Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment.
TFA	Tactical Firearms Advisor – An officer trained to provide advice to commanders on firearms tactics.
TFC	Tactical Firearms Commander – An officer trained and accredited to command firearms operations at a tactical level.
	
VIP	Very Important Person
VPD	Vulnerable Persons Database

APPENDIX 'N'

CED X26 TASER – AFTERCARE

APP (AP) 10-014

- Removal of Barbs;
- Immediate Referral to Hospital;
- Medical Assessment;

Removal of Barbs

Barbs which have penetrated the skin should normally be removed by a medical professional either at the scene, at a hospital or in the custody suite. This is principally because of the requirement for infection control, the potential for additional trauma to the skin and superficial tissues of the subject, and the risk of self- injury. In the best interest and wellbeing of the subject or in the event of an operational necessity, police officers trained in barb removal, minimum standards of forensic recovery and the associated risks may carry out this procedure. Needles/barbs in particularly vulnerable areas, such as the eyes, should always be removed by medical professionals only.

Immediate Referral to Hospital

If an officer believes that a person to whom the Taser has been applied has a cardiac pacemaker, Vagal Nerve Stimulator or other implanted device, immediate referral should be made to hospital. Similarly, if the subject is found to have any other pre-existing medical condition that might lead to increased medical risk, immediate referral to hospital should be considered.

Medical Assessment

All arrested persons who have been subjected to the discharge of a Taser must be examined by a Forensic Medical Examiner as soon as practicable after arrival at the custody suite.

Full details of care plans and visit regimes can be obtained from the [Care and Welfare of Persons in Custody SOP](#)

- **Other Medical Conditions** (APP Detention and Custody Module);
- **Use of Taser CED in Custody** (APP Detention and Custody Module);
- **Use of Taser in Hospital Settings** (APP Detention and Custody Module);
- **Information Provided by Detainees** (APP Detention and Custody Module);
- **Monitoring after Taser Discharge** (APP Detention and Custody Module).

the 1990s, the number of people in the UK who are employed in the public sector has increased by 1.5 million (from 2.5 million in 1980 to 4 million in 1999). The public sector has become a major employer in the UK, and this has implications for the way in which the public sector is managed and the way in which it is funded.

The public sector is a complex and diverse entity, and it is difficult to define it precisely. However, it can be described as the part of the economy that is owned and controlled by the state. It includes a wide range of activities, from the provision of health care and education to the provision of social housing and public transport. The public sector is a major employer in the UK, and it is also a major source of revenue for the state.

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There is a growing emphasis on the need to improve the efficiency of the public sector, and to ensure that the public sector is able to deliver the services that are required by the public. This has led to a number of initiatives, including the introduction of competition, the restructuring of public services, and the introduction of new management practices.

One of the main reasons for the need to improve the efficiency of the public sector is the increasing pressure on public resources. The public sector is now responsible for a much larger proportion of the UK's gross domestic product (GDP) than it was in the 1980s, and this has led to a number of initiatives, including the introduction of competition, the restructuring of public services, and the introduction of new management practices.

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the 1990s, the incidence of *S. flexneri* has increased in the United Kingdom [10]. In the United States, *S. flexneri* has been reported as the most common serotype in children with acute bacterial dysentery [11]. In the United Kingdom, *S. flexneri* has been reported as the most common serotype in children with acute bacterial dysentery [12].

There is a paucity of data on the epidemiology of *S. flexneri* in the United Kingdom. The only published study of *S. flexneri* in the United Kingdom was a case-control study of 10 cases of *S. flexneri* infection in children, which found that the risk of infection was significantly increased in children who had been in contact with a case of *S. flexneri* infection [13]. The study also found that the risk of infection was significantly increased in children who had been in contact with a case of *S. flexneri* infection who had been in contact with a case of *S. flexneri* infection.

The aim of this study was to determine the epidemiology of *S. flexneri* in the United Kingdom. The study was designed to determine the prevalence of *S. flexneri* in children with acute bacterial dysentery, the serotypes of *S. flexneri* isolated from children with acute bacterial dysentery, and the risk factors for *S. flexneri* infection in children with acute bacterial dysentery.

The study was conducted in the United Kingdom. The study was designed to determine the prevalence of *S. flexneri* in children with acute bacterial dysentery, the serotypes of *S. flexneri* isolated from children with acute bacterial dysentery, and the risk factors for *S. flexneri* infection in children with acute bacterial dysentery.

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the 1990s, the number of people in the UK who are employed in the public sector has increased by 1.5 million, from 2.5 million in 1980 to 4 million in 1998. The public sector has also become an important employer of women, with 4.5 million women employed in the public sector in 1998, compared with 3.5 million in 1980.

There is a growing emphasis on the importance of the public sector in providing services to the community, and in particular in providing services to the elderly. The public sector is also becoming an important employer of people with disabilities, and in particular of people with mental health problems. The public sector is also becoming an important employer of people who are at risk of homelessness, and in particular of people who are at risk of becoming homeless because of mental health problems.

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There are a number of reasons why the public sector has become an important employer of women. One reason is that the public sector has a high proportion of women in its workforce. In 1995, 88% of the public sector workforce were women, compared with 78% in 1980.

Another reason is that the public sector has a high proportion of women in its senior management. In 1995, 33% of the public sector senior management were women, compared with 23% in 1980. This is a significant increase, and it suggests that the public sector is becoming more gender equal in its senior management.

There are a number of reasons why the public sector has a high proportion of women in its senior management. One reason is that the public sector has a high proportion of women in its senior management. In 1995, 33% of the public sector senior management were women, compared with 23% in 1980.

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The public sector has also become an important employer of people who are over 50 years of age. In 1995, 1.5 million people over 50 years of age were employed in the public sector, compared with 1.2 million in 1980. The public sector has also become an important employer of people who are under 25 years of age. In 1995, 1.5 million people under 25 years of age were employed in the public sector, compared with 1.2 million in 1980.

The public sector has also become an important employer of people who are from ethnic minorities. In 1995, 1.5 million people from ethnic minorities were employed in the public sector, compared with 1.2 million in 1980. The public sector has also become an important employer of people who are from the Caribbean. In 1995, 1.5 million people from the Caribbean were employed in the public sector, compared with 1.2 million in 1980.

The public sector has also become an important employer of people who are from the Indian subcontinent. In 1995, 1.5 million people from the Indian subcontinent were employed in the public sector, compared with 1.2 million in 1980. The public sector has also become an important employer of people who are from Pakistan. In 1995, 1.5 million people from Pakistan were employed in the public sector, compared with 1.2 million in 1980.

The public sector has also become an important employer of people who are from Bangladesh. In 1995, 1.5 million people from Bangladesh were employed in the public sector, compared with 1.2 million in 1980. The public sector has also become an important employer of people who are from Africa. In 1995, 1.5 million people from Africa were employed in the public sector, compared with 1.2 million in 1980.

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There is a growing emphasis on the need to improve the efficiency of the public sector, and to ensure that the public sector is able to deliver the best possible value for money. This has led to a number of initiatives, including the introduction of competition, the restructuring of public sector organisations, and the introduction of new management practices. The aim of these initiatives is to improve the efficiency of the public sector, and to ensure that the public sector is able to deliver the best possible value for money.

One of the key challenges facing the public sector is the need to improve the efficiency of the public sector. This is a complex task, and it requires a number of different approaches. One approach is to introduce competition, which can help to drive down costs and improve efficiency. Another approach is to restructure public sector organisations, which can help to reduce duplication and improve efficiency.

Another approach is to introduce new management practices, which can help to improve the efficiency of the public sector. This can include the introduction of new management systems, such as the Balanced Scorecard, which can help to improve the efficiency of the public sector. It can also include the introduction of new management practices, such as the use of performance indicators, which can help to improve the efficiency of the public sector.

There are a number of other initiatives that are being implemented in the public sector, and these are all aimed at improving the efficiency of the public sector. These initiatives include the introduction of new management practices, the restructuring of public sector organisations, and the introduction of competition. All of these initiatives are aimed at improving the efficiency of the public sector, and ensuring that the public sector is able to deliver the best possible value for money.

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APPENDIX 'P'

POLICE SCOTLAND – WARNING & DECLARATION

Following identification of all officers present the following Warning & Fitness for Duty Declaration must be read verbatim to all AFOs being deployed.

FITNESS FOR DUTY DECLARATION

AFO'S HAVE A PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO INFORM THE ISSUING OFFICER OR A SUPERVISOR OF ANY CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THEY BELIEVE THAT THEY MAY BE UNFIT TO CARRY OUT THEIR DUTIES AS AN AFO.

ACCORDINGLY, IF THERE IS ANY PERSON PRESENT WHO HAS OR MAY HAVE ANY MEDICAL, EMOTIONAL OR OTHER LIFE STRESSES, WHICH MAY INTERFERE WITH THE DISCHARGE OF CRITICAL DECISION MAKING OR THEIR OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS, THEY MUST MAKE THIS KNOWN IMMEDIATELY.

ARE THERE ANY REASONS OR FACTORS WHICH WOULD PREVENT YOU FROM BEING ISSUED WITH FIREARMS TODAY?
(Confirm response from each officer - Yes/No)

WARNING

A POLICE OFFICER IS NOT ENTITLED TO DISCHARGE A FIREARM AGAINST A PERSON UNLESS THE OFFICER HAS REASONABLE GROUNDS FOR BELIEVING THAT THE PERSON IS COMMITTING, OR ABOUT TO COMMIT, AN ACTION LIKELY TO ENDANGER THE LIFE OR CAUSE SERIOUS INJURY TO THE OFFICER OR ANY OTHER PERSON, AND THERE IS NO OTHER WAY TO PREVENT THE DANGER.

STAFF ARE REMINDED OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AND POWERS TO USE FORCE UNDER THE FOLLOWING LAW AND REGULATIONS:

- THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998
- SCOTTISH COMMON LAW
- **POLICE SERVICE OF SCOTLAND (CONDUCT) REGULATIONS 2014**

DO YOU UNDERSTAND
(Confirm response from each officer - Yes/No)

APPENDIX 'Q'

WEAPON SYSTEMS FUNCTION CHECKS, LOAD/UNLOAD DRILLS

**POLICE SERVICE OF SCOTLAND
ARMED POLICING**

WEAPON SAFE HANDLING PROCEDURES

1. [REDACTED] SLP
2. [REDACTED] CARBINE
3. L104 A2 LAUNCHER
4. CED TASER X26
5. [REDACTED] CARBINE
6. [REDACTED] CARBINE
7. [REDACTED]
8. [REDACTED]
9. [REDACTED]
10. [REDACTED]
11. [REDACTED]
12. [REDACTED]

